A New Secularism Is Appearing in Islam
Across much of the Islamic world, many Muslims are disillusioned with the ugly things done in the name of their religion.
For decades, social scientists studying Islam discussed whether this second biggest religion of the world would go through the major transformation that the biggest one, Christianity, went through: secularization. Would Islam also lose its hegemony over public life, to become a mere one among various voices, not the dominant one, in Muslim societies?
Many Westerners gave a negative answer, thinking Islam is just too rigid and absolutist to secularize. Many Muslims also gave a negative answer, but proudly so: Our true faith would not go down the erroneous path of the godless West.
The rise of Islamism, a highly politicized interpretation of Islam, since the 1970s only seemed to confirm the same view: that “Islam is resistant to secularization,” as Shadi Hamid, a prominent thinker on religion and politics, observed in his 2016 book, Islamic Exceptionalism.
Yet nothing in human history is set in stone. And there are now signs of a new secular wave breeding in the Muslim world.
Some of those signs are captured by Arab Barometer, a research network based at Princeton and the University of Michigan whose opinion surveys map a drift away from Islamism — and even Islam itself. The network’s pollsters recently found that in the last five years, in six pivotal Arab countries, “trust in Islamist parties” and “trust in religious leaders” have declined, as well as attendance in mosques.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/23/opin ... 0920191224
The Relationship Between Religion and Politics in Islam
What Does the Iranian Election Tell Us?
The low turnout and the conservative victory in the parliamentary elections in Iran indicate intense electoral disenchantment and set the stage for the ascendance of a hard-liner as president.
On Friday Iran held its 11th parliamentary elections since the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, and the first since the Trump administration renewed sanctions on Iran and battered its economy.
The voting turnout — 42.5 percent — was the lowest since 1979, and a loose alliance of conservative candidates won. In Tehran, the capital, where about 75 percent of the voters chose not to vote, all 30 seats were won by the conservative candidates loyal to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
The Iranian electorate faces a perpetual dilemma on whether to participate or boycott the elections as the choice of candidates is limited and the Guardian Council — a constitutional committee made up of six clerics and six jurists that vets the electoral candidates — bars those seen as critical of the regime or deviating from its positions.
More than 7,000 candidates, most of them reformists and moderates, including 90 members of the current Iranian Parliament, were disqualified from Friday’s elections by the Guardian Council for having insufficient ideological loyalty, a move that reduced voter participation.
The turnout was higher than Tehran in smaller cities, where citizens have more incentive to vote if the candidates promise better schools and hospitals, improved roads, faster internet, more ethnic inclusion and even individual patronage. As the American sanctions have debilitated the Iranian economy, greater participation in parliamentary elections offers the provinces an opportunity to bargain for a better share of the shrinking pie from Tehran.
In Tehran and other major cities, the parliamentary elections signal not only the citizens’ preferences for particular factions within the regime but also its legitimacy as a whole. Participation rates in the major cities fluctuate more often and reflect the political diversity of the candidates.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opin ... 0920200225
The low turnout and the conservative victory in the parliamentary elections in Iran indicate intense electoral disenchantment and set the stage for the ascendance of a hard-liner as president.
On Friday Iran held its 11th parliamentary elections since the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, and the first since the Trump administration renewed sanctions on Iran and battered its economy.
The voting turnout — 42.5 percent — was the lowest since 1979, and a loose alliance of conservative candidates won. In Tehran, the capital, where about 75 percent of the voters chose not to vote, all 30 seats were won by the conservative candidates loyal to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
The Iranian electorate faces a perpetual dilemma on whether to participate or boycott the elections as the choice of candidates is limited and the Guardian Council — a constitutional committee made up of six clerics and six jurists that vets the electoral candidates — bars those seen as critical of the regime or deviating from its positions.
More than 7,000 candidates, most of them reformists and moderates, including 90 members of the current Iranian Parliament, were disqualified from Friday’s elections by the Guardian Council for having insufficient ideological loyalty, a move that reduced voter participation.
The turnout was higher than Tehran in smaller cities, where citizens have more incentive to vote if the candidates promise better schools and hospitals, improved roads, faster internet, more ethnic inclusion and even individual patronage. As the American sanctions have debilitated the Iranian economy, greater participation in parliamentary elections offers the provinces an opportunity to bargain for a better share of the shrinking pie from Tehran.
In Tehran and other major cities, the parliamentary elections signal not only the citizens’ preferences for particular factions within the regime but also its legitimacy as a whole. Participation rates in the major cities fluctuate more often and reflect the political diversity of the candidates.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opin ... 0920200225
Sudan’s 37 dry years are over for its non-Muslims
KHARTOUM (Reuters) – Sudan will permit non-Muslims to consume alcohol and strengthen women’s rights, including banning female genital mutilation (FGM), its justice minister said late on Saturday, in a reversal of almost four decades of hardline Islamist policies
About 3% of Sudan’s population is non-Muslim, according to the United Nations.
Alcoholic drinks have been banned since former President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced Islamic law in 1983, throwing bottles of whisky into the Nile in the capital Khartoum.
The transition government which took over after autocrat Omar al-Bashir was toppled last year has vowed to lead Sudan to democracy, end discrimination and make peace with rebels.
Non-Muslims will no longer be criminalised for drinking alcohol in private, Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari told state television. For Muslims, the ban will remain. Offenders are typically flogged under Islamic law.
Sudan will also decriminalise apostasy and ban FGM, a practice which typically involves the partial or total removal of the external genitalia of girls and women, he said.
Women will also no longer need a permit from male members of their families to travel with their children.
Bashir extended Islamic law after he took power in 1989.
Sudanese Christians live mainly in Khartoum and in the Nuba mountains near the South Sudan border. Some Sudanese also follow traditional African beliefs.
The transition government led by Abdalla Hamdok runs the country in an uneasy coalition with the military which helped remove Bashir after months of mass protests.
https://www.cnbcafrica.com/east-africa/ ... ee9d77dc9f
KHARTOUM (Reuters) – Sudan will permit non-Muslims to consume alcohol and strengthen women’s rights, including banning female genital mutilation (FGM), its justice minister said late on Saturday, in a reversal of almost four decades of hardline Islamist policies
About 3% of Sudan’s population is non-Muslim, according to the United Nations.
Alcoholic drinks have been banned since former President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced Islamic law in 1983, throwing bottles of whisky into the Nile in the capital Khartoum.
The transition government which took over after autocrat Omar al-Bashir was toppled last year has vowed to lead Sudan to democracy, end discrimination and make peace with rebels.
Non-Muslims will no longer be criminalised for drinking alcohol in private, Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari told state television. For Muslims, the ban will remain. Offenders are typically flogged under Islamic law.
Sudan will also decriminalise apostasy and ban FGM, a practice which typically involves the partial or total removal of the external genitalia of girls and women, he said.
Women will also no longer need a permit from male members of their families to travel with their children.
Bashir extended Islamic law after he took power in 1989.
Sudanese Christians live mainly in Khartoum and in the Nuba mountains near the South Sudan border. Some Sudanese also follow traditional African beliefs.
The transition government led by Abdalla Hamdok runs the country in an uneasy coalition with the military which helped remove Bashir after months of mass protests.
https://www.cnbcafrica.com/east-africa/ ... ee9d77dc9f
Turkey’s Islamist Dream Finally Becomes a Reality
The Hagia Sophia has been designated as a mosque again, its status as a museum viewed for decades as a seal on the country’s spirit.
IZMIR, Turkey — President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on Friday issued a decree ordering the Hagia Sophia, a majestic 65,000-square-foot stone structure from the sixth century in Istanbul, to be opened for Muslim prayers. The same day, a top Turkish court had revoked the 1934 decree by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic, which had turned it into a museum.
The Hagia Sophia was built as a cathedral and converted into a mosque, and then a museum. It has for centuries been the object of fierce civilizational rivalry between the Ottoman and Orthodox worlds.
The reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque was an old dream of Turkey’s Islamists. In the Islamist political tradition of President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, Ataturk’s experiment in secular republican government was a foreign imposition on Turkey, and the Hagia Sophia’s status as a museum a seal on the country’s spirit.
After making the announcement, according to one report, Mr. Erdogan was so shaken with emotion that he did not sleep until first light the next morning. What he thought of as an era of humiliation had ended.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/opin ... 778d3e6de3
******
The Hagia Sophia is now a mosque – and a victim of Turkey’s profane politics
Excerpt:
The Russian Orthodox Church claims that its concerns were never given proper hearing when the transition was being considered, while other Eastern Orthodox leaders have condemned the decision. UNESCO, under which the building was protected as a World Heritage Site, urged Turkey to delay any change until further discussion had taken place.
