Pluralism in Islamic Ummah

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UChicago Shi'i Studies Group Symposium: Sectarian Identity and Community Formation in Islam - Oct 26-27, 2018

The University of Chicago Shi'i Studies Group
Franke Institue for the Humanities
1100 E 57th St, Chicago, IL 60637
Free and Open to the Public

Agenda and more:

https://shii-studies-sites.uchicago.edu/

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Pakistan’s Supreme Court acquits a woman accused of blasphemy

But the government could still undermine this healthy precedent

Nine years ago Asia Bibi, a poor farm labourer from Pakistan’s tiny Christian minority, went to fetch a jug of water from a well for the Muslim women working beside her in the fields. It was a hot day. She took a sip before passing the water on, inadvertently initiating a furore that has lasted ever since.

On October 31st the Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the lower courts and acquitted Ms Asia of blasphemy. The charges stemmed from her neighbours’ anger that an “unclean” Christian had dared to share their drinking vessel. Ms Asia’s fellow fruit-pickers had demanded she convert to Islam. After she refused, a mob accused her of insulting the Prophet Muhammad—an offence punishable by death in Pakistan. The mother of five has languished in a windowless cell ever since, at great cost to her mental health. In 2011 Islamist extremists murdered Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, two politicians who had dared to speak in Ms Asia’s defence. In 2016 a Supreme Court judge recused himself from hearing her appeal, delaying proceedings until earlier this year. Ms Asia’s long detention and possible hanging had come to symbolise the inability of the state to stand up to religious bigotry.

More...
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/ ... m=20181031

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Blasphemy, Pakistan’s New Religion

KARACHI, Pakistan — After spending eight years on death row, Asia Bibi, a Christian, was acquitted by Pakistan’s Supreme Court this week. For many here it seemed like a good day. The country’s highest court had finally delivered justice and released a woman whose life has already been destroyed by years in solitary confinement. The court decision quoted Islamic scriptures, bits of letters by the Prophet Muhammad and a smattering of Shakespeare. A great wrong was righted.

And that’s why Pakistan’s new religious right, which has rebranded itself as the protector of the Prophet’s honor, has threatened to bring the country to a halt.

Posters were put up with fatwas against the judges who had issued the Bibi decision. The judges’ guards and cooks were urged to kill them before evening; anyone who did would earn great rewards in the afterlife. Pakistani conservatives, emboldened by gains in the general election this summer, goaded the generals into rebelling against the army chief, whom they accused of being an Ahmadi, a persecuted religious minority. They called Prime Minister Imran Khan a “Jew child.”

Khan, in an impromptu address to the nation, seemed appalled at the language and the implication: He said his government had already done more than any other for Islam and warned protesters not to take on the state. But the mobs will settle for nothing short of Bibi’s public hanging.

More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/opin ... dline&te=1

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Udasi Sikh Saints of Sindh

The Sindhi Muslim mystics of Sindh always welcomed Hindu and Sikh ascetics to their religious dominions, sometimes even providing them properties to establish their temples and darbars (Sikh shrines). This liberal attitude of Sindhi Muslim saints acted as a catalyst for many of the ascetics who started pouring in Sindh for their missionary activities. The most prominent ascetics were the Udasi Sikhs who after the itinerant Baba Sri Chand’s arrival in Sindh made that region the centre of their missionary activities. Presently, there is a shrine of an Udasi saint almost in every town and city of Sindh, reflecting the heterodox nature of all of the shrines. Both Khalsa and Udasi Sikh shrines are found in Sindh but a majority of these belong to Udasi saints who venerate both the Sikh Gurus and Hindu deities, a syncretic culture which is not now seen elsewhere in Pakistan. The Udasi panth is believed to have been founded by Baba Sri Chand (1494-1629), the elder son of Baba Guru Nanak (1469-1539). The term Udasi is derived from the Sanskrit udasin, meaning to be detached from worldly concerns. It also signifies renunciation. The majority of the Udasi shrines in Sindh are called Udasi orUdasin darbars.

More and photos:

https://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/udas ... -of-sindh/

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UAE a perfect example of tolerance, integration and acceptance of 'the other' , says Ismaili community leader

DUBAI, 3rd February, 2019 (WAM) -- The United Arab Emirates is "a great embodiment of the spirit of tolerance, pluralism and empathy, in the presence of people representing more than 200 nationalities living in peace, harmony and success on the UAE land," according to Ameeruddin Thanawalla, President of the Ismaili Community in Dubai.

The choice of the UAE by His Holiness Pope Francis, Head of the Catholic Church, as the first country in the Gulf to which to pay a visit, he said, is proof of its great international position, especially in humanitarian work, as a global centre for human coexistence and tolerance.

In a statement to the Emirates News Agency, WAM, Thanawalla said, "The UAE is keen to spread the culture of tolerance not only at the local level, but also at the global level through cooperation with the greatest religious figures, such as His Holiness Pope Francis, who is a global religious symbol who plays a leading role in establishing bridges of dialogue and brotherhood between different religions in the world."

"The UAE," he added, "is a perfect example of tolerance, integration and acceptance of the other, and the best example of what the future can be."

Thanawalla went on to recall the statement by the Aga Khan, spiritual leader and 49th Imam of the Ismaili Muslims, at the groundbreaking for the Ismaili Centre in Dubai.

"Let me take this occasion," he quoted the Aga Khan as saying, "to pay tribute to the experience of the Emirates which, like the lesson of Islam's history, illustrates admirably what heights are achievable, in realising human potential, when national interest and Muslim identity are anchored in values our historical values that widen intellectual horizons, and help to build bridges of friendship and understanding."

WAM/PH

WAM/Esraa Ismail/Rasha Abubaker

https://menafn.com/1098063683/UAE-a-per ... ity-leader

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Beyond Sacred: Voices of Muslim Identity

Beyond Sacred: Voices of Muslim Identity illuminates the daily experiences of five young Muslim Americans who came of age in a post-9/11 society, and who are building their lives in a time of continued fear of and violence towards Muslims. The cast members are from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and reflect a wide range of Muslim identities, including those who have converted to Islam, those who were raised Muslim but have since left the faith, those who identify as "culturally" Muslim, and those who are observant on a daily basis.

"A beautiful, funny, and intensely poignant cry for tolerance" (Santa Barbara Independent), Beyond Sacred supports greater dialogues and understanding among and between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Beyond Sacred was developed through a community engaged process as part of Ping Chong + Company's Undesirable Elements series. Celebrating its 25-year anniversary in 2017-2018, Undesirable Elements is an ongoing series of oral history theater works exploring the effects of history, culture, and ethnicity on the lives of individuals in a community. The series is community specific and is made through a collaborative interview and workshop process, including an extended residency and rehearsal period during which Ping Chong and collaborators conduct intensive interviews with potential participants, who then become the performers, sharing their true stories with audiences. Their interviews form the basis of a script that weaves together the historical and personal narratives of individuals who are in some way living between two cultures. Incorporating theatre, dance, song, and projection, Undesirable Elements is a moving testimonial to the unexpected connections that can unite seemingly different people.

More...

https://asiasociety.org/texas/events/be ... m-identity

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The Moroccan Exception in the Arab World

King Mohammed VI is carrying out a wide-ranging effort to revive his country’s Jewish heritage.

