Commentary
The essentials of a free society
Faith and secularism go hand in hand
IRSHAD MANJI
From Friday's Globe and Mail
November 30, 2007 at 7:11 AM EST
Among the most pressing questions of our day is this: Can secularism - the separation of organized religion and politics - withstand the rise of religious fundamentalism, which blurs the two realms?
Paradoxically, secularism must survive if faith is to have a hope in hell. At its best, secularism is bad for dogma and good for faith.
Whatever the risk of being excommunicated by doctrinaire rationalists, I defend faith. Science helps us appreciate all that we can do. Faith helps us appreciate what we should do. Ethics, in turn, grants meaning to progress.
My own faith as a Muslim gives me values that compete with materialism. I cannot say that the material world is always hollow and the spiritual sphere always hallowed. Such a claim would be too simplistic.
Rather, it is the tension between the mundane and the mysterious that I love. In that tension, I find the incentive to keep thinking, growing, stumbling, reconsidering and discovering - like a self-respecting scientist would.
Faith does not stop exploration. Dogma does. This difference is crucial. Faith, by its nature, is secure enough to handle questions. Dogma, on the other hand, is threatened by questions. By definition, dogma is rigid, brittle, often brutal, and therefore deserves to be threatened by questions.
Dogma can afflict every belief system, including secularism. Witness much of Western Europe today. There, people are calcifying the Enlightenment principles of social tolerance and individual liberty into an orthodoxy according to which anything goes. What is being tolerated includes the tolerance-trashing bigotry of Muslim fundamentalists.
Throughout Western Europe, diversity is the new dogma. And in its dogmatic form, diversity reflects not the most humane side of secularism, but its most strident: a theocracy of the sensitive, where asking questions about what other people believe - an exercise once known as inquiry - now so often invites inquisition.
In such a context, we need less dogma and more faith, bearing in mind that self-assured faith welcomes questions. I am not arguing that religious faith ought to merge with organized politics. But it can be a constructive companion to partisan politics.
Using a parliamentary metaphor, I see God-free parties as government
and God-conscious faith as the loyal opposition, constantly prodding the government but never being allowed to bully it. Once religious bullying begins, government has not just a right but also an obligation to intervene for the sake of human dignity.
Put another way, secularism works when it is imperfect and reflects our complicated humanity. Only then can it affirm that each of us is, in fact and in law, human.
Three years ago, for example, the king of Morocco joined Muslim feminists to revise outdated religious statutes. Taming the bullies of the clerical class, the king overhauled sharia law so that now, on paper at least, Morocco's women have equal access to divorce, child custody and alimony.
The same cannot be said of Israel, where women seeking divorce must
still go to rabbinical courts and frequently wind up with the shaft. Who, except government, can right this wrong?
But to stay in power, Israeli government coalitions need ultra-religious parties. So one interpretation of Judaism gets away with dehumanizing women and not a few men. Exactly because the dignity of all God's children must be protected, organized religion must know its place.
We, as human beings, should know our place, too. This brings me to
the ultimate reason that people of faith need to champion secularism. Heretical as it sounds, secularism reminds us that none of us is God.
According to the Abrahamic religions, God alone knows fully the Truth. That is why we have to be humble enough to accommodate multiple perspectives. In short, to recognize God's infinite wisdom is to accept our limited wisdom - and therefore let a thousand flowers bloom.
Pluralism of perspective can only thrive in a secular society, which clears space for all of us to worship, or not, as our personal consciences demand. Both theocratic and scientific fundamentalisms breed humiliation by marginalizing personal conscience.
Secularism breeds a competition of consciences. It demands not humiliation but humility by asking each of us to share oxygen with the other.
I, as a faithful Muslim, cannot imagine a more peaceful yet practical way to pay tribute to the Almighty instead of the Almighty's self-appointed ambassadors.
And there are many more like me. Gallup research of eight Muslim-
majority countries finds that, on average, 60 per cent of those surveyed want mullahs out of the constitution-writing business. Which tells us that to be a Muslim secularist is not a marginal position. Nor does it make you an atheist.
Let the good word go forth that, even as leaders spout dogma, ordinary people seem to favour faith. Maybe secularism has a prayer after all.
Irshad Manji is a senior fellow with the European Foundation
for Democracy and creator of the documentary Faith Without Fear.
http://www.irshadmanji.com
The Relationship Between Religion and Politics in Islam
December 18, 2007
Memo From Egypt
Fashion and Faith Meet, on Foreheads of the Pious
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — There is a strong undercurrent of competition in Egypt these days, an unstated contest among people eager to prove just how religious they are. The field of battle is the street and the focus tends to be on appearance, as opposed to conviction.
It is not that the two are mutually exclusive, but they are not necessarily linked. As Egyptians increasingly emphasize Islam as the cornerstone of identity, there has been a growing emphasis on public displays of piety.
For women, that has rapidly translated into the nearly universal adoption of the hijab, a scarf fitted over the hair and ears and wrapped around the neck. For men, it is more and more popular to have a zebibah.
The zebibah, Arabic for raisin, is a dark circle of callused skin, or in some cases a protruding bump, between the hairline and the eyebrows. It emerges on the spot where worshipers press their foreheads into the ground during their daily prayers.
It may sometimes look like a painful wound, but in Egypt it is worn proudly, the way American professionals in the 1980s felt good about the dark circles under their eyes as a sign of long work hours and little sleep.
Two decades ago, Egypt was a Muslim country with a relatively secular style. Nationalism and Arabism had alternated places as the main element of identity. But today, Egypt, like much of the Arab Middle East, is experiencing the rise of Islam as the ideology of the day.
With that, religious symbols have become the fashion. “The zebibah is a way to show how important religion is for us,” said Muhammad al-Bikali, a hairstylist in Cairo, in an interview last month. Mr. Bikali had a well-trimmed mustache and an ever-so-subtle brown spot just beneath his hairline. “It shows how religious we are. It is a mark from God.”
Observant Muslims pray five times a day. Each prayer involves kneeling and touching one’s forehead and nose to the ground. All five prayers require placing one’s head on the ground for a total of 34 times, though many people add prayers and with them, more chances to press their heads to the ground. Some people say the bump is the inevitable result of so many prayers — and that is often the point: The person with the mark is broadcasting his observance, his adherence to one of the five pillars of Islam.
But the zebibah is primarily a phenomenon of Egypt. Muslim men pray throughout the Arab world. Indeed, Egyptian women pray, but few of them end up with a prayer bump. So why do so many Egyptian men press so hard when they pray?
“If we just take it for what it is, then it means that people are praying a lot,” said Gamal al-Ghitani, editor in chief of the newspaper Akhbar El Yom. “But there is a kind of statement in it. Sometimes as a personal statement to announce that he is a conservative Muslim and sometimes as a way of outbidding others by showing them that he is more religious or to say that they should be like him.”
There are many reasons for the Islamic revival that has swept Egypt and the Middle East, from the rise of satellite television, which offers 24 hours of religious programming, to economies that offer little hope of improving people’s lives, to the resentment of Western meddling in the Middle East.
But there is also peer pressure, a powerful force in a society where conformity and tradition are aspired to and rewarded.
“I will learn more about someone when I get to know him, but the appearance is the first impression,” said Khaled Ashry, 37, a security guard at a private school.
Hanaa el-Guindy, 21, an art student in Cairo, covers her head and wears a long loose-fitting dress to hide her figure. “The outward appearance is important,” Ms. Guindy said. “It says, ‘I am a good person.’ This is a good thing. On Judgment Day, this sign, the zebibah on their forehead, will shine. It will say, ‘God is great.’”
In much of the Arab world, symbols of extreme observance are fairly standard and tend to stem from the conservative religious cultures of Persian Gulf nations, like Saudi Arabia. There is the long beard. In extreme cases men wear a loose-fitting robe that stops at their ankles, just as the prophet Muhammad wore his own gown at ankle length.
Those symbols have seeped their way into Egypt, and are growing in popularity. More and more women, for example, are covering their faces with a niqab, a black mask of cloth that has come to Egypt from the Persian Gulf. The zebibah, however, is 100 percent Egyptian, and does not carry the negative connotation of imported symbols.
Men with long beards can still find it hard to get a job. The zebibah, on the other hand, can open doors. “The zebibah can help,” said Ahmed Mohsen, 35, a messenger for a law firm whose own mark was pinkish, bumpy and peeling. “It can lead to a kind of initial acceptance between people.”
There are no statistics on the zebibah’s prevalence. But today, perhaps more than any other time in recent history, Egyptians are eager to demonstrate to one another just how religious they are.
“In Egypt, it’s the way we pray; we probably hit our heads harder than most in order to get one,” said Ahmed Fathallah, 19, as he played dominoes one evening in a Cairo coffee shop. “You also have to understand that people here like to show off their piety, maybe almost more than in the rest of the Middle East.”
There are many rumors about men who use irritants, like sandpaper, to darken the callus. There may be no truth to the rumors, but the rumors themselves indicate how fashionable the mark has become.
Not everyone has a zebibah. Plenty of Egyptians still regard their faith as a personal matter. But the pressure is growing, as religion becomes the focus of individual identity, and the most easily accessible source of pride and dignity for all social and economic classes.
“You pray, but it doesn’t come out,” said Muhammad Hojri, 23, as he gently teased his brother, Mahmoud, 21, recently while they worked in a family kebab restaurant. Muhammad has a mark. Mahmoud does not, and did not appreciate his brother’s ribbing.
“I pray for God, not for this thing on my forehead,” Mahmoud shot back.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting from Cairo.
Memo From Egypt
Fashion and Faith Meet, on Foreheads of the Pious
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — There is a strong undercurrent of competition in Egypt these days, an unstated contest among people eager to prove just how religious they are. The field of battle is the street and the focus tends to be on appearance, as opposed to conviction.
It is not that the two are mutually exclusive, but they are not necessarily linked. As Egyptians increasingly emphasize Islam as the cornerstone of identity, there has been a growing emphasis on public displays of piety.
For women, that has rapidly translated into the nearly universal adoption of the hijab, a scarf fitted over the hair and ears and wrapped around the neck. For men, it is more and more popular to have a zebibah.
The zebibah, Arabic for raisin, is a dark circle of callused skin, or in some cases a protruding bump, between the hairline and the eyebrows. It emerges on the spot where worshipers press their foreheads into the ground during their daily prayers.
It may sometimes look like a painful wound, but in Egypt it is worn proudly, the way American professionals in the 1980s felt good about the dark circles under their eyes as a sign of long work hours and little sleep.
Two decades ago, Egypt was a Muslim country with a relatively secular style. Nationalism and Arabism had alternated places as the main element of identity. But today, Egypt, like much of the Arab Middle East, is experiencing the rise of Islam as the ideology of the day.
With that, religious symbols have become the fashion. “The zebibah is a way to show how important religion is for us,” said Muhammad al-Bikali, a hairstylist in Cairo, in an interview last month. Mr. Bikali had a well-trimmed mustache and an ever-so-subtle brown spot just beneath his hairline. “It shows how religious we are. It is a mark from God.”
Observant Muslims pray five times a day. Each prayer involves kneeling and touching one’s forehead and nose to the ground. All five prayers require placing one’s head on the ground for a total of 34 times, though many people add prayers and with them, more chances to press their heads to the ground. Some people say the bump is the inevitable result of so many prayers — and that is often the point: The person with the mark is broadcasting his observance, his adherence to one of the five pillars of Islam.
But the zebibah is primarily a phenomenon of Egypt. Muslim men pray throughout the Arab world. Indeed, Egyptian women pray, but few of them end up with a prayer bump. So why do so many Egyptian men press so hard when they pray?
“If we just take it for what it is, then it means that people are praying a lot,” said Gamal al-Ghitani, editor in chief of the newspaper Akhbar El Yom. “But there is a kind of statement in it. Sometimes as a personal statement to announce that he is a conservative Muslim and sometimes as a way of outbidding others by showing them that he is more religious or to say that they should be like him.”