None of that seems to concern Mr. Erdogan, since the Islamic traditionalists who have long called for this will guarantee him power in once-secular Turkey. That tension – between the temporal and the spiritual – is at the heart of this provocative and potentially dangerous move.
Turkey is home to a modern, non-religious, educated class that looks to Europe and liberal democracies. But for those outside that class – and they are now perhaps the majority – Mr. Erdogan and his systematic and sometimes brutal policy of Islamization represents the fulfilment of a long-awaited ambition. The President sees himself as leading the Muslim world, just as did the Sultans before him – even if it sows profound division – and this irresponsible if unsurprising action is central to that.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion ... VgMaFxFnIY
The Hagia Sophia has been designated as a mosque again, its status as a museum viewed for decades as a seal on the country’s spirit.
IZMIR, Turkey — President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on Friday issued a decree ordering the Hagia Sophia, a majestic 65,000-square-foot stone structure from the sixth century in Istanbul, to be opened for Muslim prayers. The same day, a top Turkish court had revoked the 1934 decree by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic, which had turned it into a museum.
The Hagia Sophia was built as a cathedral and converted into a mosque, and then a museum. It has for centuries been the object of fierce civilizational rivalry between the Ottoman and Orthodox worlds.
The reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque was an old dream of Turkey’s Islamists. In the Islamist political tradition of President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, Ataturk’s experiment in secular republican government was a foreign imposition on Turkey, and the Hagia Sophia’s status as a museum a seal on the country’s spirit.
After making the announcement, according to one report, Mr. Erdogan was so shaken with emotion that he did not sleep until first light the next morning. What he thought of as an era of humiliation had ended.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/opin ... 778d3e6de3
******
The Hagia Sophia is now a mosque – and a victim of Turkey’s profane politics
Excerpt:
The Russian Orthodox Church claims that its concerns were never given proper hearing when the transition was being considered, while other Eastern Orthodox leaders have condemned the decision. UNESCO, under which the building was protected as a World Heritage Site, urged Turkey to delay any change until further discussion had taken place.
None of that seems to concern Mr. Erdogan, since the Islamic traditionalists who have long called for this will guarantee him power in once-secular Turkey. That tension – between the temporal and the spiritual – is at the heart of this provocative and potentially dangerous move.
Turkey is home to a modern, non-religious, educated class that looks to Europe and liberal democracies. But for those outside that class – and they are now perhaps the majority – Mr. Erdogan and his systematic and sometimes brutal policy of Islamization represents the fulfilment of a long-awaited ambition. The President sees himself as leading the Muslim world, just as did the Sultans before him – even if it sows profound division – and this irresponsible if unsurprising action is central to that.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion ... VgMaFxFnIY
'Shoot all you see': Myanmar soldiers confess for first time to Rohyingya atrocities
Nicola Smith
The Telegraph September 8, 2020, 6:08 AM CDT
Rohingya refugees flee to Bangladesh in 2017 - Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters
Two deserting soldiers from the Myanmar army have claimed they were told by commanding officers to “shoot all that you see and hear” during a brutal military operation against the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority in 2017.
The witness statements from the two soldiers is the first time that members of the military have openly admitted to participating in what a United Nations fact-finding mission has described as a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya.
They are reported to have been transferred to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, in what could be a major boost to efforts to hold the Southeast Asian nation to account over genocide charges.
In videoed confessions viewed by the NGO, Private Myo Win Tun, 33, and Private Zaw Naing Tun, 30, confess to killings and rapes during the army “clearance operations,” with both independently claiming they were acting on orders from commanders to “exterminate all [Rohingya]."
“This is a monumental moment for Rohingya and the people of Myanmar in their ongoing struggle for justice,” said Matthew Smith, CEO of Fortify Rights. “These men could be the first perpetrators from Myanmar tried at the ICC, and the first insider witnesses in the custody of the court. We expect prompt action.”
About one million Rohingya refugees live in cramped camps in Bangladesh - Cathal McNaughton/Reuters
The brutal military purge of the Rohingya population in 2017 caused some three quarters of a million people to flee rape, arson and murder into neighbouring Bangladesh where they continue to languish in squalid refugee camps with little hope of returning home.
The New York Times reported that the two men were transferred to the ICC on Monday and placed in custody although not under arrest. Fortify Rights has called for the court to offer them witness protection.
The Myanmar government, and its civilian leader, former human rights icon Aung San Suu Kyi, has repeatedly denied there was a concerted campaign of atrocities against the Rohingya.
Last year Ms Suu Kyi personally travelled to the Hague to defend the country against charges of genocide in a separate case pursued by a Gambian-led prosecution team at the International Court of Justice.
In the taped confessions – which could not be independently verified but which echoed victim testimonies – Private Zaw Naing Tun confesses to killings, burying bodies in mass graves, and other crimes against the Rohingya in five villages in Maungdaw Township during the 2017 operations.
Myo Win Tun describes his involvement in killing Rohingya women, men, and children, and he admits to rape in Taung Bazar village and surrounding villages in Buthidaung Township in September of the same year.
The soldiers provide the names and ranks of 19 direct perpetrators from the Myanmar Army, including themselves, as well as six senior commanders in the Myanmar Army who they claim ordered or contributed to atrocity crimes against Rohingya, including a lieutenant colonel, a colonel, and three captains.
The confessions were filmed separately by The Arakan Army—an ethnic armed group currently engaged in armed conflict with the Myanmar Army in Rakhine State. Both describe the location of mass graves.
“These confessions demonstrate what we’ve long known, which is that the Myanmar Army is a well-functioning national army operating with a specific and centralised command structure,” said Mr Smith.
“Commanders control, direct, and order their subordinates in all they do. In this case, commanders ordered foot soldiers to commit genocidal acts and exterminate Rohingya, and that’s exactly what they did.”
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/sh ... 02148.html
Nicola Smith
The Telegraph September 8, 2020, 6:08 AM CDT
Rohingya refugees flee to Bangladesh in 2017 - Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters
Two deserting soldiers from the Myanmar army have claimed they were told by commanding officers to “shoot all that you see and hear” during a brutal military operation against the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority in 2017.
The witness statements from the two soldiers is the first time that members of the military have openly admitted to participating in what a United Nations fact-finding mission has described as a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya.
They are reported to have been transferred to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, in what could be a major boost to efforts to hold the Southeast Asian nation to account over genocide charges.
In videoed confessions viewed by the NGO, Private Myo Win Tun, 33, and Private Zaw Naing Tun, 30, confess to killings and rapes during the army “clearance operations,” with both independently claiming they were acting on orders from commanders to “exterminate all [Rohingya]."
“This is a monumental moment for Rohingya and the people of Myanmar in their ongoing struggle for justice,” said Matthew Smith, CEO of Fortify Rights. “These men could be the first perpetrators from Myanmar tried at the ICC, and the first insider witnesses in the custody of the court. We expect prompt action.”
About one million Rohingya refugees live in cramped camps in Bangladesh - Cathal McNaughton/Reuters
The brutal military purge of the Rohingya population in 2017 caused some three quarters of a million people to flee rape, arson and murder into neighbouring Bangladesh where they continue to languish in squalid refugee camps with little hope of returning home.
The New York Times reported that the two men were transferred to the ICC on Monday and placed in custody although not under arrest. Fortify Rights has called for the court to offer them witness protection.
The Myanmar government, and its civilian leader, former human rights icon Aung San Suu Kyi, has repeatedly denied there was a concerted campaign of atrocities against the Rohingya.
Last year Ms Suu Kyi personally travelled to the Hague to defend the country against charges of genocide in a separate case pursued by a Gambian-led prosecution team at the International Court of Justice.
In the taped confessions – which could not be independently verified but which echoed victim testimonies – Private Zaw Naing Tun confesses to killings, burying bodies in mass graves, and other crimes against the Rohingya in five villages in Maungdaw Township during the 2017 operations.
Myo Win Tun describes his involvement in killing Rohingya women, men, and children, and he admits to rape in Taung Bazar village and surrounding villages in Buthidaung Township in September of the same year.
The soldiers provide the names and ranks of 19 direct perpetrators from the Myanmar Army, including themselves, as well as six senior commanders in the Myanmar Army who they claim ordered or contributed to atrocity crimes against Rohingya, including a lieutenant colonel, a colonel, and three captains.
The confessions were filmed separately by The Arakan Army—an ethnic armed group currently engaged in armed conflict with the Myanmar Army in Rakhine State. Both describe the location of mass graves.
“These confessions demonstrate what we’ve long known, which is that the Myanmar Army is a well-functioning national army operating with a specific and centralised command structure,” said Mr Smith.
“Commanders control, direct, and order their subordinates in all they do. In this case, commanders ordered foot soldiers to commit genocidal acts and exterminate Rohingya, and that’s exactly what they did.”