TANGIER, Morocco — On a recent balmy spring afternoon, a group of Muslim Moroccan students visited Rabbi Akiba, a jewelbox of a synagogue down an arched passageway in the Siaghine area of Tangier. Constructed in the mid-19th century, the synagogue underwent a meticulous renovation and recently reopened as a museum.

The students peered at the polished marble floors from the women’s balcony and examined a threadbare, hand-drawn map of the synagogues in the neighborhood. The tour of Rabbi Akiba is just one of many ways that Muslim students in Morocco are learning about their country’s Jewish heritage.

While Judaism in the Middle East and North Africa often evokes images of hostility, in Morocco, where we were born and raised, in Jewish (Ms. Azagury) and Muslim (Mr. Majid) families, that picture isn’t quite accurate. Our country boasts a rich history of Jewish-Muslim cohabitation, and in the past several years, the kingdom has taken significant steps to strengthen it.

More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/opin ... dline&te=1

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Ismaili Islam (Ismailism): History, Theology & Ritual Part 1/3 (Intro & History)

Video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66_1oIm9cGo

This lecture was delivered by Khalil Andani on April 8/2019 at the invitation of the Harvard Islamic Society. View on 1080p for best quality.
The full presentation covers the History, Theology and Ritual Practices of the Nizari Ismaili Muslims. The first segment (1 of 3) contains the following material:

1. Accounting for Muslim Diversity: "Sects" vs. Multiple Islams
2. The Prophetic-Revelatory Authority of Prophet Muhammad
3. Shi'at 'Ali: Origins of Shii Islam
4. Overview of Ismaili Muslim History
5. Contemporary Ismaili Imamat: Aga Khan III, Aga Khan IV & the AKDN

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The Impossible Future of Christians in the Middle East

An ancient faith is disappearing from the lands in which it first took root. At stake is not just a religious community, but the fate of pluralism in the region.

Excerpt:

But the fate of Christianity in places like the Nineveh Plain has a geopolitical significance as well. Religious minorities test a country’s tolerance for pluralism; a healthy liberal democracy protects vulnerable groups and allows them to participate freely in society. Whether Christians can survive, and thrive, in Muslim-majority countries is a crucial indicator of whether democracy, too, is viable in those places. In Iraq, the outlook is grim, as it is in other nations in the region that are home to historic Christian populations, including Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. Christians who live in these places are subject to discrimination, government-sanctioned intimidation, and routine violence.

More...

https://www.theatlantic.com/internation ... MDU2NzM4S0

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Communities of Interpretation in Islam II

The internal divisions of the Shi‘i community - as highlighted in the first part of this article, which was published in the last edition of The Ismaili USA - can be traced to the dispute over the succession to Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 148/765 CE). After his death, the majority of his followers eventually recognized his son Musa al-Kazim (d. 183/799 CE) as their next Imam. However, the other Shi‘i groups acknowledged the Imamat of Musa’s eldest half-brother Isma‘il, the eponym of the Isma‘ili Shi‘ia, or his son Muhammad b. Isma‘il as successors to the Imamat. Little is known about the life and career of Muhammad b. Isma‘il, the seventh Imam of the Isma‘ilis, who went into hiding, initiating a period of concealment (dawr al-satr) in early Ismaili history. This period of concealment lasted until the foundation of the Fatimid caliphate when the Ismaili Imams emerged openly as Fatimid Caliphs. Henceforth Imam Muhammad b. Isma‘il acquired the epithet al-Maktum (the hidden one), in addition to al-Maymun (the fortunate one).

The followers of Imam Muhammad b. Isma‘il, the Isma‘ili Shi‘ia, lived in very perilous circumstances in various localities. By the middle of the 9th century, the Imams had settled in Salamiyya in Syria. During this period, they concealed their identity from the public and sought to consolidate and organize the widely dispersed Ismaili community. The scholars and local leaders of the Ismailis, known as da‘is or ‘summoners’, maintained contact with the Imams and organized themselves into a da‘wa, a network of shared commitment to the Imam and intellectual values. When they emerged into the public limelight at the beginning of the 10th century, the Ismaili community was remarkably well organized and cohesive.

The Ismaili da‘is sought to extend their influence and forge alliances to create the foundations of an Ismaili state under the rule of the Imam. The opportunity of laying the foundations for a state gained momentum at the beginning of the 10th century, when the Ismaili Imam of the Time, ‘Abdallah, moved from Syria to North Africa. In 910 CE, he was proclaimed Amir al-Mu’minin (‘Commander of the Believers’), with the title of al-Mahdi (‘The Guided One’, equivalent to the idea of ‘The Saviour’). The dynasty of the Ismaili Imams, who for more than two centuries reigned over an extensive empire centered in Egypt, adopted the title of al-Fatimiyyun (commonly known as the Fatimids), after Fatima - Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and the wife of Imam ‘Ali, from whom the Ismaili Imams descended. The proclamation of Imam ‘Abdallah al-Mahdi as the first Fatimid Caliph marked the beginning of the Ismaili attempt to give a concrete shape to their vision of Shi‘i Islam.

The Fatimid period represented the ‘golden age’ of Ismaili Shi‘ism, when the Ismailis possessed a state of their own, and Ismaili scholarship and literature attained their summit. The Fatimids expanded their influence and authority, from their initial base in the present-day Tunisia, advancing to Egypt during the reign of the fourth Fatimid Imam and Caliph, Al-Mu‘izz. In 973 CE, Imam-Caliph al-Mu‘izz transferred the Fatimid capital from North Africa to the new city of al-Qahira (Cairo), which was founded by the Fatimids in 969 CE. Henceforth, Cairo became the centre of a flourishing empire, which at its peak extended westward to North Africa, Sicily, and other Mediterranean locations, and eastward to Palestine, Syria, Yemen, and Hijaz with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The founding of the Fatimid caliphate also provided the opportunity to spread the Ismaili Shi‘i da‘wa. The religio-political messages of the Ismaili da‘wa were disseminated by networks of da‘is within the Fatimid dominions as well as in other regions. The Fatimid da‘wa activities reached their peak in the long reign of Imam al-Mustansir Bi’llah. The da‘is successfully converted many in Iraq, Persia, Central and South Asia, as well as in Yemen. Some of the most eminent da‘is and scholars of the Fatimid da‘wa were: Abu Ya‘qub al-Sijistani, al-Qadi al-Nu‘man, Hamid al-Din al-Kirmani, al-Mu’ayyad fi’l-Din al-Shirazi and Nasir-i Khusraw.

In the last decade of the 11th century, the Ismaili da‘wa witnessed a schism over the question of succession to the Imam and Caliph al-Mustansir Bi’llah (d.1094 CE). One section of the Ismaili communities of Egypt, Yemen and western India recognized his younger son al-Musta‘li, who had succeeded to the Fatimid throne as the next caliph. The other faction based in Persia, under the leadership of Hasan-i Sabbah supported al-Mustansir’s elder son and designated heir, Nizar, as the rightful Imam. The Nizari Ismaili Imams of modern times, known under their hereditary title of the Aga Khan, trace their descent to Imam Nizar. Today, the two Ismaili branches are known as the Musta‘li and Nizari, named after al-Mustansir’s sons who claimed his heritage.

The Nizari Ismailis

The seat of the Nizari Imamat was originally established in Iran, where the Ismailis had already succeeded, under the leadership of Hasan-i Sabbah, in founding a state comprised of a network of fortified settlements, with its headquarters at Alamut, in northern Iran. The Nizari state later extended to parts of Syria. However, rivalries among Muslims over issues of power and territory continued in medieval times. In particular, the Nizaris were obliged to struggle against the Saljuq Turks and other adversaries that threatened their existence.