There are many reasons for the Islamic revival that has swept Egypt and the Middle East, from the rise of satellite television, which offers 24 hours of religious programming, to economies that offer little hope of improving people’s lives, to the resentment of Western meddling in the Middle East.
But there is also peer pressure, a powerful force in a society where conformity and tradition are aspired to and rewarded.
“I will learn more about someone when I get to know him, but the appearance is the first impression,” said Khaled Ashry, 37, a security guard at a private school.
Hanaa el-Guindy, 21, an art student in Cairo, covers her head and wears a long loose-fitting dress to hide her figure. “The outward appearance is important,” Ms. Guindy said. “It says, ‘I am a good person.’ This is a good thing. On Judgment Day, this sign, the zebibah on their forehead, will shine. It will say, ‘God is great.’”
In much of the Arab world, symbols of extreme observance are fairly standard and tend to stem from the conservative religious cultures of Persian Gulf nations, like Saudi Arabia. There is the long beard. In extreme cases men wear a loose-fitting robe that stops at their ankles, just as the prophet Muhammad wore his own gown at ankle length.
Those symbols have seeped their way into Egypt, and are growing in popularity. More and more women, for example, are covering their faces with a niqab, a black mask of cloth that has come to Egypt from the Persian Gulf. The zebibah, however, is 100 percent Egyptian, and does not carry the negative connotation of imported symbols.
Men with long beards can still find it hard to get a job. The zebibah, on the other hand, can open doors. “The zebibah can help,” said Ahmed Mohsen, 35, a messenger for a law firm whose own mark was pinkish, bumpy and peeling. “It can lead to a kind of initial acceptance between people.”
There are no statistics on the zebibah’s prevalence. But today, perhaps more than any other time in recent history, Egyptians are eager to demonstrate to one another just how religious they are.
“In Egypt, it’s the way we pray; we probably hit our heads harder than most in order to get one,” said Ahmed Fathallah, 19, as he played dominoes one evening in a Cairo coffee shop. “You also have to understand that people here like to show off their piety, maybe almost more than in the rest of the Middle East.”
There are many rumors about men who use irritants, like sandpaper, to darken the callus. There may be no truth to the rumors, but the rumors themselves indicate how fashionable the mark has become.
Not everyone has a zebibah. Plenty of Egyptians still regard their faith as a personal matter. But the pressure is growing, as religion becomes the focus of individual identity, and the most easily accessible source of pride and dignity for all social and economic classes.
“You pray, but it doesn’t come out,” said Muhammad Hojri, 23, as he gently teased his brother, Mahmoud, 21, recently while they worked in a family kebab restaurant. Muhammad has a mark. Mahmoud does not, and did not appreciate his brother’s ribbing.
“I pray for God, not for this thing on my forehead,” Mahmoud shot back.
Mona el-Naggar contributed reporting from Cairo.
Don't believe myths about sharia law
Jason Burke The Observer, Sunday February 10 2008
This article appeared in the Observer on Sunday February 10 2008 on p28 of the Focus section. It was last updated at 12:28 on February 10 2008. The women had no doubt. Educated, young, articulate, they had one aim: to turn their country into a real Islamic state, run according to their interpretation of Islamic law, the shariat. Only then, they said, would they be protected from the chaos and violence of the modern world. Only then would there be an end to corruption and misgovernment. Only then would the country assume its true place as a Muslim nation.
The women were speaking in Rawalpindi, the crowded northern Pakistani city. All members of an Islamist party, they believed that the current system in Pakistan, where a secular legal system co-exists uncomfortably with a religious one, was doomed to failure. The coming of shariat was, they told me, inevitable.
They, like the archbishop of Canterbury, were interested in the degree to which the specific practices of a religious community, whether majority or minority, be allowed within the legal system of a nation.
All over the world, the same question is being posed. In recent years, with the weakening of the nation state and growth in alternative identities, often religious, it has taken on a new urgency, particularly in Western countries with large, newly assertive Muslim minority populations. The resulting tensions are becoming more and more obvious.
So in France, a country where the only identity officially recognised is that of 'citizen of the republic', last week's row provoked keen interest. The British system of multiculturalism is seen by many Frenchmen as evidence of an unforgiveable and incomprehensible laxness. Yet, at the same time that he demands 'immigrants' adhere to French values, President Nicolas Sarkozy has enraged defenders of his nation's aggressive secularism by insisting repeatedly that Europe has 'Christian roots' and that religion, in its broadest sense, is at the root of civilisation. In Germany and Holland similar debates are taking place as large immigrant communities, particularly those established for several decades, challenge the status quo, asking what their place is in 'Christian' countries?
In so doing, they bring to the West an element of a fiery debate that has been longstanding in the Islamic world. In Pakistan, for example, the argument over whether the state is 'a Muslim state or a state for Muslims' has never ceased, contributing greatly to its instability. Elsewhere accommodations have been found, often based on original settlements by colonial powers. So in India, which does not have a state religion, 140 million Muslims, like other communities, have retained their own civil laws governing marriages, divorces, deaths, births and inheritance. In overwhelmingly Muslim majority Egypt, religious minorities are governed under separate personal status laws and courts. The Coptic Christian minority in the country marry under Christian law and foreigners marry under the laws of their countries of origin.
And where Sharia law is applied, it varies too. In Saudi Arabia, there are frequent executions and amputations, justified by selective reading of the Islamic holy texts. Elsewhere such punishments are rarely or never applied. In Saudi Arabia too, women may not drive. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, they can. As there is no reference to motor vehicles in the Koran, the decision as to who can or can't drive them has been made by (male) Islamic scholars. States in the Islamic world have made repeated efforts over centuries to co-opt and control the clergy, frequently with disastrous results.
What is clear is that where there is sufficient demand for Islamic law, courts of some kind are likely to be found. In Afghanistan in the 1990s, in the anarchy of civil war, many initially supported the Taliban simply because they brought a form of order. In parts of western Pakistan, Islamic judges have long dealt out summary justice according to religious law and tribal customs. For locals, the choice between slow, corrupt and expensive state legal systems and the religious alternative, rough and ready though it may be, is not hard. Elsewhere, particularly in Africa, local religious holy men settle disputes.
There are also reports of 'informal' shariat courts in the UK. Although their rulings are not recognised by English law, participants often agree to abide by their decisions in the same way that Jewish civil disputes are often settled in their own, officially recognised court, the Beth Din. This is not surprising. That some measure of Islamic law is 'unavoidable' has already been recognised in the UK. British food regulations allow meat to be slaughtered according to Islamic practices and, as Islam forbids interest on the basis that it is money unjustly earned, the Treasury has approved Sharia-compliant mortgages and investments.
The women in Rawalpindi had no doubt why they wanted more rigorous application of Islamic law. Though educated, relatively wealthy and from solid family backgrounds, they said they felt disorientated and stressed by the pace and uncertainty of modern life. 'I know that in the law I have answers and that makes me calm,' one said.
Jason Burke The Observer, Sunday February 10 2008
This article appeared in the Observer on Sunday February 10 2008 on p28 of the Focus section. It was last updated at 12:28 on February 10 2008. The women had no doubt. Educated, young, articulate, they had one aim: to turn their country into a real Islamic state, run according to their interpretation of Islamic law, the shariat. Only then, they said, would they be protected from the chaos and violence of the modern world. Only then would there be an end to corruption and misgovernment. Only then would the country assume its true place as a Muslim nation.
The women were speaking in Rawalpindi, the crowded northern Pakistani city. All members of an Islamist party, they believed that the current system in Pakistan, where a secular legal system co-exists uncomfortably with a religious one, was doomed to failure. The coming of shariat was, they told me, inevitable.
They, like the archbishop of Canterbury, were interested in the degree to which the specific practices of a religious community, whether majority or minority, be allowed within the legal system of a nation.
All over the world, the same question is being posed. In recent years, with the weakening of the nation state and growth in alternative identities, often religious, it has taken on a new urgency, particularly in Western countries with large, newly assertive Muslim minority populations. The resulting tensions are becoming more and more obvious.
So in France, a country where the only identity officially recognised is that of 'citizen of the republic', last week's row provoked keen interest. The British system of multiculturalism is seen by many Frenchmen as evidence of an unforgiveable and incomprehensible laxness. Yet, at the same time that he demands 'immigrants' adhere to French values, President Nicolas Sarkozy has enraged defenders of his nation's aggressive secularism by insisting repeatedly that Europe has 'Christian roots' and that religion, in its broadest sense, is at the root of civilisation. In Germany and Holland similar debates are taking place as large immigrant communities, particularly those established for several decades, challenge the status quo, asking what their place is in 'Christian' countries?
In so doing, they bring to the West an element of a fiery debate that has been longstanding in the Islamic world. In Pakistan, for example, the argument over whether the state is 'a Muslim state or a state for Muslims' has never ceased, contributing greatly to its instability. Elsewhere accommodations have been found, often based on original settlements by colonial powers. So in India, which does not have a state religion, 140 million Muslims, like other communities, have retained their own civil laws governing marriages, divorces, deaths, births and inheritance. In overwhelmingly Muslim majority Egypt, religious minorities are governed under separate personal status laws and courts. The Coptic Christian minority in the country marry under Christian law and foreigners marry under the laws of their countries of origin.
And where Sharia law is applied, it varies too. In Saudi Arabia, there are frequent executions and amputations, justified by selective reading of the Islamic holy texts. Elsewhere such punishments are rarely or never applied. In Saudi Arabia too, women may not drive. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, they can. As there is no reference to motor vehicles in the Koran, the decision as to who can or can't drive them has been made by (male) Islamic scholars. States in the Islamic world have made repeated efforts over centuries to co-opt and control the clergy, frequently with disastrous results.
What is clear is that where there is sufficient demand for Islamic law, courts of some kind are likely to be found. In Afghanistan in the 1990s, in the anarchy of civil war, many initially supported the Taliban simply because they brought a form of order. In parts of western Pakistan, Islamic judges have long dealt out summary justice according to religious law and tribal customs. For locals, the choice between slow, corrupt and expensive state legal systems and the religious alternative, rough and ready though it may be, is not hard. Elsewhere, particularly in Africa, local religious holy men settle disputes.
There are also reports of 'informal' shariat courts in the UK. Although their rulings are not recognised by English law, participants often agree to abide by their decisions in the same way that Jewish civil disputes are often settled in their own, officially recognised court, the Beth Din. This is not surprising. That some measure of Islamic law is 'unavoidable' has already been recognised in the UK. British food regulations allow meat to be slaughtered according to Islamic practices and, as Islam forbids interest on the basis that it is money unjustly earned, the Treasury has approved Sharia-compliant mortgages and investments.
The women in Rawalpindi had no doubt why they wanted more rigorous application of Islamic law. Though educated, relatively wealthy and from solid family backgrounds, they said they felt disorientated and stressed by the pace and uncertainty of modern life. 'I know that in the law I have answers and that makes me calm,' one said.
Religion and secularism
May 1st 2008
From The Economist print edition
The slogans of political Islam remain highly resonant, whether as a programme for peaceful governance or an inspiration to wage war. Two new books explain why
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State
By Noah Feldman
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Buy it at
Amazon.com
Amazon.co.uk
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda
By Mark Juergensmeyer
University of California Press; 384 pages; $27.50 and £16.95
Buy it at
Amazon.com
Amazon.co.uk
WHEN the British and French empires were at their height, imperial service often provided an outlet for the talents of precociously clever ethnographers, social anthropologists and scholars of religion. On the face of things, Noah Feldman is a similar figure, rendering important services to the American imperium, both as a rising star in the intellectual establishment and in more practical ways—he helped to draft Iraq's new constitution.