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/sh ... 02148.html
Whose Islam? The New Battle for Afghanistan
Finding common ground on the role of Islam is the most decisive task in the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
KABUL, Afghanistan — As the major warring parties in Afghanistan sit down for peace talks in Doha, Qatar, an old, unresolved debate is emerging as the central question: What should be the role of Islam in Afghanistan? A humid seaside resort on the Persian Gulf, where the delegates are gathered, has become the unlikely venue for a search for answers acceptable to most Afghans.
The Taliban, who fought for decades to establish an Islamic political system, struck a deal with the United States in February that calls for American troop withdrawals conditioned on the Taliban engaging in peace talks and promising not to allow the country to be used by transnational terrorists.
They started the peace talks on Sept. 12, aware of the difficulty of persuading other Afghans and the international community to accept their understanding of Islam. The Taliban also seem to have reached a conclusion internally that their 1990s model of government is not tenable today.
When the Taliban seized territory across Afghanistan in the 1990s, the group founded a new “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” but they consulted almost none of the country’s diverse political and religious groups. The result was a style of government which enforced at gunpoint the norms and lifestyles of rural southern Afghanistan on the entire country. Imposing an extremely austere lifestyle on Afghans, banning women from work and education and ignoring the pleas of the international community, turned the Taliban into an international pariah.
Establishing an “Islamic system,” of governance is now the thrust of the Taliban’s demands as it negotiates with Afghan officials and representatives of the political opposition. But the Taliban need to clearly detail their ideas about the role of Islam in society and governance.
The country already has a constitution that holds Islamic jurisprudence above all other laws. Afghan officials consider the character of their system sufficiently Islamic. Their emphasis in the peace talks is on protecting the gains of the last two decades, including women’s rights, freedom of expression and electoral democracy.
If peace is going to result from these talks, those two perspectives on what Islamic governance in Afghanistan looks like will need to be reconciled.
What is it about the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that the Taliban reject so vehemently? The Taliban say the current system was created under the shadow of Western military forces, caters mainly to Western norms and gives an insufficient role to religious authorities.
I have interviewed members of the Taliban and its leadership over many years. They see the Kabul government elites as secularists who seek to Westernize Afghan society. Instead, they see the active promotion of Islamic values and morals in society as one of the primary functions of a “true Islamic government.”
In my interviews, the Taliban cited as un-Islamic the absence of gender segregation in the current Afghan public sphere; they see the relatively free Afghan media as encouraging “moral corruption,” and they object to the banking system designed on international rules and want Islamic banking. They want a greater role for religious leaders in policy and lawmaking and greater promotion of religious education.
Many Afghans fear that the Taliban favor a return to their heavy-handed rule of the late 1990s. It is true that the Taliban are uncomfortable with the liberalizing society — with degrees of freedom of expression, lack of gender segregation and Westernizing influences — that has flourished in some parts of Afghanistan in recent years.
But there are hints emerging from Taliban ranks that they could be influenced by public opinion, perhaps allowing room for compromise. For instance, the Taliban now allow schools for girls in areas under their control where there is strong popular demand. It is a break from their strict rules restricting education for women during their earlier rule.
The Taliban banned technology and communications during their earlier rule. They have since become pretty proficient users of the internet and mobile phone technology, and, in some areas the group controls today, when local elders petitioned for their community’s internet access the Taliban granted it and guarded the telecommunications towers.
The Taliban seem to understand that they need to go further than tolerating girls’ education. Last month, Hibatullah Akhunkzada, the leader of the Taliban, deputed Mawlawi Abdul Hakim, the movement’s senior most religious scholar, to lead the Taliban negotiators in Doha. Mr. Hakim has no experience in political negotiations, but the personal involvement of such an authoritative religious figure seems to suggest that the Taliban intend to clarify their positions on the role of Islam in governance after the actual negotiations start, and that they will want to convince Taliban fighters that any agreement signed by the group’s leaders will uphold Islamic values.
I have gleaned from conversations with Taliban officials recently that they have certain positions for the negotiations, but they have not nailed down a definitive vision of what they will agree to, leaving the specifics to evolve during talks. The Taliban cite the composition of their delegation for the intra-Afghan talks — it includes a deputy leader, the senior most religious figure and over 60 percent of its most authoritative body, the leadership council — as evidence of their seriousness about reaching a deal with their rivals.
A compromise on the state system will most likely require drafting a new constitution for the country. President Ashraf Ghani has already offered the Taliban the opportunity to amend the current constitution, but only through the existing constitution’s amendment procedures, which would give the government control over the process. Afghan opposition political figures and groups have signaled their willingness to consider structural reforms to the current constitutional order while preserving protections for civil and political rights.
Significant questions remain: Would the Taliban accept elections? Would they accept a coalition government? An elected parliament? In recent weeks, the Taliban leaders have revealed that they envision a religious authority at the apex of a future Afghan government — if not the chief executive position, then a body with power to oversee the executive.
Peace negotiations will be strained on questions such as the Taliban’s refusal to accept the current share of women’s participation in public service. Without the Taliban agreeing to a compromise on individual rights and freedoms, an agreement won’t be reached.
In fact, the Taliban’s positions and attitudes stem from Afghan cultural norms as much as they do Islamic doctrine, which influences them in both strongly conservative and relatively progressive directions. The socially conservative views the Taliban espouse are common among rural Afghans, as well as a substantial share of urban educated youth.
Unlike other modern jihadist groups, the Taliban are not fixated on a literalist reading of textual sources. Their movement was born out of a combination of Islamic oral tradition and pre-Islamic cultural norms, and does not have a single ideological document. In fact, that absence of a definitive intellectual foundation in the Taliban has driven some of its more educated radicalized youth to join rival groups such as the Islamic State in Afghanistan.
The absence of core, rigid ideological texts might enable the Taliban to integrate into mainstream Afghan politics. There are many in Afghanistan who are deeply skeptical about genuine change in the Taliban and the prospect of future transformation. But there are no easier ways to test and build on those possibilities than through political engagement in the context of ongoing peace negotiations.
The evolution of the Taliban’s political thinking, though, is likely to be slow. Rushing the negotiations would risk producing an unstable result that only papers over the two sides’ differences; successful negotiations will require not only patience but also a more hands-off approach from other governments than they are usually comfortable with.
The shaping of the post-Taliban Afghanistan by the Western governments, primarily the United States, eventually turned out to be its vulnerability and undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans. A new dispensation in Afghanistan will need the support of conservative elements of Afghan society if we want the long war in the country to finally be over.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/opin ... 778d3e6de3
Finding common ground on the role of Islam is the most decisive task in the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
KABUL, Afghanistan — As the major warring parties in Afghanistan sit down for peace talks in Doha, Qatar, an old, unresolved debate is emerging as the central question: What should be the role of Islam in Afghanistan? A humid seaside resort on the Persian Gulf, where the delegates are gathered, has become the unlikely venue for a search for answers acceptable to most Afghans.
The Taliban, who fought for decades to establish an Islamic political system, struck a deal with the United States in February that calls for American troop withdrawals conditioned on the Taliban engaging in peace talks and promising not to allow the country to be used by transnational terrorists.
They started the peace talks on Sept. 12, aware of the difficulty of persuading other Afghans and the international community to accept their understanding of Islam. The Taliban also seem to have reached a conclusion internally that their 1990s model of government is not tenable today.
When the Taliban seized territory across Afghanistan in the 1990s, the group founded a new “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” but they consulted almost none of the country’s diverse political and religious groups. The result was a style of government which enforced at gunpoint the norms and lifestyles of rural southern Afghanistan on the entire country. Imposing an extremely austere lifestyle on Afghans, banning women from work and education and ignoring the pleas of the international community, turned the Taliban into an international pariah.
Establishing an “Islamic system,” of governance is now the thrust of the Taliban’s demands as it negotiates with Afghan officials and representatives of the political opposition. But the Taliban need to clearly detail their ideas about the role of Islam in society and governance.
The country already has a constitution that holds Islamic jurisprudence above all other laws. Afghan officials consider the character of their system sufficiently Islamic. Their emphasis in the peace talks is on protecting the gains of the last two decades, including women’s rights, freedom of expression and electoral democracy.
If peace is going to result from these talks, those two perspectives on what Islamic governance in Afghanistan looks like will need to be reconciled.
What is it about the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that the Taliban reject so vehemently? The Taliban say the current system was created under the shadow of Western military forces, caters mainly to Western norms and gives an insufficient role to religious authorities.
I have interviewed members of the Taliban and its leadership over many years. They see the Kabul government elites as secularists who seek to Westernize Afghan society. Instead, they see the active promotion of Islamic values and morals in society as one of the primary functions of a “true Islamic government.”