It was within this context of debilitating warfare among Muslims, shifting alliances and the rising Mongol threat that the Nizari Ismaili Imam Jalal al-Din Hasan (d. 1210-1221 CE), who ruled from Alamut, embarked on a policy of rapprochement with Sunni rulers. The Sunnis reciprocated positively, and the Abbasid Caliph al-Nasir acknowledged the legitimacy of the Ismaili Imam’s rule over a territorial state. Imam Jalal al-Din’s policy - similar to his Fatimid forebears - was a practical affirmation that whilst differences in the interpretation of the Islamic message existed among Muslims, what mattered most were the overarching principles that united them all.

The Ismaili state centered at Alamut, was uprooted by the Mongols in 1256 CE. Subsequently, many Nizari Ismaili groups found refuge in Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, and the Indian subcontinent, where large Ismaili settlements already existed. The centralized da‘wa organisation and direct leadership of the Nizari Imams disappeared for a while with the fall of the Ismaili state. Under these circumstances, scattered Nizari communities developed independently, following the leadership of local dynasties of da‘is, pirs, and mirs, while resorting to the strict observance of taqiyya (dissimulation) and adopting different external guises. For example, given the esoteric nature of the Ismaili tradition, the Ismailis who remained in Iran disguised their identity under the cover of sufism to escape persecution.

This practice gained wide currency also among the Nizari Ismailis of Central Asia, to the extent that the Ismaili Imams appeared to outsiders as Sufi masters starting with Imam Mustansir bi’llah II (d.558/1480), who carried the Sufi name of Shah Qalandar. However, in the 14th century, new centers of Nizari activity were established in the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan, the mountainous regions of Hindukush, Central Asia, and parts of China. In South Asia, the Nizari Ismailis became known as Khojas, and they developed a distinctive devotional literature known as the ginans.

The Modern Phase

The modern phase of Nizari Ismaili history, as with other Muslims, can be dated to the 19th century. As a result of political turmoils in Iran during the 1840s, the 46th Nizari Ismaili Imam, Hasan ‘Ali Shah, migrated to India. He was the first Nizari Imam to bear the title of the Aga Khan, which was granted to him by the Persian monarch Fath ‘Ali Shah Qajar. His leadership enabled the community in India to lay the foundations for institutional and social developments and also fostered more regular contacts with Ismaili communities in other parts of the world. After his death in 1881, he was succeeded by his son Imam ‘Ali Shah, Aga Khan II, who continued to build on the institutions created by his father, with a particular emphasis on providing modern education for the community. He also played an important role in representing Muslims in the emerging political institutions under British rule in India.

Following his early death in 1885, Aga Khan II was succeeded by his eight-year old son, Imam Sultan Mahomed Shah, Aga Khan III. Imam Sultan Mahomed Shah reigned as Imam for seventy-two years - the longest in Ismaili history - and his life spanned dramatic political, social and economic transformations. His long-term involvement in international affairs, his advocacy of Muslim interests in troubled times, and his commitment to the advancement of education, particularly for Muslim women, reflect some of his significant achievements. It was under his leadership as Imam that the Nizari Ismailis were transformed into a progressive community, enabling them to adapt successfully to the challenges of the 20th century.

Imam Sultan Mahomed Shah was succeeded by his grandson Shah Karim al-Husayni, in 1957, as the forty-ninth Imam of the Nizari Ismaili community, who has substantially expanded the modernization policies of his grandfather. Indeed, he has created a complex institutional network, referred to as the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which implements numerous projects in a variety of social, economic and cultural domains.

Mawlana Hazar Imam has been particularly concerned with the education of Ismailis and Muslims in general. In the field of higher education, his major initiatives include: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, founded in London in 1977 for the promotion of general Islamic as well as Shi‘i and Ismaili studies, and the Aga Khan University in Pakistan and Africa, with faculties in medicine, nursing and education, as well as its Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations, based in London. In 2000, he founded the University of Central Asia with campuses in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which aim to address the specific educational needs of the region's mountain-based societies. Mawlana Hazar Imam takes a personal interest in the operations of all his institutions, and activities.

Numbering more than ten million, today the Nizari Ismaili heritage includes cultural contributions of the Ismailis of Central Asia, South Asia, Iran and the Arab Middle East. During the 19th and 20th centuries, many Ismailis from South Asia migrated to Africa and settled there. In more recent times, Ismailis have also migrated to North America, Europe and Asia Pacific countries. However, despite such a diversity of ethnicity and cultures, the shared values that unite Nizari Ismailis are centered on their allegiance to a living Imam. The guidance and the efforts of the Ismaili Imam have enabled the Ismaili community to emerge as progressive Shi‘i Muslims in more than twenty-five countries around the world, where they generally enjoy exemplary standards of living while retaining their distinctive religious identity.

Map at:

https://the.ismaili/usa/communities-int ... rce=Direct

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Ismaili Studies: A Teaching Guide & Sample Syllabus ~ Religion Compass

Khalil Andani

This is a Teaching and Learning Guide about Ismaili Muslim History and Thought for lay readers, students and instructors. Inside you will find a recommended list of books and a sample 12 week course syllabus on the Ismailis. This guide accompanies the following articles: Khalil Andani, A Survey of Ismaili Studies Part 1: Early Ismailism and Fatimid
Ismailism. Religion Compass 10/8 (2016): 191–206, DOI 10.1111/rec3.12205 and A Survey of Ismaili Studies Part 2: Post‐
Fatimid and Modern Ismailism. Religion Compass 10/11 (2016): 269–282. DOI: 10.1111/rec3.12222

The article can be accessed at:

https://www.academia.edu/36864720/Ismai ... view-paper

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Lifelong Learning Articles
The Water is One, but the Flowers are Coloured (Al-Ma’ Wahid, Zahru Alwan)

PLURALISM AND PIETY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

According to the author, “In cities and towns all across the world—from Karachi and Tehran to Jakarta and Dakkar, Muslims find ways to express their devotion through acts of piety, not only in mosques but also in spaces as diverse as khanaqahs, imambaras and Jamatkhanas. Each of these structures has its own characteristics, but at the same time shares a commitment to providing spaces for Muslims to congregate and practice their faith.”

Image: Bara Imambara — the world’s largest Shi‘a Ithna‘Ashari structure focused around the events of Muharam, in Lucknow, India.

Article at:

https://iicanada.org/sites/default/file ... _is_On.pdf

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Book

Communities of the Qur'an: Dialogue, Debate and Diversity in the 21st Century

Emran El-Badawi

Paula Sanders
What is the nature of the Qur'an? It might seem a straightforward question, but there is no consensus among modern communities of the Qur'an, both Muslim and non-Muslim, about the answer. And why should there be?

On numerous occasions throughout history, believers from different schools and denominations, and at different times and places, have agreed to disagree. The Qur'anic interpreters, jurists and theologians of medieval Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba coexisted peacefully in spite of their diverging beliefs. Seeking to revive this 'ethics of disagreement' of Classical Islam, this volume explores the different relationships societies around the world have with the Qur'an and how our understanding of the text can be shaped by studying the interpretations of others. From LGBT groups to urban African American communities, this book aims to represent the true diversity of communities of the Qur'an in the twenty-first century, and the dialogue and debate that can flow among them.