A young professor at Harvard Law School with a doctorate in Islamic political thought, Mr Feldman is brimming with the sort of expertise that America's new proconsuls in the Middle East and Afghanistan badly need. Above all, he is qualified to opine on how America should react to the dilemma posed by the huge popular support, in Muslim lands, for explicitly Islamic forms of administration.
In a short, incisive and elegant book, he lays out for the non-specialist reader some of the forms that Islamic rule has taken over the centuries, while also stressing the differences between today's political Islam and previous forms of Islamic administration. In particular, he shows why “justice” is such a resonant slogan for Islamist movements. At least subliminally, it evokes memories of a dimly remembered era when Islamic law, as interpreted by scholars, acted as a real constraint on the power of rulers. To many Muslims, the legal tradition of their faith is not viewed as an alternative to Western democracy, based on secular law, but rather as the only real alternative to totalitarianism.
That perceived dilemma—either Muslim law and scholarship, or unfettered dictatorship—is not just a hangover from history; it also reflects the fact that many secular regimes which replaced traditional Muslim empires were dictatorships, with no separation of powers.
So far, that is a familiar argument. Mr Feldman becomes more interesting when he shows how the Ottoman empire, in its efforts to modernise while retaining some Islamic legitimacy, almost unavoidably grew more dictatorial and less Islamic.
The very fact that Islamic law was codified implied a downgrading in the authority of Muslim scholars; their task had been to apply a set of abstract, unwritten principles to an infinite variety of situations, and the written law code risked putting them out of a job. When the Ottoman sultan-caliph tried some cautious constitutional experiments in 1876, it appeared to his pious subjects that he was undermining God's sovereignty. This was not so much because the experiments seemed bad, but because constitutional change implied that an earthly ruler could tinker with systems that had been divinely ordained.
The modernising challenges facing the late Ottoman era dimly foreshadow, as Mr Feldman demonstrates, some of the problems of modern political Islam. But there are differences: the Islamists of today are not trying to reinstate the power of the scholars, which was a hallmark of all previous Islamic regimes. Instead, what modern Islamism proposes is an odd mix of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of God; as though the people, having been offered sovereign power, freely decide to render that power straight back to God.
Another of Mr Feldman's paradoxes: any modern constitution or legal code that consciously proclaims its intention to be Islamic and deferential to God, will fall short of the early Islamic ideal, where the sovereignty of God was so deeply assumed that it did not need spelling out.
Mr Feldman's book is more descriptive than prescriptive. But many readers may conclude that in Islam's heartland only forms of governance that incorporate Muslim values can hope to be legitimate. If secularism has been imposed in many places by dictatorial methods, that is not because the secular rulers were gratuitously cruel; it was because secular principles had little hope of gaining spontaneous popular assent.
One huge question, unanswered by this book, is how minorities—practitioners of other religions or none—can expect to fare in countries where a form of political Islam is practised by the will of the majority. Even if the Islamic majority offers its non-Muslim compatriots generous forms of cultural autonomy, the infidel minorities can hardly be anything more than second-class subjects of an Islamic realm.
Whereas Mr Feldman's argument is about Islamic principles as a basis for creating stable, legitimate regimes, Mark Juergensmeyer, a professor of sociology and religious thought at the University of California, Santa Barbara, highlights the odd fact that the slogans of Islam, and other religions, are more effective than any secular battle-cry as a way of rallying people to wage war, or at least to live in armed readiness. Mixing analysis with reportage, he describes encounters with the leaders of Hamas, and with Jewish zealots who cheer the killing of Palestinians. He traces the advent of Hindu bigotry as a force in Indian politics and the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka's conflict.
Any book that takes in such a sweep is bound to have errors of detail. But it is more than a minor error to describe the first decade of the Soviet communist regime as “relatively tolerant” towards religion. Still, Mr Juergensmeyer is right in his broader point—that in the early 21st century, religion retains a mobilising power that secular nationalism and universalist ideologies like Marxism have lost. If you are trying to make people risk their own lives and take the lives of others, then calling the enemy “infidels” (or, literally, demonising them) is more effective than calling them foreigners or class enemies.
In each of these books, there is at least one lacuna. Having made the fair point that scholarship and modern political Islam don't easily mix, Mr Feldman should have said something about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the hugely influential and telegenic sheikh based in Qatar who seems to straddle both those worlds quite happily.
Mr Juergensmeyer distinguishes between the effects of secular nationalism and transnational religion, but he says little about religious nationalism, the opportunistic but effective combination of these two supposed opposites. As any thieving Balkan warlord knows, decent people often kill in the name of a half-forgotten national cause and for a religion in which they hardly believe. Using both tricks at once is especially effective.
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.
By Noah Feldman.
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda.
By Mark Juergensmeyer.
University of California Press; 384 pages; $27.50 and £16.95
May 1st 2008
From The Economist print edition
The slogans of political Islam remain highly resonant, whether as a programme for peaceful governance or an inspiration to wage war. Two new books explain why
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State
By Noah Feldman
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Buy it at
Amazon.com
Amazon.co.uk
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda
By Mark Juergensmeyer
University of California Press; 384 pages; $27.50 and £16.95
Buy it at
Amazon.com
Amazon.co.uk
WHEN the British and French empires were at their height, imperial service often provided an outlet for the talents of precociously clever ethnographers, social anthropologists and scholars of religion. On the face of things, Noah Feldman is a similar figure, rendering important services to the American imperium, both as a rising star in the intellectual establishment and in more practical ways—he helped to draft Iraq's new constitution.
A young professor at Harvard Law School with a doctorate in Islamic political thought, Mr Feldman is brimming with the sort of expertise that America's new proconsuls in the Middle East and Afghanistan badly need. Above all, he is qualified to opine on how America should react to the dilemma posed by the huge popular support, in Muslim lands, for explicitly Islamic forms of administration.
In a short, incisive and elegant book, he lays out for the non-specialist reader some of the forms that Islamic rule has taken over the centuries, while also stressing the differences between today's political Islam and previous forms of Islamic administration. In particular, he shows why “justice” is such a resonant slogan for Islamist movements. At least subliminally, it evokes memories of a dimly remembered era when Islamic law, as interpreted by scholars, acted as a real constraint on the power of rulers. To many Muslims, the legal tradition of their faith is not viewed as an alternative to Western democracy, based on secular law, but rather as the only real alternative to totalitarianism.
That perceived dilemma—either Muslim law and scholarship, or unfettered dictatorship—is not just a hangover from history; it also reflects the fact that many secular regimes which replaced traditional Muslim empires were dictatorships, with no separation of powers.
So far, that is a familiar argument. Mr Feldman becomes more interesting when he shows how the Ottoman empire, in its efforts to modernise while retaining some Islamic legitimacy, almost unavoidably grew more dictatorial and less Islamic.
The very fact that Islamic law was codified implied a downgrading in the authority of Muslim scholars; their task had been to apply a set of abstract, unwritten principles to an infinite variety of situations, and the written law code risked putting them out of a job. When the Ottoman sultan-caliph tried some cautious constitutional experiments in 1876, it appeared to his pious subjects that he was undermining God's sovereignty. This was not so much because the experiments seemed bad, but because constitutional change implied that an earthly ruler could tinker with systems that had been divinely ordained.
The modernising challenges facing the late Ottoman era dimly foreshadow, as Mr Feldman demonstrates, some of the problems of modern political Islam. But there are differences: the Islamists of today are not trying to reinstate the power of the scholars, which was a hallmark of all previous Islamic regimes. Instead, what modern Islamism proposes is an odd mix of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of God; as though the people, having been offered sovereign power, freely decide to render that power straight back to God.
Another of Mr Feldman's paradoxes: any modern constitution or legal code that consciously proclaims its intention to be Islamic and deferential to God, will fall short of the early Islamic ideal, where the sovereignty of God was so deeply assumed that it did not need spelling out.
Mr Feldman's book is more descriptive than prescriptive. But many readers may conclude that in Islam's heartland only forms of governance that incorporate Muslim values can hope to be legitimate. If secularism has been imposed in many places by dictatorial methods, that is not because the secular rulers were gratuitously cruel; it was because secular principles had little hope of gaining spontaneous popular assent.
One huge question, unanswered by this book, is how minorities—practitioners of other religions or none—can expect to fare in countries where a form of political Islam is practised by the will of the majority. Even if the Islamic majority offers its non-Muslim compatriots generous forms of cultural autonomy, the infidel minorities can hardly be anything more than second-class subjects of an Islamic realm.
Whereas Mr Feldman's argument is about Islamic principles as a basis for creating stable, legitimate regimes, Mark Juergensmeyer, a professor of sociology and religious thought at the University of California, Santa Barbara, highlights the odd fact that the slogans of Islam, and other religions, are more effective than any secular battle-cry as a way of rallying people to wage war, or at least to live in armed readiness. Mixing analysis with reportage, he describes encounters with the leaders of Hamas, and with Jewish zealots who cheer the killing of Palestinians. He traces the advent of Hindu bigotry as a force in Indian politics and the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka's conflict.
Any book that takes in such a sweep is bound to have errors of detail. But it is more than a minor error to describe the first decade of the Soviet communist regime as “relatively tolerant” towards religion. Still, Mr Juergensmeyer is right in his broader point—that in the early 21st century, religion retains a mobilising power that secular nationalism and universalist ideologies like Marxism have lost. If you are trying to make people risk their own lives and take the lives of others, then calling the enemy “infidels” (or, literally, demonising them) is more effective than calling them foreigners or class enemies.
In each of these books, there is at least one lacuna. Having made the fair point that scholarship and modern political Islam don't easily mix, Mr Feldman should have said something about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the hugely influential and telegenic sheikh based in Qatar who seems to straddle both those worlds quite happily.
Mr Juergensmeyer distinguishes between the effects of secular nationalism and transnational religion, but he says little about religious nationalism, the opportunistic but effective combination of these two supposed opposites. As any thieving Balkan warlord knows, decent people often kill in the name of a half-forgotten national cause and for a religion in which they hardly believe. Using both tricks at once is especially effective.
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State.
By Noah Feldman.
Princeton University Press; 200 pages; $22.95 and £13.50
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda.
By Mark Juergensmeyer.
University of California Press; 384 pages; $27.50 and £16.95
Muslim author's book calls on Canadians to condemn Islamists
Nigel Hannaford
Calgary Herald
Saturday, May 24, 2008
The irony of the Muslim world is that to exercise basic human rights, such as freedom of religion, conscience and speech, Muslims have to leave Islamic states. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is not a place where people agree to disagree over the finer points of Islam. Nor is Pakistan, or Iran: And, while the Taliban had control, neither was Afghanistan.
So, it makes you wonder why anybody who has left these places to start a new life in Canada (or any of the other liberal democracies) would want to establish in their new home, what they left behind in their old. But, as Londoners found a few years ago, there is such a thing as home-grown terrorism. Meanwhile, here in Canada several young Canadian-born Muslim men remain in custody after evidence was discovered of a plot to bomb buildings and kill the prime minister.
My gut says this will prove at trial to be an amateur-hour effort, but even blithering idiots can kill people. (One of the IRA's few redeeming features was how many of its adherents blew themselves up while building bombs intended for somebody else.) And, there has been a serious attempt to introduce the thin end of the sharia law wedge into Ontario.
Now, if I -- as an unreconstructed white guy, and a Christian to boot -- made these assertions based on no more than my own observations, I would probably be up to my knees in paperwork from somebody's human rights commission. Pointing out the lack of human rights in Islamic states, you see, is the kind of seditious talk that human rights commissions in Canada hate.
However, I'm actually just quoting the gist of what Tarek Fatah says in his new book, Chasing a Mirage: the Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State. As he puts it, "Today, the only Muslims who are free to practice their faith as they choose and participate in public life as equal citizens without having to validate their tribal, racial, or family lineage live as tiny minorities in secular democracies such as India, South Africa, Canada and many European countries. Yet, even while seeing the advantages of life under secular civil society, many of them are committed to the establishment of the Islamic State."