In my interviews, the Taliban cited as un-Islamic the absence of gender segregation in the current Afghan public sphere; they see the relatively free Afghan media as encouraging “moral corruption,” and they object to the banking system designed on international rules and want Islamic banking. They want a greater role for religious leaders in policy and lawmaking and greater promotion of religious education.
Many Afghans fear that the Taliban favor a return to their heavy-handed rule of the late 1990s. It is true that the Taliban are uncomfortable with the liberalizing society — with degrees of freedom of expression, lack of gender segregation and Westernizing influences — that has flourished in some parts of Afghanistan in recent years.
But there are hints emerging from Taliban ranks that they could be influenced by public opinion, perhaps allowing room for compromise. For instance, the Taliban now allow schools for girls in areas under their control where there is strong popular demand. It is a break from their strict rules restricting education for women during their earlier rule.
The Taliban banned technology and communications during their earlier rule. They have since become pretty proficient users of the internet and mobile phone technology, and, in some areas the group controls today, when local elders petitioned for their community’s internet access the Taliban granted it and guarded the telecommunications towers.
The Taliban seem to understand that they need to go further than tolerating girls’ education. Last month, Hibatullah Akhunkzada, the leader of the Taliban, deputed Mawlawi Abdul Hakim, the movement’s senior most religious scholar, to lead the Taliban negotiators in Doha. Mr. Hakim has no experience in political negotiations, but the personal involvement of such an authoritative religious figure seems to suggest that the Taliban intend to clarify their positions on the role of Islam in governance after the actual negotiations start, and that they will want to convince Taliban fighters that any agreement signed by the group’s leaders will uphold Islamic values.
I have gleaned from conversations with Taliban officials recently that they have certain positions for the negotiations, but they have not nailed down a definitive vision of what they will agree to, leaving the specifics to evolve during talks. The Taliban cite the composition of their delegation for the intra-Afghan talks — it includes a deputy leader, the senior most religious figure and over 60 percent of its most authoritative body, the leadership council — as evidence of their seriousness about reaching a deal with their rivals.
A compromise on the state system will most likely require drafting a new constitution for the country. President Ashraf Ghani has already offered the Taliban the opportunity to amend the current constitution, but only through the existing constitution’s amendment procedures, which would give the government control over the process. Afghan opposition political figures and groups have signaled their willingness to consider structural reforms to the current constitutional order while preserving protections for civil and political rights.
Significant questions remain: Would the Taliban accept elections? Would they accept a coalition government? An elected parliament? In recent weeks, the Taliban leaders have revealed that they envision a religious authority at the apex of a future Afghan government — if not the chief executive position, then a body with power to oversee the executive.
Peace negotiations will be strained on questions such as the Taliban’s refusal to accept the current share of women’s participation in public service. Without the Taliban agreeing to a compromise on individual rights and freedoms, an agreement won’t be reached.
In fact, the Taliban’s positions and attitudes stem from Afghan cultural norms as much as they do Islamic doctrine, which influences them in both strongly conservative and relatively progressive directions. The socially conservative views the Taliban espouse are common among rural Afghans, as well as a substantial share of urban educated youth.
Unlike other modern jihadist groups, the Taliban are not fixated on a literalist reading of textual sources. Their movement was born out of a combination of Islamic oral tradition and pre-Islamic cultural norms, and does not have a single ideological document. In fact, that absence of a definitive intellectual foundation in the Taliban has driven some of its more educated radicalized youth to join rival groups such as the Islamic State in Afghanistan.
The absence of core, rigid ideological texts might enable the Taliban to integrate into mainstream Afghan politics. There are many in Afghanistan who are deeply skeptical about genuine change in the Taliban and the prospect of future transformation. But there are no easier ways to test and build on those possibilities than through political engagement in the context of ongoing peace negotiations.
The evolution of the Taliban’s political thinking, though, is likely to be slow. Rushing the negotiations would risk producing an unstable result that only papers over the two sides’ differences; successful negotiations will require not only patience but also a more hands-off approach from other governments than they are usually comfortable with.
The shaping of the post-Taliban Afghanistan by the Western governments, primarily the United States, eventually turned out to be its vulnerability and undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans. A new dispensation in Afghanistan will need the support of conservative elements of Afghan society if we want the long war in the country to finally be over.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/opin ... 778d3e6de3
Iran's secular shift: new survey reveals huge changes in religious beliefs
Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Utrecht University and Ammar Maleki, Assistant Professor, Public Law and Governance, Tilburg University
The Conversation September 10, 2020, 6:14 AM CDT
Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution was a defining event that changed how we think about the relationship between religion and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini’s mass mobilisation of Islam showed that modernisation by no means implies a linear process of religious decline.
Reliable large-scale data on Iranians’ post-revolutionary religious beliefs, however, has always been lacking. Over the years, research and waves of protests and crackdowns indicated massive disappointment among Iranians with their political system. This steadily turned into a deeply felt disillusionment with institutional religion.
In June 2020, our research institute, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN (GAMAAN), conducted an online survey with the collaboration of Ladan Boroumand, co-founder of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.
Iran’s census claims that 99.5% of the population are Muslim, a figure that hides the state’s active hostility toward irreligiosity, conversion and unrecognised religious minorities.
Iranians live with an ever-present fear of retribution for speaking against the state. In Iran, one cannot simply call people or knock on doors seeking answers to politically sensitive questions. That’s why the anonymity of digital surveys offers an opportunity to capture what Iranians really think about religion.
Since the revolution, literacy rates have risen sharply and the urban population has grown substantially. Levels of internet penetration in Iran are comparable to those in Italy, with around 60 million users and the number grows relentlessly: 70% of adults are members of at least one social media platform.
For our survey on religious belief in Iran, we targeted diverse digital channels after analyzing which groups showed lower participation rates in our previous large-scale surveys. The link to the survey was shared by Kurdish, Arab, Sufi and other networks. And our research assistant successfully convinced Shia pro-regime channels to spread it among their followers, too. We reached mass audiences by sharing the survey on Instagram pages and Telegram channels, some of which had a few million followers.
After cleaning our data, we were left with a sample of almost 40,000 Iranians living in Iran. The sample was weighted and balanced to the target population of literate Iranians aged above 19, using five demographic variables and voting behaviour in the 2017 presidential elections.
A secular and diverse Iran
Our results reveal dramatic changes in Iranian religiosity, with an increase in secularization and a diversity of faiths and beliefs. Compared with Iran’s 99.5% census figure, we found that only 40% identified as Muslim.
In contrast with state propaganda that portrays Iran as a Shia nation, only 32% explicitly identified as such, while 5% said they were Sunni Muslim and 3% Sufi Muslim. Another 9% said they were atheists, along with 7% who prefer the label of spirituality. Among the other selected religions, 8% said they were Zoroastrians – which we interpret as a reflection of Persian nationalism and a desire for an alternative to Islam, rather than strict adherence to the Zoroastrian faith – while 1.5% said they were Christian.
Most Iranians, 78%, believe in God, but only 37% believe in life after death and only 30% believe in heaven and hell. In line with other anthropological research, a quarter of our respondents said they believed in jinns or genies. Around 20% said they did not believe in any of the options, including God.
These numbers demonstrate that a general process of secularization, known to encourage religious diversity, is taking place in Iran. An overwhelming majority, 90%, described themselves as hailing from believing or practizing religious families. Yet 47% reported losing their religion in their lifetime, and 6% said they changed from one religious orientation to another. Younger people reported higher levels of irreligiosity and conversion to Christianity than older respondents.
A third said they occasionally drank alcohol in a country that legally enforces temperance. Over 60% said they did not perform the obligatory Muslim daily prayers, synchronous with a 2020 state-backed poll in which 60% reported not observing the fast during Ramadan (the majority due to being “sick”). In comparison, in a comprehensive survey conducted in 1975 before the Islamic Revolution, over 80% said they always prayed and observed the fast.
Religion and legislation
We found that societal secularization was also linked to a critical view of the religious governance system: 68% agreed that religious prescriptions should be excluded from legislation, even if believers hold a parliamentary majority, and 72% opposed the law mandating all women wear the hijab, the Islamic veil.
Iranians also harbour illiberal secularist opinions regarding religious diversity: 43% said that no religions should have the right to proselytize in public. However, 41% believed that every religion should be able to manifest in public.
Four decades ago, the Islamic Revolution taught sociologists that European-style secularization is not followed universally around the world. The subsequent secularization of Iran confirmed by our survey demonstrates that Europe is not exceptional either, but rather part of complex, global interactions between religious and secular forces.
Other research on population growth, whose decline has been linked to higher levels of secularisation, also suggests a decline in religiosity in Iran. In 2020, Iran recorded its lowest population growth, below 1%.