The entire book can be accessed at:

https://www.academia.edu/39304835/Commu ... st_Century

******
Chapter in the book: Professor Ali Asani: Nizari Ismaili Engagements with the Qur’an: The Khojas of South Asia

https://www.academia.edu/39914434/Asani ... South_Asia

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The Shia of India

Video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mx19SV3kmis

With 40 million Shia in India today, this documentary aims to unearth how and why Shia's migrated in such large numbers into the subcontinent with a look at the various dynasties where they ruled and contributed.

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Critical Conversations: Diversity in Islam - A Faith of Many Faces

Video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8f8Difu_Ok

ITREB Canada and ITREB USA present Critical Conversations, a virtual forum featuring faith-based perspectives on the questions of our time. Diversity in Islam: A Faith of Many Faces features Dr. Zul Hirji and Rahim Rajan and is moderated by Purnur Ilolova.

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Would the Prophet Muhammad Convert Hagia Sophia?

Turkey’s decision to change the former cathedral into a mosque flies against the pluralist instincts of Islam’s founders.

The recent decision by the Turkish government to reconvert the majestic Hagia Sophia, which was once the world’s greatest cathedral, from a museum back to a mosque has been bad news for Christians around the world. They include Pope Francis, who said he was “pained” by the move, and the spiritual leader of Eastern Christianity, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who said he was “saddened and shaken.” When contrasted with the joy of Turkey’s conservative Muslims, all this may seem like a new episode in an old story: Islam vs. Christianity.

But some Muslims, including myself, are not fully comfortable with this historic step, and for a good reason: forced conversion of shrines, which has occurred too many times in human history in all directions, can be questioned even from a purely Islamic point of view.

To see why, look closely into early Islam, which was born in seventh century Arabia as a monotheist campaign against polytheism. The Prophet Muhammad and his small group of believers saw the earlier monotheists — Jews and Christians — as allies. So when those first Muslims were persecuted in pagan Mecca, some found asylum in the Christian kingdom in Ethiopia. Years later, when the Prophet ruled Medina, he welcomed a group of Christians from the city of Najran to worship in his own mosque. He also signed a treaty with them, which read:

“There shall be no interference with the practice of their faith. … No bishop will be removed from his bishopric, no monk from his monastery, no priest from his parish.”

This religious pluralism was also reflected in the Quran, when it said God protects “monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of God is much mentioned.” (22:40) It is the only verse in the Quran that mentions churches — and only in a reverential tone.

To be sure, these theological affinities did not prevent political conflicts. Nor did they prevent Muslims, right after the Prophet’s passing, from conquering Christian lands, from Syria to Spain. Yet still, the early Muslim conquerors did something uncommon at the time: They did not touch the shrines of the subjugated peoples.

The Prophet’s spirit was best exemplified by his second successor, or caliph, Umar ibn Al-Khattab, soon after his conquest of Jerusalem in the year 637. The city, which had been ruled by Roman Christians for centuries, had been taken by Muslims after a long and bloody siege. Christians feared a massacre, but instead found aman, or safety. Caliph Umar, “the servant of God” and “the commander of the faithful,” gave them security “for their possessions, their churches and crosses.” He further assured:

“Their churches shall not be taken for residence and shall not be demolished … nor shall their crosses be removed.”

The Christian historian Eutychius even tells us that when Caliph Umar entered the city, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, invited him to pray at the holiest of all Christian shrines: the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Umar politely declined, saying that Muslims might later take this as a reason to convert the church into a mosque. He instead prayed at an empty area that Christians ignored but Jews honored, then as now, as their holiest site, the Temple Mount, where today the Western Wall, the last remnant of that ancient Jewish temple, rises to the top of the Mount, on which the Mosque of Umar and the Dome of the Rock were built.

In other words, Islam entered Jerusalem without really converting it. Even “four centuries after the Muslim conquest,” as the Israeli historian Oded Peri observes, “the urban landscape of Jerusalem was still dominated by Christian public and religious buildings.”

Yet Islam was becoming the religion of an empire, which, like all empires, had to justify its appetite for hegemony. Soon, some jurists found an excuse to overcome the Jerusalem model: There, Christians were given full security, because they had ultimately agreed on a peaceful surrender. The cities that resisted Muslim conquerors, however, were fair game for plunder, enslavement, and conversion of their churches.

In the words of the Turkish scholar Necmeddin Guney, this legitimatization of conversion of churches came from not the Quran nor the Prophetic example, but rather “administrative regulation.” The jurists who made this case, he adds, “were probably trying to create a society that makes manifest the supremacy of Islam in an age of religion wars.”

Another scholar, Fred Donner, an expert on early Islam, argues that this political drive even distorted records of the earlier state of affairs. For example, later versions of the aman given to the Christians of Damascus allotted Muslims “half of their homes and churches.” In the earlier version of the document, there was no such clause.

When the Ottomans reached the gates of Constantinople in 1453, Islamic attitudes had long been imperialized, and also toughened in the face of endless conflicts with the Crusaders. Using a disputed license of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence they followed, they converted Hagia Sophia and a few other major churches. But they also did other things that represent the better values of Islam: They gave full protection to not only Greek but also Armenian Christians, rebuilt Istanbul as a cosmopolitan city, and soon also welcomed the Spanish Jews who were fleeing the Catholic Inquisition.

Today, centuries later, the question for Turkey is what aspect of this complex Ottoman heritage is really more valuable.

For the religious conservatives who have rallied behind President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the past two decades, the main answer seems to be imperial glory embodied in an absolute ruler.

For other Turks, however, the greatness of the Ottomans lies in their pluralism, rooted at the very heart of Islam, and it would inspire different moves today — perhaps opening Hagia Sophia to both Muslim and Christian worship, as I have advised for years. Another would be reopening the Halki Seminary, a Christian school of theology that opened in 1844 under Ottoman auspices, went victim to secular nationalism in 1971, but is still closed despite all the calls from advocates for religious freedom.

For the broader Muslim world, Hagia Sophia is a reminder that our tradition includes both our everlasting faith and values, as well as a legacy of imperialism. The latter is a bitter fact of history, like Christian imperialism or nationalism, which have targeted our mosques and even lives as well — from Cordoba to Srebrenica. But today, we should try to heal such wounds of the past, not open new ones.

So, if we Muslims really want to revive something from the past, let’s focus on the model initiated by the Prophet and implemented by Caliph Umar. That means no shrines should be converted — or reconverted. All religious traditions should be respected. And the magnanimity of tolerance should overcome the pettiness of supremacism.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/opin ... ogin-email

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Video Quote: MHI on Diversity in Islam



Video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHmjkxo7rhA

Speech by His Highness the Aga Khan at the 2010 Aga Khan Award for Architecture ceremony, Doha, Qatar, 24 November 2010.

[mahebubchatur]

New Article on Pluralism based on guidance and Farmans of His Highness the Aga Khan since 1992. He has said Pluralism is a vital top priority - link to the Article

http://ismaili.net/timeline/2020/2020-1 ... ociety.pdf

What is Pluralism - Definition

“Pluralism is a choice which understands competing values and ethics as sources and forces of strength, and enacts those which are for the common good. Pluralism is not instinctive, and requires a continuum of education and learning. Ethics* of Pluralism are a part of the individual and institutional paradigm. Pluralism recognises all values, faiths, diversity, equity, humanity, inclusion, resilience, equality and innovation”
*ethics is the vehicle of our values in action. Ethics enact our ethical code values and implicit biases. For example, individuals and institutions can behave ethically or unethically. Ethics of pluralism can prevent or change a course of action (m chatur sept 2020)

#AgaKhan #Ismaili #Pluralism

[mahebubchatur]

Link http://www.ismaili.net/html/modules.php ... 1371#71371

[kmaherali]

Why India’s Muslims Reach for Liberalism

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi makes Hindus more equal than religious minorities, Muslims seek equality from the secular Constitution, not Shariah.