I guess that makes me an infidel, and Fatah a heretic.
I ran into him at the Hyatt this week, after a book signing. If I were a Liberal (he claims to be, though I believe he may be salvageable) I'd call him a poster boy for multicultural Canada.
"An Indian born in Pakistan; a Punjabi born in Islam," he writes of himself, a Muslim with Hindu ancestors, a left-wing student imprisoned for radical activities against the Pakistani military junta, who reported for a Karachi newspaper, sold ads in Saudi Arabia and admires Tommy Douglas and Pierre Trudeau. He came to Canada in 1987, and worked in Bob Rae's office while Rae was Ontario premier.
How does he like Canada?
"It is only here in Canada that I can speak out against the hijacking of my faith and the encroaching spectre of a new Islamo-fascism."
He is obviously completely integrated. So, what about the Muslims he writes of, who are not? They have been seduced, he says, by the tragic illusion referred to in his book's title: An Islamic State. Deeply ingrained in the Muslim psyche, he writes, is the idea of replicating the so-called Golden Age of the Rightly Guided Caliphs -- but few Muslims are willing to consider the implications of what they're asking for.
That's his argument, and his book, a comprehensive review of Muslim history to back up his contention that Islamic States cannot be deduced from the teachings of the prophet, and where they have existed, they have been Muslims' most egregious oppressors.
Christians, many of whom deplore the same things in western society that radical Islamists so despise, are routinely challenged from the pulpit to internalize their faith, rather than follow an empty form of it. Thus, Christian living is supposed to follow from an inner desire to please God, not conformity to external rules. Indeed, some Christians will concede a Christian state could easily become a suffocating society, even without the rigorous compulsions once made available by the state to the church.
Tarek makes a parallel plea, for Muslims to aspire to a "state of Islam," rather than an Islamic State, the current iterations of which take compulsion all the way to public beheading.
His book will not impress hard-line Islamists. Canadians, however, may take it as evidence one can be a Muslim, and loyal to a secular state. We need to hear that more often from Muslims -- and also what Tarek says of white liberals, that they should quit excusing extremists.
He certainly doesn't.
[email protected]
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Nigel Hannaford
Calgary Herald
Saturday, May 24, 2008
The irony of the Muslim world is that to exercise basic human rights, such as freedom of religion, conscience and speech, Muslims have to leave Islamic states. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is not a place where people agree to disagree over the finer points of Islam. Nor is Pakistan, or Iran: And, while the Taliban had control, neither was Afghanistan.
So, it makes you wonder why anybody who has left these places to start a new life in Canada (or any of the other liberal democracies) would want to establish in their new home, what they left behind in their old. But, as Londoners found a few years ago, there is such a thing as home-grown terrorism. Meanwhile, here in Canada several young Canadian-born Muslim men remain in custody after evidence was discovered of a plot to bomb buildings and kill the prime minister.
My gut says this will prove at trial to be an amateur-hour effort, but even blithering idiots can kill people. (One of the IRA's few redeeming features was how many of its adherents blew themselves up while building bombs intended for somebody else.) And, there has been a serious attempt to introduce the thin end of the sharia law wedge into Ontario.
Now, if I -- as an unreconstructed white guy, and a Christian to boot -- made these assertions based on no more than my own observations, I would probably be up to my knees in paperwork from somebody's human rights commission. Pointing out the lack of human rights in Islamic states, you see, is the kind of seditious talk that human rights commissions in Canada hate.
However, I'm actually just quoting the gist of what Tarek Fatah says in his new book, Chasing a Mirage: the Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State. As he puts it, "Today, the only Muslims who are free to practice their faith as they choose and participate in public life as equal citizens without having to validate their tribal, racial, or family lineage live as tiny minorities in secular democracies such as India, South Africa, Canada and many European countries. Yet, even while seeing the advantages of life under secular civil society, many of them are committed to the establishment of the Islamic State."
I guess that makes me an infidel, and Fatah a heretic.
I ran into him at the Hyatt this week, after a book signing. If I were a Liberal (he claims to be, though I believe he may be salvageable) I'd call him a poster boy for multicultural Canada.
"An Indian born in Pakistan; a Punjabi born in Islam," he writes of himself, a Muslim with Hindu ancestors, a left-wing student imprisoned for radical activities against the Pakistani military junta, who reported for a Karachi newspaper, sold ads in Saudi Arabia and admires Tommy Douglas and Pierre Trudeau. He came to Canada in 1987, and worked in Bob Rae's office while Rae was Ontario premier.
How does he like Canada?
"It is only here in Canada that I can speak out against the hijacking of my faith and the encroaching spectre of a new Islamo-fascism."
He is obviously completely integrated. So, what about the Muslims he writes of, who are not? They have been seduced, he says, by the tragic illusion referred to in his book's title: An Islamic State. Deeply ingrained in the Muslim psyche, he writes, is the idea of replicating the so-called Golden Age of the Rightly Guided Caliphs -- but few Muslims are willing to consider the implications of what they're asking for.
That's his argument, and his book, a comprehensive review of Muslim history to back up his contention that Islamic States cannot be deduced from the teachings of the prophet, and where they have existed, they have been Muslims' most egregious oppressors.
Christians, many of whom deplore the same things in western society that radical Islamists so despise, are routinely challenged from the pulpit to internalize their faith, rather than follow an empty form of it. Thus, Christian living is supposed to follow from an inner desire to please God, not conformity to external rules. Indeed, some Christians will concede a Christian state could easily become a suffocating society, even without the rigorous compulsions once made available by the state to the church.
Tarek makes a parallel plea, for Muslims to aspire to a "state of Islam," rather than an Islamic State, the current iterations of which take compulsion all the way to public beheading.
His book will not impress hard-line Islamists. Canadians, however, may take it as evidence one can be a Muslim, and loyal to a secular state. We need to hear that more often from Muslims -- and also what Tarek says of white liberals, that they should quit excusing extremists.
He certainly doesn't.
[email protected]
© The Calgary Herald 2008
June 5, 2008
Court Annuls Turkish Headscarf Bill
By REUTERS
Filed at 1:27 p.m. ET
ANKARA (Reuters) - Turkey's ruling AK party appeared to move a step closer to being shut down on Thursday when the Constitutional Court overturned a reform that would have allowed women to wear Islamic headscarves in universities.
The headscarf amendment plays a central role in a separate, crucial case that seeks to outlaw the AK Party for anti-secular activities, and ban 71 members, including the prime minister and president, from belonging to a political party for five years.
"This guarantees the closure of the party. I don't think we can talk of any calm before full chaos," said Cengiz Aktar, a political scientist at Istanbul's Bahcesehir University.
The court said in a statement it upheld, by 9 votes to 2, an appeal from the main opposition CHP party, seeking to block a legal amendment allowing students to wear the garment on campus.
More conservative secularists saw the amendment as a violation of strict separation between Mosque and state, and evidence the AK Party has a secret agenda to introduce a system of Islamic law. AK denies such ambitions and has introduced many social reforms aimed at European Union membership.
"With this decision the Constitutional Court has exceeded its authority. I see this decision as contrary to the constitution," said AK Party deputy group chairman Bekir Bozdag.
The AK Party has roots in political Islam and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan served a prison sentence for Islamist activity in the 1990s. But it was formed, six years ago, as a broad coalition of religious conservatives, nationalists, market liberals and centre-right activists.
The Turkish lira fell 1 percent against the dollar on the news, with markets fearing prolonged political uncertainty in the EU-applicant country and a slow-down of economic and political reforms.
ANTI-SECULAR MOVE
The Constitutional Court, the highest judicial body, said lifting the headscarf ban was contrary to three articles in the constitution, including article two that specifies that Turkey is a secular republic. Turkey is also 99 percent Muslim.
The AK Party says the right to wear the headscarf at university is a personal and religious freedom. Secularists see it as a symbol of political Islam.
"If Turkey is a secular, democratic state, we must all respect the (court's) decisions. The ruling states the obvious," military chief General Yasar Buyukanit told reporters.
A powerful elite of military, judicial and academic officials regard themselves as the custodians of secularism and the army, with public support, edged a party from power as recently as 1997 on accusations of Islamist activity.
In AK, however, the secularist elite faces a party with a large parliamentary majority and a highly popular leader.
Senior AK Party members told Reuters recently the party has started to believe it would be closed down and Erdogan banned from belonging to a political party for five years.
The closure case is expected to take months to conclude.
Secularists, who until recently controlled key state institutions, are now accused by some of using the judiciary to hit back at an increasingly prosperous and assertive religious middle class that forms the bedrock of support for the AK Party.
"These guys are playing their last card and they won't take any chances. They can't do a coup d'etat any more like in 1960, 1971 or 1980," Aktar said.
If AK is outlawed its members in parliament are expected to form a new political party and form the next government, analysts said, but added they may face serious legal hurdles.
More than 80 years after revolutionary secularists led by Mustafal Kemal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate, the divisive potential of Islam in Turkey remains high.
"We fear this ruling will accelerate the process of dividing and polarizing Turkish society on the basis of belief," said Devlet Bahceli, leader of the MHP, which supported the AK Party in pushing the headscarf-related amendments through parliament.
(Additional reporting by Selcuk Gokoluk in Ankara, Daren Butler, Thomas Grove, and Zerin Elci in Istanbul; Writing by Paul de Bendern)
Court Annuls Turkish Headscarf Bill
By REUTERS
Filed at 1:27 p.m. ET
ANKARA (Reuters) - Turkey's ruling AK party appeared to move a step closer to being shut down on Thursday when the Constitutional Court overturned a reform that would have allowed women to wear Islamic headscarves in universities.
The headscarf amendment plays a central role in a separate, crucial case that seeks to outlaw the AK Party for anti-secular activities, and ban 71 members, including the prime minister and president, from belonging to a political party for five years.
"This guarantees the closure of the party. I don't think we can talk of any calm before full chaos," said Cengiz Aktar, a political scientist at Istanbul's Bahcesehir University.
The court said in a statement it upheld, by 9 votes to 2, an appeal from the main opposition CHP party, seeking to block a legal amendment allowing students to wear the garment on campus.
More conservative secularists saw the amendment as a violation of strict separation between Mosque and state, and evidence the AK Party has a secret agenda to introduce a system of Islamic law. AK denies such ambitions and has introduced many social reforms aimed at European Union membership.
"With this decision the Constitutional Court has exceeded its authority. I see this decision as contrary to the constitution," said AK Party deputy group chairman Bekir Bozdag.
The AK Party has roots in political Islam and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan served a prison sentence for Islamist activity in the 1990s. But it was formed, six years ago, as a broad coalition of religious conservatives, nationalists, market liberals and centre-right activists.
The Turkish lira fell 1 percent against the dollar on the news, with markets fearing prolonged political uncertainty in the EU-applicant country and a slow-down of economic and political reforms.
ANTI-SECULAR MOVE
The Constitutional Court, the highest judicial body, said lifting the headscarf ban was contrary to three articles in the constitution, including article two that specifies that Turkey is a secular republic. Turkey is also 99 percent Muslim.
The AK Party says the right to wear the headscarf at university is a personal and religious freedom. Secularists see it as a symbol of political Islam.
"If Turkey is a secular, democratic state, we must all respect the (court's) decisions. The ruling states the obvious," military chief General Yasar Buyukanit told reporters.
A powerful elite of military, judicial and academic officials regard themselves as the custodians of secularism and the army, with public support, edged a party from power as recently as 1997 on accusations of Islamist activity.
In AK, however, the secularist elite faces a party with a large parliamentary majority and a highly popular leader.
Senior AK Party members told Reuters recently the party has started to believe it would be closed down and Erdogan banned from belonging to a political party for five years.