Greater access to the world via the internet, but also through interactions with the global Iranian diaspora in the past 50 years, has generated new communities and forms of religious experience inside the country. A future disentangling of state power and religious authority would likely exacerbate these societal transformations. Iran as we think we know it is changing, in fundamental ways.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Pooyan Tamimi Arab is the secretary of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN.
Ammar Maleki is the director of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. GAMAAN (gamaan.org) collaborated with and received funding for this research from Ladan Boroumand.
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/ir ... 17092.html
Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Utrecht University and Ammar Maleki, Assistant Professor, Public Law and Governance, Tilburg University
The Conversation September 10, 2020, 6:14 AM CDT
Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution was a defining event that changed how we think about the relationship between religion and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini’s mass mobilisation of Islam showed that modernisation by no means implies a linear process of religious decline.
Reliable large-scale data on Iranians’ post-revolutionary religious beliefs, however, has always been lacking. Over the years, research and waves of protests and crackdowns indicated massive disappointment among Iranians with their political system. This steadily turned into a deeply felt disillusionment with institutional religion.
In June 2020, our research institute, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN (GAMAAN), conducted an online survey with the collaboration of Ladan Boroumand, co-founder of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.
Iran’s census claims that 99.5% of the population are Muslim, a figure that hides the state’s active hostility toward irreligiosity, conversion and unrecognised religious minorities.
Iranians live with an ever-present fear of retribution for speaking against the state. In Iran, one cannot simply call people or knock on doors seeking answers to politically sensitive questions. That’s why the anonymity of digital surveys offers an opportunity to capture what Iranians really think about religion.
Since the revolution, literacy rates have risen sharply and the urban population has grown substantially. Levels of internet penetration in Iran are comparable to those in Italy, with around 60 million users and the number grows relentlessly: 70% of adults are members of at least one social media platform.
For our survey on religious belief in Iran, we targeted diverse digital channels after analyzing which groups showed lower participation rates in our previous large-scale surveys. The link to the survey was shared by Kurdish, Arab, Sufi and other networks. And our research assistant successfully convinced Shia pro-regime channels to spread it among their followers, too. We reached mass audiences by sharing the survey on Instagram pages and Telegram channels, some of which had a few million followers.
After cleaning our data, we were left with a sample of almost 40,000 Iranians living in Iran. The sample was weighted and balanced to the target population of literate Iranians aged above 19, using five demographic variables and voting behaviour in the 2017 presidential elections.
A secular and diverse Iran
Our results reveal dramatic changes in Iranian religiosity, with an increase in secularization and a diversity of faiths and beliefs. Compared with Iran’s 99.5% census figure, we found that only 40% identified as Muslim.
In contrast with state propaganda that portrays Iran as a Shia nation, only 32% explicitly identified as such, while 5% said they were Sunni Muslim and 3% Sufi Muslim. Another 9% said they were atheists, along with 7% who prefer the label of spirituality. Among the other selected religions, 8% said they were Zoroastrians – which we interpret as a reflection of Persian nationalism and a desire for an alternative to Islam, rather than strict adherence to the Zoroastrian faith – while 1.5% said they were Christian.
Most Iranians, 78%, believe in God, but only 37% believe in life after death and only 30% believe in heaven and hell. In line with other anthropological research, a quarter of our respondents said they believed in jinns or genies. Around 20% said they did not believe in any of the options, including God.
These numbers demonstrate that a general process of secularization, known to encourage religious diversity, is taking place in Iran. An overwhelming majority, 90%, described themselves as hailing from believing or practizing religious families. Yet 47% reported losing their religion in their lifetime, and 6% said they changed from one religious orientation to another. Younger people reported higher levels of irreligiosity and conversion to Christianity than older respondents.
A third said they occasionally drank alcohol in a country that legally enforces temperance. Over 60% said they did not perform the obligatory Muslim daily prayers, synchronous with a 2020 state-backed poll in which 60% reported not observing the fast during Ramadan (the majority due to being “sick”). In comparison, in a comprehensive survey conducted in 1975 before the Islamic Revolution, over 80% said they always prayed and observed the fast.
Religion and legislation
We found that societal secularization was also linked to a critical view of the religious governance system: 68% agreed that religious prescriptions should be excluded from legislation, even if believers hold a parliamentary majority, and 72% opposed the law mandating all women wear the hijab, the Islamic veil.
Iranians also harbour illiberal secularist opinions regarding religious diversity: 43% said that no religions should have the right to proselytize in public. However, 41% believed that every religion should be able to manifest in public.
Four decades ago, the Islamic Revolution taught sociologists that European-style secularization is not followed universally around the world. The subsequent secularization of Iran confirmed by our survey demonstrates that Europe is not exceptional either, but rather part of complex, global interactions between religious and secular forces.
Other research on population growth, whose decline has been linked to higher levels of secularisation, also suggests a decline in religiosity in Iran. In 2020, Iran recorded its lowest population growth, below 1%.
Greater access to the world via the internet, but also through interactions with the global Iranian diaspora in the past 50 years, has generated new communities and forms of religious experience inside the country. A future disentangling of state power and religious authority would likely exacerbate these societal transformations. Iran as we think we know it is changing, in fundamental ways.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Pooyan Tamimi Arab is the secretary of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN.
Ammar Maleki is the director of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. GAMAAN (gamaan.org) collaborated with and received funding for this research from Ladan Boroumand.
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/ir ... 17092.html
United Arab Emirates relaxes Islamic laws on alcohol and cohabitation, criminalizes 'honor' killings
The broadening of personal freedoms reflects the changing profile of the skyscraper-studded Arab Gulf country.
DUBAI — The United Arab Emirates announced on Saturday a major overhaul of the country's Islamic personal laws, allowing unmarried couples to cohabitate, loosening alcohol restrictions and criminalizing so-called "honor killings."
The broadening of personal freedoms reflects the changing profile of a country that has sought to bill itself as a skyscraper-studded destination for Western tourists and businesses, despite its legal system based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law.
The reforms aim to boost the country's economic and social standing and "consolidate the UAE's principles of tolerance," state-run WAM news agency reported.
The changes also reflect the efforts of the Emirates' rulers to keep pace with a rapidly changing society. In a country where expatriates outnumber citizens nearly nine to one, the amendments will also permit foreigners to avoid Islamic Shariah courts on issues like marriage, divorce and inheritance.
The announcement also follows a historic U.S.-brokered deal to normalize relations between the UAE and Israel, which is expected to bring an influx of Israeli tourists and investment.
"I could not be happier for these new laws that are progressive and proactive," said Emirati filmmaker Abdallah Al Kaabi, whose art has tackled taboo topics like homosexual love and gender identity.
"2020 has been a tough and transformative year for the UAE," he added.
Changes include scrapping penalties for alcohol consumption, sales and possession for those aged 21 and over.
Although liquor and beer are widely available in bars and clubs in the UAE's luxuriant coastal cities, individuals previously needed a government-issued license to purchase, transport or have alcohol in their homes. The new rule would apparently allow Muslims, who have been barred from obtaining licenses, to drink alcoholic beverages freely.
The legal reforms were announced by state-run WAM news agency and detailed in state-linked newspaper The National.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/unit ... r-n1246902
The broadening of personal freedoms reflects the changing profile of the skyscraper-studded Arab Gulf country.
DUBAI — The United Arab Emirates announced on Saturday a major overhaul of the country's Islamic personal laws, allowing unmarried couples to cohabitate, loosening alcohol restrictions and criminalizing so-called "honor killings."
The broadening of personal freedoms reflects the changing profile of a country that has sought to bill itself as a skyscraper-studded destination for Western tourists and businesses, despite its legal system based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law.
The reforms aim to boost the country's economic and social standing and "consolidate the UAE's principles of tolerance," state-run WAM news agency reported.
The changes also reflect the efforts of the Emirates' rulers to keep pace with a rapidly changing society. In a country where expatriates outnumber citizens nearly nine to one, the amendments will also permit foreigners to avoid Islamic Shariah courts on issues like marriage, divorce and inheritance.
The announcement also follows a historic U.S.-brokered deal to normalize relations between the UAE and Israel, which is expected to bring an influx of Israeli tourists and investment.
"I could not be happier for these new laws that are progressive and proactive," said Emirati filmmaker Abdallah Al Kaabi, whose art has tackled taboo topics like homosexual love and gender identity.
"2020 has been a tough and transformative year for the UAE," he added.
Changes include scrapping penalties for alcohol consumption, sales and possession for those aged 21 and over.
Although liquor and beer are widely available in bars and clubs in the UAE's luxuriant coastal cities, individuals previously needed a government-issued license to purchase, transport or have alcohol in their homes. The new rule would apparently allow Muslims, who have been barred from obtaining licenses, to drink alcoholic beverages freely.