By now, the world knows that Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and his Hindu supremacist Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.) have eroded the liberal principles of the Indian Constitution and are turning the country into an increasingly illiberal democracy. It is common knowledge that Mr. Modi thrives on the grievances and bigotries that pit privileged majorities against minorities living in fear.

Less familiar, but much more hopeful, is the response of the main target of this majoritarian assault: India’s Muslim minority — roughly 172 million people who account for just about 14.2 percent of India’s total population of approximately 1.32 billion people, roughly 79.8 percent of whom are Hindu.

This large religious minority of Muslims has gone through a hard time in recent years at the hands of Hindu supremacists: They have faced lynchings, lethal riots, and social and political disenfranchisement.

When minorities are pushed to such walls, they may retreat into a siege mentality that breeds radicalization. But India’s Muslims have not come up with calls for violent jihad, nor chants for Shariah law. Instead, they have embraced and emphasized the blessings of liberal democracy by placing their faith in the Constitution of India and insisting on their constitutional rights as citizens.

This hopeful tack was most visible during the mass protests for three months that started in December against the Citizenship Amendment Act, an unabashedly discriminatory law enacted by the government that fast-tracked citizenship for Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist immigrants from neighboring countries, but not for Muslims, whom Home Minister Amit Shah tried to dehumanize as “termites.”

Mr. Shah has also proposed a national register of citizens requiring documentary evidence for place of birth and residence that many Indians, especially the poor, lack. Of these the non-Muslims could escape through the loophole in the new Citizenship Amendment Act, but Muslims would find themselves stateless and liable to be put into detention camps.

In response, Shaheen Bagh, a neighborhood in New Delhi, held a 101-day sit-in against the citizenship law and the proposed citizenship registry, with the protest led not by conservative Muslim clerics, but by Muslim women. Thousands occupied a protest tent 24 hours each day by rotating in shifts and displaying banners saying, “We stand for peace, harmony and fraternity.” They also showed portraits of the Hindu leaders who led India’s independence movement, and festooned their dais with the preamble of the secular Constitution.

The B.J.P.’s propaganda machine depicted Muslim protesters as “traitors” and “anti-nationals,” but they were wearing headbands saying, “I love India.” waving Indian flags, and repeatedly singing the national anthem.

In other campaigns, Indian Muslim women in recent years challenged not just Hindu supremacism but also patriarchy within their own community. Through successful appeals to the Supreme Court — which upholds India’s constitutional principles — they obtained a legal ban in 2017 on “instant divorce,” a contested Shariah ruling that gives Muslim men the right to abandon their wives at will. Another Muslim women’s group gained a 2016 court decision that enforced women’s constitutionally guaranteed right of equal entry, along with men, to a Sufi shrine in Mumbai.

All such liberal moves, according to Sharik Laliwala, a Muslim Indian commentator, signify “a fundamental transformation in the political strategy of the Muslim community.” Indian Muslims, he added, are “marrying a constitutional phraseology of freedom, justice and equality with religious notions.”

Irfan Ahmad, an Indian anthropologist based at the Max Planck Institute in Germany, argues that what is happening is a new emphasis rather than a transformation, which Indian Muslims have always sought along with pluralism. The protests in Shaheen Bagh, he adds, highlighted the rift between the B.J.P.’s rule by and for the Hindu majority and a new vision of democracy that would uphold the rights and dignity of all Indians, including Muslims.

Yet there is still a danger that B.J.P. ruthlessness may backfire and drive Muslims into radicalism. In September, Umar Khalid, a secular left-wing student leader who is Muslim, was arrested on highly contested charges of orchestrating Hindu-Muslims riots last February in Delhi, where most victims were Muslim.

All of this means that India is on a very wrong track. A country that does not treat its minorities as equal human beings will be not the world’s biggest democracy, but rather a tyranny of the majority.

The results may be social strife, radicalism, decline of economic progress, and the ruination of India’s image abroad. The country is already being criticized by human rights organizations for violating human rights in Kashmir, and more recently for forcing Amnesty International’s office in India to close.

India’s story could hold lessons for Muslims elsewhere. Across the border, Pakistan long ago established what India’s B.J.P. seeks: an ethno-religious state dominated by the majority. In Pakistan’s case, this means the hegemony of Sunni Muslims at the expense of minorities such as Shiite Muslims, Ahmadis or Christians.

Farther in the East, in Malaysia, Malay-Muslim supremacy has been an official ideology since the founding of the multireligious nation in 1957. In Turkey, the Islam-infused populism of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with its own insatiable wrath against “traitors” and “anti-nationals,” has strong parallels with Mr. Modi’s populism. And in the parlance of Islamist movements everywhere, “liberalism” and “secular state” are only dirty words, if not heresies.

Alas, it seems that many Muslims in countries other than India enjoy the tyranny of the majority when they themselves are in the majority and control the state, while others realize the blessings of liberalism if they are in minorities. Of course, such a double standard is neither virtuous nor defensible.

A more principled Muslim view of politics is needed, and for that, Muslim opinion leaders should observe the experience of their coreligionists in India. The latter, the largest religious minority in the world, has an important story with a lesson: Human rights and liberties must be defended in every nation, in every civilization. Without them, only power rules. And instead of betting on power, which may be won or lost, they should try to constrain it everywhere, so that no one group is oppressed and everyone is free.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/opin ... ogin-email

[Admin]

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion ... t-thrives/

Canada thrives when our pluralist spirit thrives

Aleem Bharwani and Deborah Yedlin
Special to The Globe and Mail

Aleem Bharwani is a director for public policy and strategic partnerships at the University of Calgary’s Cumming School of Medicine, policy lead for the O’Brien Institute for Public Health, and a clinical associate professor in the Department of Medicine. Deborah Yedlin is the Chancellor of the University of Calgary.

In 2018, the University of Calgary and the Aga Khan University signed a memorandum of understanding to facilitate international cooperation with regard to human development, global health, social justice and pluralism. The creation of UCalgary’s Pluralism Initiative is a product of this agreement, with the goal of teaching our students to become community builders for the world of tomorrow through experiences that result in their ability to value difference.

Our vision for Canada’s future is predicated on the simple concept that pluralism is a public good. A society that recognizes, respects, reconciles and values differences is a society that also creates economic value and social cohesion.

The University of Calgary recognizes diversity as a sociological fact. However, how we engage in diversity is a choice. As a term, it can often be perceived as referring to differences in gender, ethnicity, race, language, culture and religion, but true diversity extends to any form of difference including abilities, geography, discipline, sector, and socioeconomic class.

When we fail to productively engage difference, conflict can entrench itself along axes of exclusion. The outcomes can be problematic: social, political and economic inequities, exclusion and harassment, political polarization, as well as inter-group violence within or across borders.