The closure case is expected to take months to conclude.
Secularists, who until recently controlled key state institutions, are now accused by some of using the judiciary to hit back at an increasingly prosperous and assertive religious middle class that forms the bedrock of support for the AK Party.
"These guys are playing their last card and they won't take any chances. They can't do a coup d'etat any more like in 1960, 1971 or 1980," Aktar said.
If AK is outlawed its members in parliament are expected to form a new political party and form the next government, analysts said, but added they may face serious legal hurdles.
More than 80 years after revolutionary secularists led by Mustafal Kemal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate, the divisive potential of Islam in Turkey remains high.
"We fear this ruling will accelerate the process of dividing and polarizing Turkish society on the basis of belief," said Devlet Bahceli, leader of the MHP, which supported the AK Party in pushing the headscarf-related amendments through parliament.
(Additional reporting by Selcuk Gokoluk in Ankara, Daren Butler, Thomas Grove, and Zerin Elci in Istanbul; Writing by Paul de Bendern)
Turkey's dangerous message to the Muslim world
A court ban on the most pro-Western party would be a big mistake.
By Alex Taurel and Shadi Hamid
from the July 24, 2008 edition
Washington - President Bush's vision of a democratic Middle East was premised in part on the region's popular Islamist groups reconciling themselves to the give-and-take nature of democracy.
It might make sense then, that the Bush administration would do what it could to support a party that has made such a transformation in Turkey. But it's not.
Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), which fashioned itself as the Muslim equivalent of Europe's Christian Democrats, has stood out by passing a series of unprecedented political reforms as the country's ruling party.
Yet the Turkish Constitutional Court – bastion of the hard-line secularist old guard – is now threatening to close down the AKP and ban its leading figures, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, from party politics for five years. And the Bush administration, in the face of this impending judicial coup, has chosen to remain indifferent. The consequences could reach beyond a setback to democracy in Turkey and affect the Middle East.
The Constitutional Court will rule as soon as next week on an indictment accusing the AKP of being a "focal point of antisecular activities."
Turkey's Constitution establishes secularism as an unalterable principle and allows the court to ban parties it deems antisecular. But disbanding a democratically-elected party on such dubious grounds as attempting to lift a controversial ban on wearing head scarves in universities – the crux of the case against the AKP – is not how mature democracies handle divisive issues. Judges should not decide parties' fates; voters should.
Indeed, voters have flocked to the AKP since its founding by break away reformists within the Islamic movement. The party was elected in 2002 on pledges to preserve secularism and vigorously pursue Turkey's efforts to join the European Union. It also explicitly disavowed the Islamist label.
The AKP-led government then passed a series of democratic reforms that led Brussels to begin formal accession negotiations with Turkey. Those reforms, together with a booming economy, spurred 47 percent of Turks to vote for the AKP in its landslide 2007 reelection.
To be sure, the AKP's democratic credentials are hardly perfect. It has been overly cautious in repealing certain restrictions on freedom of speech, and it abruptly lifted the head scarf ban without first initiating a national dialogue.
Yet despite its flaws, the AKP is the most democratically inclined – and somewhat ironically, the most pro-Western – political party on the Turkish scene today. Closing it down would be a mistake.
A ban on a party that nearly half of the country supports could spark violence – which Turkey's secularist generals might then use as a pretext for a direct military intervention. Regardless, senior EU figures have criticized the closure case and warned that banning the AKP could gravely damage Turkey's candidacy.
Even more troubling is the message it would send to the rest of the Muslim world – no matter how much Islamists moderate, they won't be accepted as legitimate participants in the democratic process.
In recent years, mainstream Islamist groups throughout the region – including in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco – have embraced many of the foundational components of democratic life. Yet their moderation has been met with harsh government repression, or more subtle designs to restrict their political participation.
More is at stake than may initially appear. If the AKP – the most moderate, pro-democratic "Islamist" party in the region today – is disbanded, it will strengthen those Islamists who see violence and confrontation as a surer means to influence political power.
During the past year, a number of Islamist leaders we've spoken to in Egypt and Jordan have warned that rank-and-file activists are losing faith in the democratic process, and may soon become attracted to more radical approaches. A ban on the AKP would only make it that much harder for moderates to continue making the case that participating in elections is worthwhile.
Though US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praises the AKP's democratization agenda, last month she said, "Obviously, we are not going to get involved in … the current controversy in Turkey about the court case." Yet moments later she opined, "Sometimes when I'm asked what might democracy look like in the Middle East, I think it might look like Turkey." It's difficult to tell if she's referring to the new, democratizing Turkey of the past five years – or the reactionary Turkey where judges and generals flagrantly overrule the people's will.
President Bush has one last opportunity to reinvigorate the cause of Middle East democracy. By publicly denouncing the closure case, the administration would signal that the US not only supports Turkish democracy against a dangerous internal assault, but that it is also committed to defending all actors willing to abide by democratic principles in a region that desperately needs more of them.
• Alex Taurel is a research associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy. Shadi Hamid is the director of research there and a research fellow at the American Center for Oriental Research in Amman, Jordan.
Find this article at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0724/p09s02-coop.html
A court ban on the most pro-Western party would be a big mistake.
By Alex Taurel and Shadi Hamid
from the July 24, 2008 edition
Washington - President Bush's vision of a democratic Middle East was premised in part on the region's popular Islamist groups reconciling themselves to the give-and-take nature of democracy.
It might make sense then, that the Bush administration would do what it could to support a party that has made such a transformation in Turkey. But it's not.
Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), which fashioned itself as the Muslim equivalent of Europe's Christian Democrats, has stood out by passing a series of unprecedented political reforms as the country's ruling party.
Yet the Turkish Constitutional Court – bastion of the hard-line secularist old guard – is now threatening to close down the AKP and ban its leading figures, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, from party politics for five years. And the Bush administration, in the face of this impending judicial coup, has chosen to remain indifferent. The consequences could reach beyond a setback to democracy in Turkey and affect the Middle East.
The Constitutional Court will rule as soon as next week on an indictment accusing the AKP of being a "focal point of antisecular activities."
Turkey's Constitution establishes secularism as an unalterable principle and allows the court to ban parties it deems antisecular. But disbanding a democratically-elected party on such dubious grounds as attempting to lift a controversial ban on wearing head scarves in universities – the crux of the case against the AKP – is not how mature democracies handle divisive issues. Judges should not decide parties' fates; voters should.
Indeed, voters have flocked to the AKP since its founding by break away reformists within the Islamic movement. The party was elected in 2002 on pledges to preserve secularism and vigorously pursue Turkey's efforts to join the European Union. It also explicitly disavowed the Islamist label.
The AKP-led government then passed a series of democratic reforms that led Brussels to begin formal accession negotiations with Turkey. Those reforms, together with a booming economy, spurred 47 percent of Turks to vote for the AKP in its landslide 2007 reelection.
To be sure, the AKP's democratic credentials are hardly perfect. It has been overly cautious in repealing certain restrictions on freedom of speech, and it abruptly lifted the head scarf ban without first initiating a national dialogue.
Yet despite its flaws, the AKP is the most democratically inclined – and somewhat ironically, the most pro-Western – political party on the Turkish scene today. Closing it down would be a mistake.
A ban on a party that nearly half of the country supports could spark violence – which Turkey's secularist generals might then use as a pretext for a direct military intervention. Regardless, senior EU figures have criticized the closure case and warned that banning the AKP could gravely damage Turkey's candidacy.
Even more troubling is the message it would send to the rest of the Muslim world – no matter how much Islamists moderate, they won't be accepted as legitimate participants in the democratic process.
In recent years, mainstream Islamist groups throughout the region – including in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco – have embraced many of the foundational components of democratic life. Yet their moderation has been met with harsh government repression, or more subtle designs to restrict their political participation.
More is at stake than may initially appear. If the AKP – the most moderate, pro-democratic "Islamist" party in the region today – is disbanded, it will strengthen those Islamists who see violence and confrontation as a surer means to influence political power.
During the past year, a number of Islamist leaders we've spoken to in Egypt and Jordan have warned that rank-and-file activists are losing faith in the democratic process, and may soon become attracted to more radical approaches. A ban on the AKP would only make it that much harder for moderates to continue making the case that participating in elections is worthwhile.
Though US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praises the AKP's democratization agenda, last month she said, "Obviously, we are not going to get involved in … the current controversy in Turkey about the court case." Yet moments later she opined, "Sometimes when I'm asked what might democracy look like in the Middle East, I think it might look like Turkey." It's difficult to tell if she's referring to the new, democratizing Turkey of the past five years – or the reactionary Turkey where judges and generals flagrantly overrule the people's will.
President Bush has one last opportunity to reinvigorate the cause of Middle East democracy. By publicly denouncing the closure case, the administration would signal that the US not only supports Turkish democracy against a dangerous internal assault, but that it is also committed to defending all actors willing to abide by democratic principles in a region that desperately needs more of them.
• Alex Taurel is a research associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy. Shadi Hamid is the director of research there and a research fellow at the American Center for Oriental Research in Amman, Jordan.
Find this article at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0724/p09s02-coop.html
July 31, 2008
Turkish Court Calls Ruling Party Constitutional
By SABRINA TAVERNISE and SEBNEM ARSU
Turkey’s governing party narrowly missed being banned in a court ruling on Wednesday that relieved months of pressure in the country and handed a victory to the party’s leader, a former Islamist.
The party, Justice and Development, or AKP, as it is known in Turkish, was kept alive by just one vote — six members of Turkey’s Constitutional Court voted to close it for violating the country’s secular principles, but seven were required. A ban would have brought down the government, forcing elections for the second time in a year and pitching Turkey into political chaos.
“A great uncertainty blocking Turkey’s future has been lifted,” said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the party, speaking in Ankara, the capital.
The court case was the culmination of an epic battle between the country’s secular establishment — a powerful coterie of judges and generals that has deposed elected governments four times in Turkish history — and Mr. Erdogan, a broadly popular politician whose supporters say that his past as a political Islamist is firmly behind him.
And while the ruling was widely viewed as a victory for Mr. Erdogan, and in turn for Turkish democracy, the court reined the party in, imposing a strong but not fatal sanction to cut its public financing in half and issuing a “serious warning” that it was steering the country in too Islamic a direction. Legislation pressed by the party that would have allowed women in head scarves to attend universities, for example, raised suspicions about its agenda.
“AKP is on probation,” said Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Bilgi University in Istanbul. “The court clearly said it sees the party as a focal institution for Islamizing the country.”
Still, by overcoming the case, which accused the party of trying to bring Islamic rule to Turkey, the party and its supporters have prevailed against the country’s staunchly secular old guard, which has steered the country from behind the scenes since Turkey’s founding by Ataturk in 1923.
The ruling releases the political deadlock that had paralyzed politics in Turkey since March, when the case was filed, and seems to have softened the sharp polarization that had formed between parts of Turkish society — those who want a more openly religious society and those who fear that too much space for Islam will end up curbing secular lifestyles. In a live news conference interrupted by jubilant supporters, Mr. Erdogan said his party had “never been the focus of antisecular activities,” and pledged that it would “continue to protect the fundamental principles of our republic also in the future.”
Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, but its system of government is secular. While the case against the AKP was broadly criticized as weak, secular Turks still worry that the party, with its control of Parliament, the presidency and the government, has too much leeway to impose policies that appeal to its socially conservative base.
But the ruling seemed to have something for everyone, clearing the air politically and allowing even Turkey’s most adamant secularists to claim it as a victory.
“AKP can no longer continue with its previous line in politics,” said Onur Oymen, the deputy chairman of the secular opposition Republican People’s Party. “They have been granted a chance. In order to make the best of it, they need to go through some serious self-critique.”