The legal reforms were announced by state-run WAM news agency and detailed in state-linked newspaper The National.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/unit ... r-n1246902
Malaysian court rules non-Muslims can use word 'Allah'
Associated Press Wed, March 10, 2021, 7:27 AM
A Malaysian court ruled Wednesday, March 10, 2021, that non-Muslims can use the word “Allah” to refer to God, in a major decision in a divisive issue for religious freedom in the Muslim-majority country.
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) — A Malaysian court ruled Wednesday that non-Muslims can use the word “Allah” to refer to God, in a major decision over a divisive issue for religious freedom in the Muslim-majority country.
Two ethnic Malay political parties immediately voiced concern and Thursday urged the government to challenge the ruling.
The High Court deemed unconstitutional a 35-year-old government ban on the usage of Allah and three other Arabic words by Christian publications, said the plaintiff's lawyer, Annou Xavier.
The government has previously said Allah should be reserved exclusively for Muslims to avoid confusion that could lead them to convert to other religions, a stance that is unique to Malaysia and hasn't been an issue in other Muslim-majority nations with sizeable Christian minorities.
Christian leaders in Malaysia say the ban is unreasonable because Christians who speak the Malay language have long used Allah, a Malay word derived from Arabic, in their Bibles, prayers and songs.
The high court ruling appeared to contradict an earlier decision by the country’s Federal Court in 2014 that upheld the government ban following a legal challenge by the Roman Catholic Church, which had used the word Allah in its Malay-language newsletter.
“The court has now said the word Allah can be used by all Malaysians,” Xavier said. “Today’s decision entrenches the fundamental freedom of religious rights for non-Muslims in Malaysia" enshrined in the constitution, he added.
Muslims account for about two-thirds of Malaysia's 32 million people, with large ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. Christians comprise about 10% of the population.
Most Christians in Malaysia worship in English, Tamil or various Chinese dialects, and refer to God in those languages, but some Malay-speaking people on the island of Borneo have no other word for God but Allah.
Three other words — “kaabah" or Islam's holiest shrine in Mecca, “baitullah" or house of God, and “solat" or prayer, were also banned in the 1986 government directive.
The United Malays National Organization and the conservative Islamic Party in joint statement said they viewed the court ruling with concern and demanded the government pursue the case in the Appeals Court. Home ministry officials couldn't be immediately reached for comment.
The government ban was introduced under the rule of an UMNO-led coalition, but the coalition was ousted in a historic 2018 elections. UMNO returned to govern under a new Malay-dominated government last year following a series of political maneuvers.
Government counsel Shamsul Bolhassan was quoted by The Star newspaper as saying that the four words can be used in Christian materials according to the court's ruling, as long as it clearly states it is intended for Christians only and a symbol of a cross is displayed.
The ruling was a result of a long legal challenge by a Christian woman whose religious materials containing the word Allah were seized by authorities at the airport when she returned home from Indonesia in 2008.
The controversy over the usage of Allah has provoked violence in Malaysia. Anger over a lower court ruling against the government ban in 2009 led to a string of arson attacks and vandalism at churches and other places of worship. That ruling was subsequently overturned by higher courts.
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/ma ... 32325.html
Associated Press Wed, March 10, 2021, 7:27 AM
A Malaysian court ruled Wednesday, March 10, 2021, that non-Muslims can use the word “Allah” to refer to God, in a major decision in a divisive issue for religious freedom in the Muslim-majority country.
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) — A Malaysian court ruled Wednesday that non-Muslims can use the word “Allah” to refer to God, in a major decision over a divisive issue for religious freedom in the Muslim-majority country.
Two ethnic Malay political parties immediately voiced concern and Thursday urged the government to challenge the ruling.
The High Court deemed unconstitutional a 35-year-old government ban on the usage of Allah and three other Arabic words by Christian publications, said the plaintiff's lawyer, Annou Xavier.
The government has previously said Allah should be reserved exclusively for Muslims to avoid confusion that could lead them to convert to other religions, a stance that is unique to Malaysia and hasn't been an issue in other Muslim-majority nations with sizeable Christian minorities.
Christian leaders in Malaysia say the ban is unreasonable because Christians who speak the Malay language have long used Allah, a Malay word derived from Arabic, in their Bibles, prayers and songs.
The high court ruling appeared to contradict an earlier decision by the country’s Federal Court in 2014 that upheld the government ban following a legal challenge by the Roman Catholic Church, which had used the word Allah in its Malay-language newsletter.
“The court has now said the word Allah can be used by all Malaysians,” Xavier said. “Today’s decision entrenches the fundamental freedom of religious rights for non-Muslims in Malaysia" enshrined in the constitution, he added.
Muslims account for about two-thirds of Malaysia's 32 million people, with large ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. Christians comprise about 10% of the population.
Most Christians in Malaysia worship in English, Tamil or various Chinese dialects, and refer to God in those languages, but some Malay-speaking people on the island of Borneo have no other word for God but Allah.
Three other words — “kaabah" or Islam's holiest shrine in Mecca, “baitullah" or house of God, and “solat" or prayer, were also banned in the 1986 government directive.
The United Malays National Organization and the conservative Islamic Party in joint statement said they viewed the court ruling with concern and demanded the government pursue the case in the Appeals Court. Home ministry officials couldn't be immediately reached for comment.
The government ban was introduced under the rule of an UMNO-led coalition, but the coalition was ousted in a historic 2018 elections. UMNO returned to govern under a new Malay-dominated government last year following a series of political maneuvers.
Government counsel Shamsul Bolhassan was quoted by The Star newspaper as saying that the four words can be used in Christian materials according to the court's ruling, as long as it clearly states it is intended for Christians only and a symbol of a cross is displayed.
The ruling was a result of a long legal challenge by a Christian woman whose religious materials containing the word Allah were seized by authorities at the airport when she returned home from Indonesia in 2008.
The controversy over the usage of Allah has provoked violence in Malaysia. Anger over a lower court ruling against the government ban in 2009 led to a string of arson attacks and vandalism at churches and other places of worship. That ruling was subsequently overturned by higher courts.
https://currently.att.yahoo.com/news/ma ... 32325.html
TODAY'S PAPER | MAY 12, 2021
Will OIC confront France?
Pervez Hoodbhoy Published May 8,
The writer is an Islamabad based physicist and writer.
WHEN PM Khan summoned OIC ambassadors to his office last Monday, he assigned their countries a new mission. So far Muslim countries have failed, he said, to convince the West — France particularly — that blasphemy against the Prophet (PBUH) was hurting sentiments of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims. This failure is causing endless trouble in Pakistan. The West must therefore curb freedom of expression and introduce blasphemy laws acceptable to Pakistan and the ummah. Would OIC’s ambassadors kindly double down to their job?
Ambassadors are trained not to raise difficult questions. But making powerful countries change their cherished beliefs and laws is not easy. Hence some might be tempted to ask:
Sir: we are all Muslims and deeply pained every time our beloved Prophet is disrespected. But please explain why violence erupts in your country but not in ours. When some blasphemy incident occurs in France or Denmark we simply condemn it, shout for a bit, and then move on. In our countries we don’t let protesters paralyze cities, torture and kill policemen, or set fire to property. Back home when we call such people terrorists, we actually shoot them dead. But you seem to be a kind man. True, you did declare the TLP as terrorist but then you immediately bargained and released 669 rioters even though they had injured 700 of your policemen and killed four officers. We next heard you saying that you share the TLP’s goals but not its methods. Your approach to terrorism puzzles us.
For Pakistan to keep its GSP-Plus status it will have to show the EU that it treats its blasphemy accused fairly.
Sir: we read in your newspapers that you agreed with TLP that the French ambassador’s expulsion should be debated in parliament. Of course we despise Emmanuel Macron. Who doesn’t? Still, none of our countries threatened to expel his ambassador. Anyway, the debate deadline of April 20, 2021, has long passed so kindly clarify whether there was a debate. Obviously we don’t know the outcome but we heard you saying in one of your near-daily addresses to the nation that Pakistan cannot sever relations with France lest the European Union react badly. Is that why we still see a French-looking gentleman strolling around in the diplomatic enclave? He doesn’t seem to have departure plans and Kohsar Market remains well stocked with French cheeses. Does this mean that the French ambassador will stay and French goods will not be boycotted? We hope to receive your guidance for onward transmission to our capitals.
Sir: if you don’t plan to expel the French or boycott their goods, how can we persuade our leaders back home to expel or boycott either? They will want to know from you how to force Westerners into accepting our demands. Of course, we completely understand that your economy hangs upon the West’s goodwill and so you have to be extra nice to them. As it is these days Covid-19 has made life tough for you. Thankfully, the West gave you some special aid to handle it but we see FATF and IMF conditions hanging around your neck. We are truly sorry that you cannot bring back the billions looted by your previous governments, get your citizens to pay their taxes, fix the head-to-toe corruption, and that your army’s spending is not for you to determine. In return we hope you will appreciate that although a few of us have lots of oil, we also can’t talk too loudly against those who supply us with weapons, technology, ideas and a comfortable life.