However, new societal value can be created when we constructively recognize, respect and value difference. Social cohesion thrives and innovations arise when attitudes, policies and practices acknowledge difference as a source of value rather than as a threat. Pluralism therefore must be considered by actors across government, public and private sector, as well as civil society, making pluralism a vital citizenship behaviour.

We are considered citizens of cities and nations because of a shared commitment to our collective security, sovereignty and prosperity. However, borders are not the contained structures they once were. In the context of increasingly interdependent political, social, economic, digital and environmental systems, our fates are increasingly intertwined across traditional borders. People and ideas, infections and cures, air and water – these all cross traditional borders, blurring the line between local and global, and slowly erasing our sense of jurisdictional confinement.

Whether and how we engage difference and the consequences of those differences is a fundamental question of what outcome we seek in our local and global communities. A disposition towards pluralism and community citizenship requires us to know ourselves, know each other and know the systems in which we are integrated.

This foundation, when paired with a commitment to social innovation and entrepreneurial thinking, intends to position community citizens as active, inclusive community builders serving the peoples with whom they share a common future.

We need to understand Canada’s role in the world, particularly in the context of increasing global polarization at a time when cooperation is vitally needed to address critical challenges such as climate change, systemic poverty or distributing a COVID-19 vaccine.

To understand pluralism is to recognize that it is an important element in business and in the ability of companies to create value and economic growth. Today, more than ever, we need sound leadership and innovative business practices guided by pluralistic principles that are inclusive and progressive. The attitudes, behaviours and skills that foster inclusive work environments are the very same practices that generate new and innovative business ideas.

The same logic can be applied in the field of education, which has been transformed by the COVID-19 pandemic into a predominantly digital platform, making it harder to nurture and model empathy, not to mention teach the critical citizenship skills often acquired in a classroom setting.

Our Pluralism Initiative also seeks to examine the tension between truth and civility in social media. Both elements are critical for society to reach its pluralistic outcomes. The challenge – as we see every day – is that advocating for truth can require incivility to be part of the process. The question we need to answer in this context is whether there is an alternative path to address what is increasingly uncivil behaviour acted out from behind the often anonymous digital curtain, and with harmful consequences.

Finally, we need to better understand the link between pluralism and equity, diversity and inclusion. Canada, like many countries around the world, is grappling with declining trust in established institutions, which in turn compromises the critical supports that have ensured the stability of our civil society for much of our history.

Re-establishing and elevating this discourse is critical to ensuring pluralism remains a pillar value in our shared future – no matter what we do or where we live.

[kmaherali]

The Arab State between Sectarianism, Nationalism,and Islamism

Elisheva Machlis

In December 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan warned of the threat from an emerging “Shi‘a crescent” in the Middle East. In this well-known remark, Abdullah captured the fear of many Sunnis in the Arab milieu that the Shi‘is would create a united front stretching from Iran across Iraq to Lebanon, andthereby undermine the historical Sunni hegemony over the region.1
Similarly,in April 2006, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt declared that the Shi‘is are more loyal to Iran than to the countries in which they reside.2
In essence, these two important Arab leaders argued that the Shi‘is have the desire, and perhaps the potential, to take over the Arab and Muslim worlds, following the empowerment of Shi‘is in Iraq since 2003. Another dimension to this fear is the economic factor; the Shi‘is reside in the oil-rich regions of a number of Arab states, including in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.The ascendance of Islamist-led movements following the “Arab Spring”uprisings added another layer to the growing concern over the rise of a new Shi‘i power in the Middle East. Yet to what extent does the historical Sunni-Shi‘i divide play a part in the geopolitical situation in the contemporary MiddleEast? Further, has the “Islamic Awakening” in the last decades strengthened this conflict? This chapter will explore these questions in the context of the Arab milieu with some references to Iran, focusing on the post-2003 period.

The entire chapter can be accessed at:

https://www.academia.edu/8417380/_The_A ... view-paper

[kmaherali]

Shiism in the Modern Context: From Religious Quietism to Political Activism

Abstract

The intention of this article is twofold. The first part tries to elucidate some characteristics of Shiism by briefly describing the background of this basic sectarian rift within Islam and its consequences for the Shiite worldview. The second part is a stocktaking of the situation of Shiites in the contemporary Muslim world and the role of Shiism in today’s political landscape in the Middle East and beyond. Apart from Iran and the revolution of 1979 which has proved to be the decisive watershed in Islamic sectarianism, four regions are dealt within particular: Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Lebanon, and Pakistan. In conclusion,the transition from quietism to activism will be illustrated by several key concepts of classical Shiism and their modern implementation.

The paper can be accessed at:

https://www.academia.edu/657020/Shiism_ ... load-paper

[kmaherali]

Book

The Sunna and Shi'a in History
Division and Ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East



MEIR LITVAK Senior Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University, Israel. Ofra Bengio is a Senior Research Fellow at The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and a Senior Lecturer in Middle East History at Tel Aviv University.Sunni-Shi'i relations have undergone significant transformations in recent decades.The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran had a major spill-over effect on the entire Middle East, and the 2003 war in Iraq transformed the Shi'is into the dominant force in Iraq.The emergence of Iran as a regional power following Saddam Husayn's removal,along with the weakness of the Arab state system, raised the specter of the "Shi'iCrescent" threatening Sunni-Arab domination in the region. The present volume demonstrates the complexity of Sunni-Shi'i relations by analyzing political, ideological,and social encounters between the two communities from early Islamic history to the present. While analyzing specific case studies in various Middle Eastern regions, the book provides a panoramic picture ranging from hostility to efforts of cooperation and ecumenism.

Contents:

PART I: SUNNA AND SHI'A IN THE AGE OF MUSLIM EMPIRES
Responses to Unwanted Authority in Early Islam: Models for Current Shi'i and Sunni Activists; J.Lassner
Early Hanbalism and the Shi'a;N.Hurvitz
The Confrontation Between Sunni and Shi`i Empires: Ottoman-Safavid RelationsBetween the Fourteenth and the Seventeenth Century;
M.Scherberger
Encounters between Shi'i and Sunni 'ulama' in Ottoman Iraq;M.Litvak
The Ottoman Dilemma in Handling the Shi'i Challenge in Nineteenth-Century Iraq;I.S.Üstün

PART II: SUNNIS AND SHI'IS AND THE MODERN STATES
Religious Extremism and Ecumenical Tendencies in Modern Iraqi Shi'ism; A.Baram
Quietists Turned Activists: the Shi'i Revolution in Iraq; O.Bengio
The Sunni-Shi'i Struggle over Lebanon: a New Chapter in the History of Lebanon;E.Zisser
The Wahhabiya and Shi'ism, from 1744/45 to 2008; G.Steinberg
Unity or Hegemony? Iranian Attitudes to the Sunni-Shi'i Divide; Z.Maghen
Debating the 'awakening shi'a': Sunni Perceptions of the Iranian Revolution;
M.Hatina
Interesting Times: Egypt and Shi'ism at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century;R.Brunner
Epilogue: The Sunni-Shi'i Parado

More...

https://www.academia.edu/2518268/Egypt_ ... view-paper

[kmaherali]

‘Sectarianism’ and Its Discontentsin the Study of the Middle East

Fanar Haddad

This article offers a critical examination of the vocabulary associated with the study of ‘sectarianism’ in the Middle East. It surveys Arabic- and English-lan-guage works on ‘sectarianism’ to illustrate how the term’s lack of definition has allowed it to be used in contradictory ways that render it, not simply meaningless, but distortive to our understanding of the region. In addition, the term ‘sectarian-ism’, with its inescapably negative connotations, has been used as a tool to neutralize political dissent and stigmatize people’s religious identity and otherwise legitimate acts of expression and mobilization.