There appear to be no practical implications for the party aside from the cut in financing, which is expected to be made up from other sources in the party’s vast middle- and upper-class network of supporters. The ruling opens a new opportunity for Mr. Erdogan to reach out to liberal Turks, who oppose the secular elite but resented his legislation on the head scarves. They felt that he had abandoned other liberal issues like freedom of speech.
“They can no longer afford to act single-handedly,” said Ersin Kalaycioglu, political science professor of Sabanci University in Istanbul, who compared the party to a soccer player “with a yellow card to be expelled from the game after one more mistake.”
The ruling was an “elegant solution,” said Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who used a metaphor to describe its effect: “If the AKP was a river that has overflown its banks, the court has set up embankments, forcing it back into its bed. It has not put a dam in front of it.”
The ruling came at a time of great tension in the country. A bomb attack had killed 17 people in Istanbul just three days before, and a ban of the party and its senior members would have brought great instability. On Wednesday, the Istanbul police detained nine people in connection with the blast, Turkey’s state-run Anatolian News Agency reported.
“The judges must have judged that the consequences of closure would have been intolerable for the country,” Mr. Ozel said.
A government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the party had taken the ruling to heart. “A new period is ahead,” the official said. “The self-critique following the verdict,” he said, “will be seen in our actions, not in words.”
Turkey is trying to gain membership in the European Union, and its chances could have been dented if the party was closed.
“There is a great sense of relief among the Europeans,” said Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament who works on matters regarding Turkey.
The case has paralleled another sensational legal proceeding — the prosecution of 86 people, including writers, members of civic organizations and former military officers who are charged with plotting to overthrow the government — and many in Turkey saw the effects of that case in the ruling on Wednesday.
The case, referred to as Ergenekon, the name of the ultranationalist organization the people belong to, is one of the first public accountings of the darker side of Turkey’s deep state.
Baskin Oran, a professor of international relations at Ankara University, said the ruling was a sign that Turkey’s judiciary, long believed to be well in the sphere of the secular establishment, seemed to have broken ranks.
“Everybody is very happy with this decision,” he said. “Otherwise it would have created a hell of a situation for Turkey.”
Sabrina Tavernise reported from Baghdad, and Sebnem Arsu from Istanbul.
Turkish Court Calls Ruling Party Constitutional
By SABRINA TAVERNISE and SEBNEM ARSU
Turkey’s governing party narrowly missed being banned in a court ruling on Wednesday that relieved months of pressure in the country and handed a victory to the party’s leader, a former Islamist.
The party, Justice and Development, or AKP, as it is known in Turkish, was kept alive by just one vote — six members of Turkey’s Constitutional Court voted to close it for violating the country’s secular principles, but seven were required. A ban would have brought down the government, forcing elections for the second time in a year and pitching Turkey into political chaos.
“A great uncertainty blocking Turkey’s future has been lifted,” said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the party, speaking in Ankara, the capital.
The court case was the culmination of an epic battle between the country’s secular establishment — a powerful coterie of judges and generals that has deposed elected governments four times in Turkish history — and Mr. Erdogan, a broadly popular politician whose supporters say that his past as a political Islamist is firmly behind him.
And while the ruling was widely viewed as a victory for Mr. Erdogan, and in turn for Turkish democracy, the court reined the party in, imposing a strong but not fatal sanction to cut its public financing in half and issuing a “serious warning” that it was steering the country in too Islamic a direction. Legislation pressed by the party that would have allowed women in head scarves to attend universities, for example, raised suspicions about its agenda.
“AKP is on probation,” said Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Bilgi University in Istanbul. “The court clearly said it sees the party as a focal institution for Islamizing the country.”
Still, by overcoming the case, which accused the party of trying to bring Islamic rule to Turkey, the party and its supporters have prevailed against the country’s staunchly secular old guard, which has steered the country from behind the scenes since Turkey’s founding by Ataturk in 1923.
The ruling releases the political deadlock that had paralyzed politics in Turkey since March, when the case was filed, and seems to have softened the sharp polarization that had formed between parts of Turkish society — those who want a more openly religious society and those who fear that too much space for Islam will end up curbing secular lifestyles. In a live news conference interrupted by jubilant supporters, Mr. Erdogan said his party had “never been the focus of antisecular activities,” and pledged that it would “continue to protect the fundamental principles of our republic also in the future.”
Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, but its system of government is secular. While the case against the AKP was broadly criticized as weak, secular Turks still worry that the party, with its control of Parliament, the presidency and the government, has too much leeway to impose policies that appeal to its socially conservative base.
But the ruling seemed to have something for everyone, clearing the air politically and allowing even Turkey’s most adamant secularists to claim it as a victory.
“AKP can no longer continue with its previous line in politics,” said Onur Oymen, the deputy chairman of the secular opposition Republican People’s Party. “They have been granted a chance. In order to make the best of it, they need to go through some serious self-critique.”
There appear to be no practical implications for the party aside from the cut in financing, which is expected to be made up from other sources in the party’s vast middle- and upper-class network of supporters. The ruling opens a new opportunity for Mr. Erdogan to reach out to liberal Turks, who oppose the secular elite but resented his legislation on the head scarves. They felt that he had abandoned other liberal issues like freedom of speech.
“They can no longer afford to act single-handedly,” said Ersin Kalaycioglu, political science professor of Sabanci University in Istanbul, who compared the party to a soccer player “with a yellow card to be expelled from the game after one more mistake.”
The ruling was an “elegant solution,” said Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who used a metaphor to describe its effect: “If the AKP was a river that has overflown its banks, the court has set up embankments, forcing it back into its bed. It has not put a dam in front of it.”
The ruling came at a time of great tension in the country. A bomb attack had killed 17 people in Istanbul just three days before, and a ban of the party and its senior members would have brought great instability. On Wednesday, the Istanbul police detained nine people in connection with the blast, Turkey’s state-run Anatolian News Agency reported.
“The judges must have judged that the consequences of closure would have been intolerable for the country,” Mr. Ozel said.
A government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the party had taken the ruling to heart. “A new period is ahead,” the official said. “The self-critique following the verdict,” he said, “will be seen in our actions, not in words.”
Turkey is trying to gain membership in the European Union, and its chances could have been dented if the party was closed.
“There is a great sense of relief among the Europeans,” said Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament who works on matters regarding Turkey.
The case has paralleled another sensational legal proceeding — the prosecution of 86 people, including writers, members of civic organizations and former military officers who are charged with plotting to overthrow the government — and many in Turkey saw the effects of that case in the ruling on Wednesday.
The case, referred to as Ergenekon, the name of the ultranationalist organization the people belong to, is one of the first public accountings of the darker side of Turkey’s deep state.
Baskin Oran, a professor of international relations at Ankara University, said the ruling was a sign that Turkey’s judiciary, long believed to be well in the sphere of the secular establishment, seemed to have broken ranks.
“Everybody is very happy with this decision,” he said. “Otherwise it would have created a hell of a situation for Turkey.”
Sabrina Tavernise reported from Baghdad, and Sebnem Arsu from Istanbul.
Separation of Mosque and State
Turkey's Constitutional Court has decided against disbanding the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and ruled instead to cut the party's public funding. This sent a clear signal that the AKP is now on probation, and may yet be shut down if it pursues what ardent secularists view as a policy of creeping Islamization.
These decisions echo beyond the Middle East. From Istanbul to Paris, and from Cairo to Jakarta, the conflict between Muslims who want to tighten versus loosen the mosque-state link is escalating. In Middle East countries that have pursued modest political reform, this elemental dispute is undercutting democratization. But even where democracy is on firmer ground, the battle between Islamists and secularists is eroding the quality of democratic governance. The stakes are enormous.
Consider Turkey and France. While it may seem odd to put them in the same basket, the political systems of both countries have long been guided by elites who champion an ideology of state-enforced secularism. Although upheld as a key ingredient of democratic life, this ideology was animated by a profoundly illiberal impulse: to keep any display of faith out of the public sphere. This arrangement worked so long as the vast majority of French and Turks favored or acquiesced to it. But in recent years, social, demographic and economic changes have enhanced the clout of a new generation of Muslims--many of whom are not ready to fold up their headscarves when they walk into a public university or government office. Alarmed, the defenders of "laïcite" and Ataturk-style secularism are striking back.
Thus in France, political leaders left and right have applauded the recent decision by that country's highest court to deny citizenship to a Moroccan woman because, among other reasons, she wears a burka (a full body cover traditionally worn in Afghanistan). This clothing, the Court stated, is "incompatible with values of the French community, particularly the principle of equality of the sexes." Echoing a similar logic, Turkey's Constitutional Court cancelled an amendment proposed by the AKP that would have allowed for the wearing of headscarves in public universities. The Court went a step further when it considered a proposal to disband the AKP itself. But while the Court has stepped back from the brink, a hobbled AKP must now tread carefully between its desire to promote "religious freedom" and the ardent determination of secularists to confine that freedom to family or the mosque.
In France and Turkey, unelected courts have intervened in ways that ignore or defy the voice of elected parliaments. But at what cost? France's democracy will certainly survive. But it is a huge leap of state authority for France's highest court to deny citizenship on the grounds that someone's religious values clash with prevailing notions of gender equality. While French intellectuals are busy debating whether the burka-clad woman in question suffers from false consciousness, they should ponder the broader implications of the Court's actions (particularly in a country that practically invented the term liberté).
By contrast, the decisions taken by Turkey's Constitutional Court may --or may not-- create a space for the deepening of democracy. Much will depend on whether moderate political leaders on both sides of the Islamist-secularist divide can use this fragile moment to craft a mutually acceptable vision of secularism.
It won't be easy. It may be that AKP leaders genuinely believe that allowing headscarves is not part of some grand conspiracy to Islamicize society. But many secular Turks think otherwise. After all, they argue, the issue is not merely freedom of religion but freedom from religion. Open up the universities to headscarves and many secular women may feel growing social pressures to wear religious garb. Islamicization will come, not out of choice, but out of a fear.
While such concerns may be exaggerated, they should not be dismissed. True, the banning of the AKP would have been a disaster not merely for Turkey, but for the wider Middle East, where a new generation of Arab Islamists has been inspired by the AKP's quest to forge a pluralistic vision that is also attentive to conservative religious values. Yet Washington should not romanticize the AKP by ignoring or downplaying the tensions and fears provoked by its efforts to advance a post-Islamist secularism. Instead, the U.S. should take a cue from European leaders, who are now encouraging the AKP to address the concerns of secular Turks, many of whom voted for the party only to wonder about its ultimate intensions.
Posted by Daniel Brumberg on August 7, 2008 10:09 AM
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfa ... state.html
Daniel Brumberg
Daniel Brumberg is an Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Co-Director of the Democracy and Governance Studies at GU. He also serves as a Acting Director of the United States Institute of Peace Muslim World Initiative, where he directs a number of programs on democracy and political change in the Muslim world. A former senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project (2003–04). Brumberg previously was a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at USIP, where he pursued a study of power sharing in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In 1997, Brumberg was a Mellon junior fellow at Georgetown University and a visiting fellow at the International Forum on Democratic Studies. He was a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science at Emory University and a visiting fellow in the Middle East Program in the Jimmy Carter Center, and has also taught at the University of Chicago and Sciences Po, Paris. He received his B.A. from Indiana University and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. His books include "Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), and "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, co-edited with Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Close.
Turkey's Constitutional Court has decided against disbanding the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and ruled instead to cut the party's public funding. This sent a clear signal that the AKP is now on probation, and may yet be shut down if it pursues what ardent secularists view as a policy of creeping Islamization.
These decisions echo beyond the Middle East. From Istanbul to Paris, and from Cairo to Jakarta, the conflict between Muslims who want to tighten versus loosen the mosque-state link is escalating. In Middle East countries that have pursued modest political reform, this elemental dispute is undercutting democratization. But even where democracy is on firmer ground, the battle between Islamists and secularists is eroding the quality of democratic governance. The stakes are enormous.