Sir: we can sense your panic at the recent EU parliamentary resolution seeking possible revocation of Pakistan’s GSP-Plus status. That it was approved 662 to three (with 26 not voting) must be worrying. We know that its implementation will wreck Pakistan’s textile exports and your economy may collapse. As it stands, Pakistan’s pre-Covid GDP annual growth rate of one per cent didn’t compare well with India’s (4.2pc) or Bangladesh’s (8.2pc). Now that the Americans have fled Afghanistan, Coalition Support Funds have dried up. As for the Chinese, who knows better than you how stingy they are on aid. We don’t have much advice here to offer but maybe you can get into the West’s good books by releasing those who have spent five to 10 years in jail awaiting trial for blasphemy? Stop mob lynchings? Give a modicum of religious freedom to your people? At least allow your blasphemy laws to be discussed? Yes, we know we OIC folks aren’t great on human rights but your country and Shireen Mazari still surprises us.
Sir: we much appreciate the trust you place in us to find a joint strategy against Europe but we feel you are a tad too optimistic about our unity. Frankly, we Muslim colleagues can’t agree on any big issue, including iftar timings and moon sightings. Some of us have recognized Israel, others are on the brink, and yet others say they will fight that Zionist entity till death. We differ on practically everything, including the war in Yemen. As for Kashmir, we didn’t want to offend you last December and so upon your repeated insistence — and that of Shah Mahmood Qureshi — we did eventually pass the resolution you wanted so badly. But you know well that we don’t want to offend India either and we won’t lift a finger to hurt it. That’s all that we are allowed to say as diplomats.
Mr Prime Minister: we agree with you that the French are a bad, blasphemous, laïcité-afflicted people. It’s therefore terribly sad that so many of us Muslims — and your countrymen in particular — are still lining up for French visas and millions of Muslims continue to live in Europe. None want to leave France or EU. Finally, we know its Islamophobia that upsets you and not Muslimophobia. But on your borders the Chinese are beating the daylights out of Uighur Muslims. Of course, we are quite aware that you don’t know anything about that but the facts are just a click away. May we therefore request that upon your next jaunt to Beijing you whisper to President Xi Jinping to be just a little nicer to them? Thank you, sir.
The writer is an Islamabad based physicist and writer.
Published in Dawn, May 8th, 2021
https://www.dawn.com/news/1622674/will- ... ont-france
Will OIC confront France?
Pervez Hoodbhoy Published May 8,
The writer is an Islamabad based physicist and writer.
WHEN PM Khan summoned OIC ambassadors to his office last Monday, he assigned their countries a new mission. So far Muslim countries have failed, he said, to convince the West — France particularly — that blasphemy against the Prophet (PBUH) was hurting sentiments of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims. This failure is causing endless trouble in Pakistan. The West must therefore curb freedom of expression and introduce blasphemy laws acceptable to Pakistan and the ummah. Would OIC’s ambassadors kindly double down to their job?
Ambassadors are trained not to raise difficult questions. But making powerful countries change their cherished beliefs and laws is not easy. Hence some might be tempted to ask:
Sir: we are all Muslims and deeply pained every time our beloved Prophet is disrespected. But please explain why violence erupts in your country but not in ours. When some blasphemy incident occurs in France or Denmark we simply condemn it, shout for a bit, and then move on. In our countries we don’t let protesters paralyze cities, torture and kill policemen, or set fire to property. Back home when we call such people terrorists, we actually shoot them dead. But you seem to be a kind man. True, you did declare the TLP as terrorist but then you immediately bargained and released 669 rioters even though they had injured 700 of your policemen and killed four officers. We next heard you saying that you share the TLP’s goals but not its methods. Your approach to terrorism puzzles us.
For Pakistan to keep its GSP-Plus status it will have to show the EU that it treats its blasphemy accused fairly.
Sir: we read in your newspapers that you agreed with TLP that the French ambassador’s expulsion should be debated in parliament. Of course we despise Emmanuel Macron. Who doesn’t? Still, none of our countries threatened to expel his ambassador. Anyway, the debate deadline of April 20, 2021, has long passed so kindly clarify whether there was a debate. Obviously we don’t know the outcome but we heard you saying in one of your near-daily addresses to the nation that Pakistan cannot sever relations with France lest the European Union react badly. Is that why we still see a French-looking gentleman strolling around in the diplomatic enclave? He doesn’t seem to have departure plans and Kohsar Market remains well stocked with French cheeses. Does this mean that the French ambassador will stay and French goods will not be boycotted? We hope to receive your guidance for onward transmission to our capitals.
Sir: if you don’t plan to expel the French or boycott their goods, how can we persuade our leaders back home to expel or boycott either? They will want to know from you how to force Westerners into accepting our demands. Of course, we completely understand that your economy hangs upon the West’s goodwill and so you have to be extra nice to them. As it is these days Covid-19 has made life tough for you. Thankfully, the West gave you some special aid to handle it but we see FATF and IMF conditions hanging around your neck. We are truly sorry that you cannot bring back the billions looted by your previous governments, get your citizens to pay their taxes, fix the head-to-toe corruption, and that your army’s spending is not for you to determine. In return we hope you will appreciate that although a few of us have lots of oil, we also can’t talk too loudly against those who supply us with weapons, technology, ideas and a comfortable life.
Sir: we can sense your panic at the recent EU parliamentary resolution seeking possible revocation of Pakistan’s GSP-Plus status. That it was approved 662 to three (with 26 not voting) must be worrying. We know that its implementation will wreck Pakistan’s textile exports and your economy may collapse. As it stands, Pakistan’s pre-Covid GDP annual growth rate of one per cent didn’t compare well with India’s (4.2pc) or Bangladesh’s (8.2pc). Now that the Americans have fled Afghanistan, Coalition Support Funds have dried up. As for the Chinese, who knows better than you how stingy they are on aid. We don’t have much advice here to offer but maybe you can get into the West’s good books by releasing those who have spent five to 10 years in jail awaiting trial for blasphemy? Stop mob lynchings? Give a modicum of religious freedom to your people? At least allow your blasphemy laws to be discussed? Yes, we know we OIC folks aren’t great on human rights but your country and Shireen Mazari still surprises us.
Sir: we much appreciate the trust you place in us to find a joint strategy against Europe but we feel you are a tad too optimistic about our unity. Frankly, we Muslim colleagues can’t agree on any big issue, including iftar timings and moon sightings. Some of us have recognized Israel, others are on the brink, and yet others say they will fight that Zionist entity till death. We differ on practically everything, including the war in Yemen. As for Kashmir, we didn’t want to offend you last December and so upon your repeated insistence — and that of Shah Mahmood Qureshi — we did eventually pass the resolution you wanted so badly. But you know well that we don’t want to offend India either and we won’t lift a finger to hurt it. That’s all that we are allowed to say as diplomats.
Mr Prime Minister: we agree with you that the French are a bad, blasphemous, laïcité-afflicted people. It’s therefore terribly sad that so many of us Muslims — and your countrymen in particular — are still lining up for French visas and millions of Muslims continue to live in Europe. None want to leave France or EU. Finally, we know its Islamophobia that upsets you and not Muslimophobia. But on your borders the Chinese are beating the daylights out of Uighur Muslims. Of course, we are quite aware that you don’t know anything about that but the facts are just a click away. May we therefore request that upon your next jaunt to Beijing you whisper to President Xi Jinping to be just a little nicer to them? Thank you, sir.
The writer is an Islamabad based physicist and writer.
Published in Dawn, May 8th, 2021
https://www.dawn.com/news/1622674/will- ... ont-france
This Is How Theocracy Shrivels
Taliban fighters praying at the Pul-I-Khishti Mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Friday.Credit...Marcus Yam/Los
Certain years leap out as turning points in world history: 1517, 1776 and 1917. These are years when powerful ideas strode onto the world stage: the Reformation, democratic capitalism and revolutionary Communism.
The period around 1979 was another such dawn. Political Islam burst onto global consciousness with the Iranian revolution, the rise of the mujahedeen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamization program in Pakistan and the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world.
The ideas that seized the imagination of millions had deep and diverse intellectual roots. For example, the mid-20th century thinker Sayyid Qutb mounted a comprehensive critique of the soulless materialism of America, tracing it in part to the separation of church and state — the fatal error, he believed, that divided the spirit from the flesh. In the Muslim world, he argued, body and soul should not be split asunder, but should live united in a resurrected caliphate, governed by Shariah law.
This vision could manifest in more temperate ways, as clerics seeking to exercise political power, or in more violent ways, as jihadists trying to overthrow Arab regimes.