What is ‘sectarianism’? Is it something that is felt or practiced? Is it a mindset or a policy? Is it synonymous with identity-centric politics or is it restricted to intercommunal hate? Is it a social, religious or a political issue? According to the works surveyed in this article, ‘sectarianism’ and the equivalent Arabic term
ta’ifiyya can mean any of these and much more. Particularly since the turn of the century and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, interest in ‘sectarianism’ in the Middle East has given birth to an ever-growing field of study and a prodigious amount of commentary. However, this often reads like a dialogue of the deaf and, when taken collectively, the study of and commentary on ‘sectarianism’ can seem rather convoluted for one simple reason: there is no agreement on, and very rarely any attempt to define, the contours of the object of study. While there is no shortage of analyses and opinions on the subject, there is no agreement as to what is being studied. As such, to study ‘sectarianism’ in the 21st century Middle East is to study a slogan, the meaning of which is left to the beholder.1

This article examines more than 100 Arabic- and English-language scholarly sources on the subject of ‘sectarianism’ in the modern Middle East. The vast majority of these were written after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and, as such, are mostly concerned with the Sunni-Shi‘a divide. This material will be used to highlight the varied, and at times contradictory, ways in which the term ‘sectarianism’ is framed and understood. As will be seen, the fact that the term lacks and eludes definition has lent it a shape-shifting quality that has allowed it to be used indiscriminately to refer to anything relating to sect identity.

This article does not, however, attempt to define ‘sectarianism’. Indeed, one of the central contentions of this study is that the term is too politicized, overused, mired in negativity, and emotionally charged for it to be salvageable. In today’s usage, ‘sectarianism’ leaves too much room for subjective interpretation and personal whim for it to be useful as a category of scholarly inquiry.What is being questioned here is not the relevance of sects and their associated identities, meanings, and relationships with one another to the study of the contemporary Middle East, but the vocabulary used in relation to the subject. As such, this article suggests an alternative lexical framework to the catch-all term ‘sectarianism’. In most cases, this can easily be done by using the word ‘sectarian’ with an adjoining word:sectarian relations, sectarian unity, sectarian cooperation, sectarian conflict, and so forth.However, some aspects of sectarian identity can be more clearly identified. For example,if we want to refer to a symbol associated with a sect, we should not use the term ‘sectarian symbol’, lest we tar what may be a perfectly legitimate symbol of a particular sect with the stigmatizing, hate-associated brush of ‘sectarianism’. In such cases, the term‘sect-specific’ would be more accurate and less ambiguous. Likewise, in other contexts,‘sect-centric’ can serve the same purpose of increasing clarity and avoiding what could be misconstrued as value judgments: a ‘sect-centric’ party sounds far less problematic than a ‘sectarian party’, which can mean anything from a political faction that revolves around issues pertaining to a particular sect to one that promotes hatred of others.Before turning more fully into the issue of vocabulary, an overview of the varied ways in which the term ‘sectarianism’ is used in the literature is presented, and I argue that the resulting linguistic incoherence has significantly obscured our understanding of the workings of sectarian identities in the Middle East. That same incoherence has also led to an undefined ‘sectarianism’ overshadowing more relevant factors such as geographic and class divisions and geopolitics in analyses of the sociopolitical issues facing the region. More importantly, however, the article discusses how the elasticity of the term ‘sectarianism’ has had a detrimental impact on our understanding of the dynamics of sect-centricity and on our ability to adequately address sectarian conflict.Finally, that same elasticity has also had a tangible sociopolitical effect in the Middle East itself in that it has allowed the term to be used as a tool with which regime which regimes and conservative social elements can dismiss and silence dissent and squash perceived threats to the status quo. This is mirrored in some scholarly works wherein ‘sectarian-ism’ is used as a catch-all phrase for all that is related to sectarian identities and, given the negativity of the term, this has at times served to stigmatize what are perfectly legitimate manifestations of religious and communal identities — for example by using ‘sectarianism’ in a manner that refers to everything from sect-centric behavior to intercommunal violence.
2

It should be highlighted from the outset that what follows is not a critique of the scholars cited; rather, it is a critique of the term ‘sectarianism’ itself. The usage of the term does not detract from the value of the scholarly contributions examined here;indeed, the works cited in this article are among the most valuable scholarly works on the dynamics of Sunni-Shi‘i relations. Rather than detracting from the work of the scholars cited here, this article aims to start a debate on the validity of the term ‘sec-tarianism’ in scholarly inquiry and to question the term’s coherence, relevance, utility,and applicability.

More...

https://www.academia.edu/34130515/Secta ... view-paper

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"SECTARIAN DILEMMAS IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHEN STRATEGY AND IDENTITY POLITICS COLLIDE" by Afshon Ostovar


Summary

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is a product of its self-interest. Striving to protect Iran’s Islamic theocracy from external threats drives the country’s approach to foreign affairs. That approach can, at times, look aggressive or pragmatic. A sectarian angle also exists. Given its relative alienation from its neighbors since the 1979 revolution, Iran has relied on a strategy of forming relationships with non-state groups to help promote its strategic interests. Although it supports Sunni groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, Iran’s backing of Shia organizations has most angered its neighbors.That practice, often fused with the unofficial policy of exporting the revolution, has paid dividends for Iran strategically but has also hardened perceptions of its confessional bias.

Religion and Iranian Behavior in the Middle East

• Religion has been an inseparable component of Iranian decision making since the 1979 revolution.
• Since the revolution, Iran’s leaders have stressed their commitment to Islamic unity. They downplay the Shia character of the Islamic Republic when speaking on foreign policy issues and continue to express the pan-Islamic, as opposed to Shia-centric, tenets of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
• Despite its pan-Islamic aspirations, since 2003, Iran’s strategic approach in the Middle East has focused on supporting Shia armed groups. Working through those non-state clients has helped Iran greatly expand its regional influence, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Conclusions

• Religious identity and beliefs influence Iran’s approach to foreign relation ships, but they do not dictate them. Religion matters little in Iran’s state-to-state relationships, but it figures more prominently in Iran’s relations with non-state groups.
• Essentializing Iran’s foreign policy as sectarian obscures more than it reveals about its behavior. However, as the Middle East has grown more sectarian since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring, so too has Iran’s regional behavior.
• Iran’s operations in Syria provide the most overt examples of its sectarian behavior. Iran has facilitated the involvement of thousands of non-Syrian Shia militants to help defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Even though Iranian leaders stress the legitimacy of the intervention in Syria, and deny any sectarian agenda, Iran’s military and its affiliates frame their role in that war in distinctly confessional terms.
• Iran’s regional activities cannot be divorced from the explosion of Sunni sectarianism across the Middle East. Iran accuses its Sunni neighbors of supporting the rise of Sunni extremism and feels compelled to counter that behavior by doubling down on support to Shia allies of its own.

More...

https://www.academia.edu/30246178/SECTA ... view-paper

[kmaherali]

Bridging Time, Distance and Distrust, With Music

Neta Elkayam, an Israeli singer, plumbs the rich culture of the Moroccan Jews she descended from, and introduces it to new audiences in both countries.

RABAT, Morocco — Neta Elkayam did not really understand the depth of her dual identity until, in her late 20s, she and a friend took a trip from their home country, Israel, to that of their parents, Morocco.