Consider Turkey and France. While it may seem odd to put them in the same basket, the political systems of both countries have long been guided by elites who champion an ideology of state-enforced secularism. Although upheld as a key ingredient of democratic life, this ideology was animated by a profoundly illiberal impulse: to keep any display of faith out of the public sphere. This arrangement worked so long as the vast majority of French and Turks favored or acquiesced to it. But in recent years, social, demographic and economic changes have enhanced the clout of a new generation of Muslims--many of whom are not ready to fold up their headscarves when they walk into a public university or government office. Alarmed, the defenders of "laïcite" and Ataturk-style secularism are striking back.
Thus in France, political leaders left and right have applauded the recent decision by that country's highest court to deny citizenship to a Moroccan woman because, among other reasons, she wears a burka (a full body cover traditionally worn in Afghanistan). This clothing, the Court stated, is "incompatible with values of the French community, particularly the principle of equality of the sexes." Echoing a similar logic, Turkey's Constitutional Court cancelled an amendment proposed by the AKP that would have allowed for the wearing of headscarves in public universities. The Court went a step further when it considered a proposal to disband the AKP itself. But while the Court has stepped back from the brink, a hobbled AKP must now tread carefully between its desire to promote "religious freedom" and the ardent determination of secularists to confine that freedom to family or the mosque.
In France and Turkey, unelected courts have intervened in ways that ignore or defy the voice of elected parliaments. But at what cost? France's democracy will certainly survive. But it is a huge leap of state authority for France's highest court to deny citizenship on the grounds that someone's religious values clash with prevailing notions of gender equality. While French intellectuals are busy debating whether the burka-clad woman in question suffers from false consciousness, they should ponder the broader implications of the Court's actions (particularly in a country that practically invented the term liberté).
By contrast, the decisions taken by Turkey's Constitutional Court may --or may not-- create a space for the deepening of democracy. Much will depend on whether moderate political leaders on both sides of the Islamist-secularist divide can use this fragile moment to craft a mutually acceptable vision of secularism.
It won't be easy. It may be that AKP leaders genuinely believe that allowing headscarves is not part of some grand conspiracy to Islamicize society. But many secular Turks think otherwise. After all, they argue, the issue is not merely freedom of religion but freedom from religion. Open up the universities to headscarves and many secular women may feel growing social pressures to wear religious garb. Islamicization will come, not out of choice, but out of a fear.
While such concerns may be exaggerated, they should not be dismissed. True, the banning of the AKP would have been a disaster not merely for Turkey, but for the wider Middle East, where a new generation of Arab Islamists has been inspired by the AKP's quest to forge a pluralistic vision that is also attentive to conservative religious values. Yet Washington should not romanticize the AKP by ignoring or downplaying the tensions and fears provoked by its efforts to advance a post-Islamist secularism. Instead, the U.S. should take a cue from European leaders, who are now encouraging the AKP to address the concerns of secular Turks, many of whom voted for the party only to wonder about its ultimate intensions.
Posted by Daniel Brumberg on August 7, 2008 10:09 AM
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfa ... state.html
Daniel Brumberg
Daniel Brumberg is an Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Co-Director of the Democracy and Governance Studies at GU. He also serves as a Acting Director of the United States Institute of Peace Muslim World Initiative, where he directs a number of programs on democracy and political change in the Muslim world. A former senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project (2003–04). Brumberg previously was a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at USIP, where he pursued a study of power sharing in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In 1997, Brumberg was a Mellon junior fellow at Georgetown University and a visiting fellow at the International Forum on Democratic Studies. He was a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science at Emory University and a visiting fellow in the Middle East Program in the Jimmy Carter Center, and has also taught at the University of Chicago and Sciences Po, Paris. He received his B.A. from Indiana University and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. His books include "Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), and "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, co-edited with Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Close.
Religion and State, Never. Faith and Poliitcs, Always.
Right on, Rick Warren! Now let's hope he means it. But whether or not we trust his intentions, we can all learn from his words. The separation of church and state is one of the great ideas of the modern world. It attempted to end the thousands year old tradition, among all three Abrahamic faiths at least, of people using state power to kill other people in order to make God happy. But the idea that faith should be separated from politics is one of the worst expressions of "baby-out-with-the-bathwater" thinking that has come along in almost as many years. Instead of killing people for God, we tried to kill God for people, only that has worked so well either.
We have managed to kill as many people over the last two hundred years, without God in the mix, as we did in the thousands of years before. So maybe we need to try something else. Instead of killing off either God, or those who don't share our beliefs, perhaps we should reintegrate the two in a healthier way. That is what I find so useful about Rev. Warren's comment.
Neither the state nor religions are well served when they are one and the same - not in America, not in Saudi Arabia, and not in Israel. But neither are they maximized when they are totally disconnected from each other either. Our faiths, the beliefs which animate our lives, whatever they may be, must inform our politics if they are to be anything more than occasional, spiritual entertainment. Our beliefs, if deeply held, will always affect our politics, if we actually care about people other than ourselves.
Faith, or the lack of it, is a personal matter and must always remain so. But the values and commitments that flow from that personal decision must be about something larger than our own personal lives. If not, neither our faith nor our lack of it, is anything more than narcissism with good footnotes. The real test is not whether that which we believe has a political agenda, it is whether or not the faiths and politics we profess, leave room for the agendas of others.
Please e-mail On Faith if you'd like to receive an email notification when On Faith sends out a new question.
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfa ... faith.html
Right on, Rick Warren! Now let's hope he means it. But whether or not we trust his intentions, we can all learn from his words. The separation of church and state is one of the great ideas of the modern world. It attempted to end the thousands year old tradition, among all three Abrahamic faiths at least, of people using state power to kill other people in order to make God happy. But the idea that faith should be separated from politics is one of the worst expressions of "baby-out-with-the-bathwater" thinking that has come along in almost as many years. Instead of killing people for God, we tried to kill God for people, only that has worked so well either.
We have managed to kill as many people over the last two hundred years, without God in the mix, as we did in the thousands of years before. So maybe we need to try something else. Instead of killing off either God, or those who don't share our beliefs, perhaps we should reintegrate the two in a healthier way. That is what I find so useful about Rev. Warren's comment.
Neither the state nor religions are well served when they are one and the same - not in America, not in Saudi Arabia, and not in Israel. But neither are they maximized when they are totally disconnected from each other either. Our faiths, the beliefs which animate our lives, whatever they may be, must inform our politics if they are to be anything more than occasional, spiritual entertainment. Our beliefs, if deeply held, will always affect our politics, if we actually care about people other than ourselves.
Faith, or the lack of it, is a personal matter and must always remain so. But the values and commitments that flow from that personal decision must be about something larger than our own personal lives. If not, neither our faith nor our lack of it, is anything more than narcissism with good footnotes. The real test is not whether that which we believe has a political agenda, it is whether or not the faiths and politics we profess, leave room for the agendas of others.
Please e-mail On Faith if you'd like to receive an email notification when On Faith sends out a new question.
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfa ... faith.html
Meet Fethullah Gülen, the World’s Top Public Intellectual
Posted August 2008
When Foreign Policy and Prospect magazine asked readers to vote for the world’s top public intellectual, one man won in a landslide: Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, an inspirational leader to millions of followers around the world and persona non grata to many in his native Turkey, where some consider him a threat to the country’s secular order. In a rare interview, Gülen speaks to FP about terrorism, political ambitions, and why his movement is so misunderstood.
Illustration: Lara Tomlin for FP
Foreign Policy: How do you feel about being named the world’s top public intellectual?
Fethullah Gülen: I have never imagined being or wished to be chosen as something important in the world. I have always tried to be a humble servant of God and a humble member of humanity. The Koran says that humanity has been created to recognize and worship God and, as a dimension of this worship, to improve the world in strict avoidance of corruption and bloodshed. It requires treating all things and beings with deep compassion. This is my philosophy, which obliges me to remain aloof from all worldly titles and ranks. However, I am not indifferent to the appreciation of kind people. [The voters were] extremely kind in naming me the world’s top public intellectual, a title to which I can never see myself as entitled.
FP: Do you harbor any political ambitions?
FG: I have never had, nor will I ever have, any [political] ambitions. The only thing on which I have always set my heart is being able to gain God’s good pleasure and, therefore, trying to make him known correctly and loved by humanity.
FP: Where does Islam fit in a Muslim’s political life?
FG: Islam as a religion focuses primarily on the immutable aspects of life and existence, whereas a political system concerns only social aspects of our worldly life. Islam’s basic principles of belief, worship, morality, and behavior are not affected by changing times. Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Islam has never offered nor established a theocracy in its name. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character. So, politics can be a factor neither in shaping Islam nor directing Muslims’ acts and attitudes in Islam’s name.
FP: Why do you believe your movement is suspected by so many Turks?
FG: I do not believe so many Turks suspect my activities. The idea that this movement of volunteers is suspected by many Turks arises in the same way and for the same reasons that the world hears more about those Muslims whom the media call radicals. Since those who give this impression are extremely loud, some observers can be deceived.
FP: Hundreds of schools have been opened around the world based on a model you pioneered, blending science and religion. How centrally controlled are the schools run by the Gülenist movement?
FG: My only role in the opening of the schools has been to suggest and encourage opening them. But it is impossible for there to be a [central authority] controlling the schools. They are in more than 100 countries, and there must be many different companies that have opened and run them. Some of them may have closer relations or interactions. Some may be sharing their experiences with others.
FP: What is the most misunderstood thing about the Gülenist movement?
FG: I cannot accept concepts such as Gülenism or Gülenist. I was only a writer and an official preacher among people. I can have no direct influence on any person or activity. It is inconceivable that I can exert pressure on anybody.
But some people may regard my views well and show respect to me, and I hope they have not deceived themselves in doing so. Some people think that I am a leader of a movement. Some think that there is a central organization responsible for all the institutions they wrongly think affiliated with me. They ignore the zeal of many to serve humanity and to gain God’s good pleasure in doing so. They ignore people’s generosity. Such misunderstandings may lead others to have suspicions about the financial resources of the schools. A small minority in Turkey even accuses me of having political ambitions, when in fact I have been struggling with various illnesses for many years.
FP: You preach a moderate, tolerant Islam. What do you think causes terrorism?.
FG: Islam abhors and absolutely condemns terrorism and any terrorist activity. I have repeatedly declared that it is impossible for a true Muslim to be a terrorist, nor can a terrorist be regarded as a true Muslim. Terrorism is one of the cardinal sins that the Koran threatens with hellfire.
It is a fact that Muslims have lagged behind in science and technology for the last few centuries. The Muslim world suffers from internal divisions, antidemocratic practices, and the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. But Muslims have never been and never can be so base as to expect any solutions to their problems through terror.
[Terrorism] is formed of certain fundamental problems, [including] ignorance, poverty, and fear of others. Some people take advantage of the young and foolish. They are manipulated, abused, and even drugged to such an extent that they can be used as murderers on the pretext of some crazy ideals or goals.
To defeat terrorism, we must acknowledge that we are all human beings. It is not our choice to belong to a particular race or family. We should be freed from fear of the other and enjoy diversity within democracy. I believe that dialogue and education are the most effective means to surpass our differences.
FP: Would you like to return to Turkey someday?
FG: I certainly long for my country and my friends there. However, I have submitted myself to my fate and am willingly resigned to however it judges.
Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic scholar now living in the United States, was voted the world’s top public intellectual in the 2008 FOREIGN POLICY/Prospect poll.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms. ... ry_id=4349
Posted August 2008
When Foreign Policy and Prospect magazine asked readers to vote for the world’s top public intellectual, one man won in a landslide: Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, an inspirational leader to millions of followers around the world and persona non grata to many in his native Turkey, where some consider him a threat to the country’s secular order. In a rare interview, Gülen speaks to FP about terrorism, political ambitions, and why his movement is so misunderstood.