By 2006, in an essay called “The Master Plan,” Lawrence Wright could report in The New Yorker how Al Qaeda had operationalized these dreams into a set of sweeping, violent strategies. The plans were epic in scope: expel the U.S. from Iraq, establish a caliphate, overthrow Arab regimes, initiate a clash with Israel, undermine Western economies, create “total confrontation” between believers and nonbelievers, and achieve “definitive victory” by 2020, transforming world history.
These were the sorts of bold dreams that drove Islamist terrorism in the first part of the 21st century.
To the terrorists behind Thursday’s bombing outside the Kabul airport, the murder of more than a dozen Americans and scores of Afghans may seem like a step toward that utopia. The humbling American withdrawal from Afghanistan may to them seem like a catastrophic defeat for Western democracy and a great leap toward the dream of a unified Muslim community.
But something has changed over the past several years. The magnetic ideas at the heart of so many of these movements have lost their luster.
If extremists thought they could mobilize Muslim opinion through acts of clarifying violence, they have failed. Across 11 lands in which Pew surveyed Muslims in 2013, a median of only 13 percent had a favorable opinion of Al Qaeda.
In his 2011 book, “The Missing Martyrs,” Charles Kurzman showed that fewer than one in every 100,000 Muslims had become an Islamist terrorist in the years since 9/11. The vast majority rejected the enterprise.
When political Islamists tried to establish theocratically influenced rule in actual nations, their movement’s reputation was badly hurt. In one of extremism’s most violent, radical manifestations, the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria became a blood-drenched nightmare.
But even in more moderate places, political Islam is losing favor. In 2019, The Economist surveyed the data and concluded, “Across the Arab world people are turning against religious political parties and the clerics who helped bring them to power. Many appear to be giving up on Islam, too.” Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi of Iran noticed the trend in his own country: “Iranians are evading religious teachings and turning to secularism.”
Globally, terrorism is down. Deaths from attacks fell by 59 percent between 2014 and 2019. Al Qaeda’s core members haven’t successfully attacked the U.S. homeland since 9/11. In 2017, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, began a process of marginalizing radical Wahhabism.
Experts see Islamic extremism’s fortunes slipping away. “The past two decades,” Nelly Lahoud writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, “have made clear just how little jihadi groups can hope to accomplish. They stand a far better chance of achieving eternal life in paradise than of bringing the United States to its knees.”
In The Washington Post, Fareed Zakaria notes that “most Islamist terrorism today tends to be local — the Taliban in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa. That’s a major reversal from the glory days of Al Qaeda, when its leaders insisted that the focus must be not on the ‘near enemy’ (the local regimes) but rather the ‘far enemy’ (the United States and the West more broadly).”
In this humiliating month, as the Taliban takes power in Afghanistan and ISIS still spreads mayhem, it’s obvious that even local conflicts can create incredible danger. But the idea of global glory — a fundamental shaking of the world order — that burst on the world stage roughly 40 years ago has been brought low.
The problem has not been eliminated by any means, but it has shrunk.
We blundered when we sought to defeat a powerful idea through some decisive military victory. But much is achieved when we keep up the pressure, guard the homeland, promote liberal ideas and allow theocracy to shrivel under the weight of its own flaws.
The men and women, in and out of uniform, who have done this work over the past 40 years, and are still giving their lives to it, deserve our gratitude and admiration.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/opin ... 778d3e6de3
Taliban fighters praying at the Pul-I-Khishti Mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Friday.Credit...Marcus Yam/Los
Certain years leap out as turning points in world history: 1517, 1776 and 1917. These are years when powerful ideas strode onto the world stage: the Reformation, democratic capitalism and revolutionary Communism.
The period around 1979 was another such dawn. Political Islam burst onto global consciousness with the Iranian revolution, the rise of the mujahedeen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamization program in Pakistan and the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world.
The ideas that seized the imagination of millions had deep and diverse intellectual roots. For example, the mid-20th century thinker Sayyid Qutb mounted a comprehensive critique of the soulless materialism of America, tracing it in part to the separation of church and state — the fatal error, he believed, that divided the spirit from the flesh. In the Muslim world, he argued, body and soul should not be split asunder, but should live united in a resurrected caliphate, governed by Shariah law.
This vision could manifest in more temperate ways, as clerics seeking to exercise political power, or in more violent ways, as jihadists trying to overthrow Arab regimes.
By 2006, in an essay called “The Master Plan,” Lawrence Wright could report in The New Yorker how Al Qaeda had operationalized these dreams into a set of sweeping, violent strategies. The plans were epic in scope: expel the U.S. from Iraq, establish a caliphate, overthrow Arab regimes, initiate a clash with Israel, undermine Western economies, create “total confrontation” between believers and nonbelievers, and achieve “definitive victory” by 2020, transforming world history.
These were the sorts of bold dreams that drove Islamist terrorism in the first part of the 21st century.
To the terrorists behind Thursday’s bombing outside the Kabul airport, the murder of more than a dozen Americans and scores of Afghans may seem like a step toward that utopia. The humbling American withdrawal from Afghanistan may to them seem like a catastrophic defeat for Western democracy and a great leap toward the dream of a unified Muslim community.
But something has changed over the past several years. The magnetic ideas at the heart of so many of these movements have lost their luster.
If extremists thought they could mobilize Muslim opinion through acts of clarifying violence, they have failed. Across 11 lands in which Pew surveyed Muslims in 2013, a median of only 13 percent had a favorable opinion of Al Qaeda.
In his 2011 book, “The Missing Martyrs,” Charles Kurzman showed that fewer than one in every 100,000 Muslims had become an Islamist terrorist in the years since 9/11. The vast majority rejected the enterprise.
When political Islamists tried to establish theocratically influenced rule in actual nations, their movement’s reputation was badly hurt. In one of extremism’s most violent, radical manifestations, the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria became a blood-drenched nightmare.
But even in more moderate places, political Islam is losing favor. In 2019, The Economist surveyed the data and concluded, “Across the Arab world people are turning against religious political parties and the clerics who helped bring them to power. Many appear to be giving up on Islam, too.” Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi of Iran noticed the trend in his own country: “Iranians are evading religious teachings and turning to secularism.”
Globally, terrorism is down. Deaths from attacks fell by 59 percent between 2014 and 2019. Al Qaeda’s core members haven’t successfully attacked the U.S. homeland since 9/11. In 2017, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, began a process of marginalizing radical Wahhabism.
Experts see Islamic extremism’s fortunes slipping away. “The past two decades,” Nelly Lahoud writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, “have made clear just how little jihadi groups can hope to accomplish. They stand a far better chance of achieving eternal life in paradise than of bringing the United States to its knees.”
In The Washington Post, Fareed Zakaria notes that “most Islamist terrorism today tends to be local — the Taliban in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa. That’s a major reversal from the glory days of Al Qaeda, when its leaders insisted that the focus must be not on the ‘near enemy’ (the local regimes) but rather the ‘far enemy’ (the United States and the West more broadly).”
In this humiliating month, as the Taliban takes power in Afghanistan and ISIS still spreads mayhem, it’s obvious that even local conflicts can create incredible danger. But the idea of global glory — a fundamental shaking of the world order — that burst on the world stage roughly 40 years ago has been brought low.
The problem has not been eliminated by any means, but it has shrunk.
We blundered when we sought to defeat a powerful idea through some decisive military victory. But much is achieved when we keep up the pressure, guard the homeland, promote liberal ideas and allow theocracy to shrivel under the weight of its own flaws.
The men and women, in and out of uniform, who have done this work over the past 40 years, and are still giving their lives to it, deserve our gratitude and admiration.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/opin ... 778d3e6de3
What was the relationship between government and religion in Middle Eastern and North African history? In a world of caliphs, sultans, and judges, who exercised political and religious authority? In this book, Ali Humayun Akhtar investigates debates about leadership that involved ruling circles and scholars of jurisprudence and theology. At the heart of this story is a medieval rivalry between three caliphates: the Umayyads of Cordoba, the Fatimids of Cairo, and the Abbasids of Baghdad. In a fascinating revival of Late Antique Hellenism, Aristotelian and Platonicnotions of wisdom became a key component of how these caliphs debated their authority as political leaders. By tracing how these political debates impacted the theological and jurisprudential scholars (ulama) and their own conception of communal guidance, Akhtar offers a newpicture of premodern political authority and the connections between Western and Islamic civilizations. It will be of use to students and specialists of the premodern and modern Middle East and North Africa.Ali Humayun Akhtar is an Assistant Professor at Bates College. He is also the Robert M. Kingdon Fellow at the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He holds a PhDin History and Middle Eastern Studies from New York University
pdf of the book at:
https://www.academia.edu/37865106/Philo ... card=title