“It was like drugs,” Ms. Elkayam said. “We both felt like we were walking on air. This is how our place needs to feel. I felt home. I felt filled with happiness. I felt like a complete stranger at the same time. A lot of people on the streets looked like me or like people I knew from my childhood.”

Now 41, Ms. Elkayam, a singer and visual artist, has since earned a following with recordings of the music of Morocco’s Jews, most of whom left that country decades ago. Ms. Elkayam has joined the ranks of artists from scattered people around the world whose longing for a lost homeland has helped preserve once-thriving cultures.

Her connection to her Moroccan heritage led to her latest and most emotional project, with roots in a sprawling transit camp on the outskirts of Marseille, France, that once housed displaced Jews. Many of them were from North Africa, trying to make their way to Israel. Few artifacts remain of life in the camp, called Grand Arenas, which operated from 1945 to 1966, but among them are recordings of Jewish women from the Atlas Mountains in Morocco singing.

Ms. Elkayam said she wept the first time she heard the aching, mesmerizing voices of those long-ago Amazighs — often called Berbers, a term some consider derogatory.

The Amazighs are an ethnic group largely from North and West Africa who are nowadays mostly Muslim, though there was a significant Jewish Berber minority in Morocco in the past. In present-day Morocco, there is occasional animosity between Arabs and Amazigh, who often say that they feel their culture is neglected by the Arab-majority state.

In the recordings, the Jewish women from Morocco sang of displacement and the meaning of home as they headed into a new life in a faraway country, leaving behind all that was familiar.

“This is history that you don’t find in books, and you don’t learn at school,” she said in a video interview from her music studio in Jerusalem. “I was crying while listening to the voices of these women. I felt that I needed to make something with it and make it super relevant.”

She and her husband, Amit Hai Cohen, a musician, are recording an album, incorporating those old recordings and updating them with electronic beats and elements of jazz.

More...

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/worl ... 778d3e6de3

[kmaherali]

WORKSHOP

Sectarianism in the Middle East

ABSTRACT

Sectarian conflict and polarisation has become a key feature of Middle East politics in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011. This workshop looked at some of the key drivers of this, such as the troubled legacy of foreign intervention, state failure,regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia, Iran and others, ruling strategies of authoritarian regimes as well as the spread of identity and sect-based political movements. With in-depth analysis of the two key arenas of sectarian conflict in the contemporary Middle East, Syria and Iraq, and a paper on the consequences of state collapse, this paper also makes recommendations on how the EU could help reduce sectarian tensions.

Details of the proceedings at:

https://www.academia.edu/34765208/Secta ... view-paper

[kmaherali]

What is really behind the Saudi-Iranian cold war?

Abstract:

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is routinely explained away as a sectarian rift, but this paper argues that the rise in sectarian tensions is a consequence, rather than the cause, of the rivalry between the two regional powers. The Kingdom has resorted to playing the sectarian card in response to the ideological challenge posed by Iran, which tries to woo Sunni Muslims to its side by advocating a political system that combines Islam and a democracy of sorts. For its part,the Islamic Republic prefers to downplay the Sunni-Shiite split and emphasises the need for Islamic unity against foreign enemies, notably Israel and the US. In addition, both Riyadh and Tehran are concerned about regime survival, which is a major factor in their foreign policy and how it is framed

The entire paper with conclusion can be accessed at:

https://www.academia.edu/34614962/What_ ... card=title

[kmaherali]

Diversity of Interpretations & Practices within Islamic Ummah
BY ISMAILIMAIL POSTED ON DECEMBER 4, 2021
By: Sadruddin Noorani, Chicago, USA

Jamada al-Awwal 1443, 4th December 2021

In Islam, the month of Jumada al-Awwal is marked by celebrations of several local Muslim saints which reflects on the diverse traditions, practices and customs prevailing in Islam. Islam is not a monolithic interpretation; it is a faith of over 1.5 billion Muslims, manifested in multiple societies and cultures. This pluralism results in widely diverse interpretations and popular views of various religious practices. One such practice is the veneration of holy men and women, which has taken on a special significance in the popular culture of Islam. These individuals are believed to possess blessing (barakah), with the Will of Allah and are often considered saintly. The Arabic word for saint is wali or waliullah, translated as ‘friend of God’. Some other terms used for these saints are Pir, Shaikh or Sayyid.

Another common practice in Muslim cultures is annual celebration by believers, known as Urs or Urs-e-Shareef, (literal meaning: wedding), which means Ascension Day (when the saint’s departed soul meets with the Creator), and which includes various rituals. The concept of Urs also exists in most Sufi orders such as Bulleh Shah, Nizamuddin Auliya, Fariduddin Ganjshakar, Khwaja Ghulam Farid, Naqshbandiyya, Chishtiyya, etc., and is celebrated with great enthusiasm. The devotees refer to their saints as lovers of God, the most beloved.

Prophet Muhammed (peace and blessings be upon him and his family, PBUH) experienced Me’raj (meaning Ascension) in his lifetime as he had ascended to meet the Creator on the Auspicious Night known to our Faith as Shab-i Mi’raj or Isra. This is a solemn Day of Supplication (Du’a) and obligatory Prayers. In some traditions (tariqah), believers also go on pilgrimages to the tomb of their saints to seek barakah and divine intervention through them, from Allah. Many dargah (tombs or shrines) of Shi’a Imams and Sufi Masters are also visited by their believers annually; some believers visit their shrines during times of hardship and at times when they hope to fulfill their personal desire. The underlying notion in these celebrations is that saints are viewed as mediators between their believers and Allah; and a source of guidance and barakah. The Ismaili Muslim tariqah, however, has a living Hazar Imam (Imam-of-the-Time), considered to be the bearer of Nur-e ‘Ali.

Ismaili Muslims do not visit tombs of their past Imams or pirs. They seek the intercession of their current Imam-of-the-Time, Hazar Imam, and receive blessings and barakah from him in the form of farameen, guidance and teachings, and through various types of rituals and ceremonies approved by him, in accordance with the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah.

The current Imam-of the-Time, Mawlana Hazar Imam (Aga Khan lV), said the following in a speech in Al-Khawabi, Syria, on 9th November 2001, where he explained the notion of diversity of interpretations & practices within the Islamic Ummah, which is bound by the ethics of Islam.

“Bismi’l-lahi’r-Rahmani’r Rahim”

“As-Salamu ‘Alaykum”

“In Islam, the pluralism of human society is well recognized, and the ethics of its multiple interpretations require that this diversity be accorded respect.”

The Aga Khan reminded his audience that “the Shahada – – (the Muslim profession of faith), La-illaha-Illallah-Muhammadur-Rasullilah – – binds a thousand million people who, over the centuries, have come to live in different cultures, speak different languages, live in different political contexts, and who differentiate in some interpretations of their faith. Within the Ummah, the Ismaili Jamat reflects much of the same pluralism. The plurality of the Muslim world” he stressed, “is not just an irreversible historical fact, but it is a strength for which we must be grateful, and a strength that must be continuously harnessed to the building of the future within the ethics of Islam. Any differences must be resolved through tolerance, through understanding, through compassion, through dialogue, through forgiveness, through generosity, all of which represent the ethics of Islam.” (November 9, 2001, Al-Khawabi, Syria)

https://ismailimail.blog/2021/12/04/div ... mic-ummah/