Illustration: Lara Tomlin for FP
Foreign Policy: How do you feel about being named the world’s top public intellectual?
Fethullah Gülen: I have never imagined being or wished to be chosen as something important in the world. I have always tried to be a humble servant of God and a humble member of humanity. The Koran says that humanity has been created to recognize and worship God and, as a dimension of this worship, to improve the world in strict avoidance of corruption and bloodshed. It requires treating all things and beings with deep compassion. This is my philosophy, which obliges me to remain aloof from all worldly titles and ranks. However, I am not indifferent to the appreciation of kind people. [The voters were] extremely kind in naming me the world’s top public intellectual, a title to which I can never see myself as entitled.
FP: Do you harbor any political ambitions?
FG: I have never had, nor will I ever have, any [political] ambitions. The only thing on which I have always set my heart is being able to gain God’s good pleasure and, therefore, trying to make him known correctly and loved by humanity.
FP: Where does Islam fit in a Muslim’s political life?
FG: Islam as a religion focuses primarily on the immutable aspects of life and existence, whereas a political system concerns only social aspects of our worldly life. Islam’s basic principles of belief, worship, morality, and behavior are not affected by changing times. Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Islam has never offered nor established a theocracy in its name. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character. So, politics can be a factor neither in shaping Islam nor directing Muslims’ acts and attitudes in Islam’s name.
FP: Why do you believe your movement is suspected by so many Turks?
FG: I do not believe so many Turks suspect my activities. The idea that this movement of volunteers is suspected by many Turks arises in the same way and for the same reasons that the world hears more about those Muslims whom the media call radicals. Since those who give this impression are extremely loud, some observers can be deceived.
FP: Hundreds of schools have been opened around the world based on a model you pioneered, blending science and religion. How centrally controlled are the schools run by the Gülenist movement?
FG: My only role in the opening of the schools has been to suggest and encourage opening them. But it is impossible for there to be a [central authority] controlling the schools. They are in more than 100 countries, and there must be many different companies that have opened and run them. Some of them may have closer relations or interactions. Some may be sharing their experiences with others.
FP: What is the most misunderstood thing about the Gülenist movement?
FG: I cannot accept concepts such as Gülenism or Gülenist. I was only a writer and an official preacher among people. I can have no direct influence on any person or activity. It is inconceivable that I can exert pressure on anybody.
But some people may regard my views well and show respect to me, and I hope they have not deceived themselves in doing so. Some people think that I am a leader of a movement. Some think that there is a central organization responsible for all the institutions they wrongly think affiliated with me. They ignore the zeal of many to serve humanity and to gain God’s good pleasure in doing so. They ignore people’s generosity. Such misunderstandings may lead others to have suspicions about the financial resources of the schools. A small minority in Turkey even accuses me of having political ambitions, when in fact I have been struggling with various illnesses for many years.
FP: You preach a moderate, tolerant Islam. What do you think causes terrorism?.
FG: Islam abhors and absolutely condemns terrorism and any terrorist activity. I have repeatedly declared that it is impossible for a true Muslim to be a terrorist, nor can a terrorist be regarded as a true Muslim. Terrorism is one of the cardinal sins that the Koran threatens with hellfire.
It is a fact that Muslims have lagged behind in science and technology for the last few centuries. The Muslim world suffers from internal divisions, antidemocratic practices, and the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. But Muslims have never been and never can be so base as to expect any solutions to their problems through terror.
[Terrorism] is formed of certain fundamental problems, [including] ignorance, poverty, and fear of others. Some people take advantage of the young and foolish. They are manipulated, abused, and even drugged to such an extent that they can be used as murderers on the pretext of some crazy ideals or goals.
To defeat terrorism, we must acknowledge that we are all human beings. It is not our choice to belong to a particular race or family. We should be freed from fear of the other and enjoy diversity within democracy. I believe that dialogue and education are the most effective means to surpass our differences.
FP: Would you like to return to Turkey someday?
FG: I certainly long for my country and my friends there. However, I have submitted myself to my fate and am willingly resigned to however it judges.
Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic scholar now living in the United States, was voted the world’s top public intellectual in the 2008 FOREIGN POLICY/Prospect poll.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms. ... ry_id=4349
June 22, 2009
News Analysis
In Iran, Both Sides Seek to Carry Islam’s Banner
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, ended his prayer sermon in tears on Friday, invoking the name of a disappeared Shiite prophet to suggest that his government was besieged by forces of evil out to destroy a legitimate Islamic government.
The opposition leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi, in criticizing the government, demanded the kind of justice promised by the Koran and exhorted his followers to take to their rooftops at night to cry out, “Allahu akbar,” or “God is great.”
In the battle to control Iran’s streets, both the government and the opposition are deploying religious symbols and parables to portray themselves as pursing the ideal of a just Islamic state.
That struggle could prove the main fulcrum in the battle for the hearts and minds of most ordinary Iranians, because the Islamic Revolution, since its inception, has painted itself as battling evil. If the government fails the test of being just, not least by using excessive violence against its citizens, it risks letting the opposition wrap itself in the mantle of Islamic virtue.
“If either the reformists or the conservatives can make reference to Islamic values in a way that the majority of citizens understand, they will win,” said Mohsen Kadivar, a senior Iranian religious scholar teaching Islamic studies at Duke University.
Perhaps most important, the outcome may determine the support the government enjoys among the ideological zealots who form the backbone of the security forces. Some Iran experts see the level of violence in the week ahead as crucial in the tug of war over Islam.
“What is really smart about Moussavi and his group is that they say they are part of the Islamic Revolution and they want to say ‘God is great’ and overthrow tyranny,” said Said A. Arjomand, a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. “It is a struggle over the appropriation of the old symbols. If the public says we want Hussein and ‘God is great’ and then the militias are told to go kill them, that will be a little hard.”
The dawn of the Shiite faith can be traced back to the death of Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson; his killing at the hands of a far larger force in 680 has long infused the faith with a sense of being the underdog. Hence, both sides in Iran portray themselves as ready to be martyrs to their cause — Ayatollah Khamenei suggested it in his sermon, and Mr. Moussavi was quoted as saying that he was also ready to give his life.
The argument on both sides has stayed narrowly within the bounds of Islam, with the opposition even deftly using green, the color of Islam and the family of the prophet, as a subtle symbol that its protests are rooted in the faith. Both sides say they are the true heirs of the revered revolutionary patriarch, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in trying to carry out Islamic principles.
In his criticism on Sunday, Mr. Moussavi avoided any direct assault against the supreme leader, instead saying the government cheated on the results of the June 12 presidential election.
“Every Muslim understands that anyone who would lie in this way is not just,” said Mr. Kadivar, the Duke professor, who was a senior adviser to the previous reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. “The basic requirement for being the supreme leader is to be just. Justice is a key point in Islamic values.”
The argument by Ayatollah Khamenei, laid out in his Friday sermon, is that he is the spiritual guide and therefore challenging him is challenging Islam. In the short term he probably has the more potent argument, analysts said, but sustained violence to subdue demonstrations will work against him.
“Both sides want to paint the other as responsible for the violence,” said Mr. Arjomand, adding that the opposition could not label Ayatollah Khamenei a dictator. “They don’t want to push it too far; they know they will lose because ultimately Khamenei has the better claim to being Khomeini’s heir.”
On the other hand, every time anyone inside Iran opens a Web site and sees the images of a teenage girl shot dead in a protest, it chips away at the government’s claim to being moral.
“If the movement is successful, they could spread the idea that the regime is evil,” said Fatimah Haghighatjoo, a former reformist member of the Iranian Parliament who is now a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
In student uprisings against the government in 1999 and 2003, demonstrators challenged the idea of having a supreme leader. It proved relatively easy to crush them, not just because of their small numbers, but because they were challenging the very foundation of the system.
“The people inside Iran are not saying they want regime change. They are saying, ‘Where is my vote?’ ” Ms. Haghighatjoo said. “It is just people coming down into the streets to defend their vote; they can’t accuse them of being anti-regime. I don’t think the lowest-level Basijis would accept shooting people because they are protesting cheating on the elections.”
The Basij — paramilitary, plainclothes vigilantes — is the main force the government uses to try to dispel antigovernment protesters. Thus far, that has been done mostly through beatings, arrests and other intimidation tactics. But the death toll is reportedly 10 to 19 people nationwide.
“In general, the Basij is an ideologically or culturally driven force, but the majority are very committed fundamentalists,” said Afshon P. Ostovar, who is writing his doctoral thesis at the University of Michigan about the Iranian security forces.
That ideology may not hold out if the crackdowns start to divide society, however. “You may see the middle ground in the Basij and even the Revolutionary Guards start to question their commitment,” Mr. Ostovar said.
This is one reason the suppression has not been as violent as it could be, he added.
Analysts also believe that the government has been holding back because the most senior ayatollahs, who so far have been largely silent about the election, could no longer sit on the sidelines. A few prominent liberal ayatollahs have criticized the election outcome.
But wider bloodshed would likely prompt the most senior conservative clerics in the holy city of Qum, as well as Najaf in Iraq, to weigh in against the government. That would have a significant impact on turning popular opinion toward the opposition.
The strength of the protests is that they have remained within religion, said Roxanne Varzi, an anthropologist at the University of California, Irvine, who has studied the way the government spreads its ideology.
“It was easier to play on the discourse of the infidel versus the righteous citizen,” said Ms. Varzi, but the opposition movement adopted the whole Islamic discourse. “It is not meant to be something anti-Islamic, even for those who are secular in their practices. Because they have kept inside that structure, it is hard for the government to justify clamping down on them.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world ... nted=print
News Analysis
In Iran, Both Sides Seek to Carry Islam’s Banner
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, ended his prayer sermon in tears on Friday, invoking the name of a disappeared Shiite prophet to suggest that his government was besieged by forces of evil out to destroy a legitimate Islamic government.
The opposition leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi, in criticizing the government, demanded the kind of justice promised by the Koran and exhorted his followers to take to their rooftops at night to cry out, “Allahu akbar,” or “God is great.”
In the battle to control Iran’s streets, both the government and the opposition are deploying religious symbols and parables to portray themselves as pursing the ideal of a just Islamic state.
That struggle could prove the main fulcrum in the battle for the hearts and minds of most ordinary Iranians, because the Islamic Revolution, since its inception, has painted itself as battling evil. If the government fails the test of being just, not least by using excessive violence against its citizens, it risks letting the opposition wrap itself in the mantle of Islamic virtue.
“If either the reformists or the conservatives can make reference to Islamic values in a way that the majority of citizens understand, they will win,” said Mohsen Kadivar, a senior Iranian religious scholar teaching Islamic studies at Duke University.
Perhaps most important, the outcome may determine the support the government enjoys among the ideological zealots who form the backbone of the security forces. Some Iran experts see the level of violence in the week ahead as crucial in the tug of war over Islam.
“What is really smart about Moussavi and his group is that they say they are part of the Islamic Revolution and they want to say ‘God is great’ and overthrow tyranny,” said Said A. Arjomand, a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. “It is a struggle over the appropriation of the old symbols. If the public says we want Hussein and ‘God is great’ and then the militias are told to go kill them, that will be a little hard.”
The dawn of the Shiite faith can be traced back to the death of Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson; his killing at the hands of a far larger force in 680 has long infused the faith with a sense of being the underdog. Hence, both sides in Iran portray themselves as ready to be martyrs to their cause — Ayatollah Khamenei suggested it in his sermon, and Mr. Moussavi was quoted as saying that he was also ready to give his life.
The argument on both sides has stayed narrowly within the bounds of Islam, with the opposition even deftly using green, the color of Islam and the family of the prophet, as a subtle symbol that its protests are rooted in the faith. Both sides say they are the true heirs of the revered revolutionary patriarch, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in trying to carry out Islamic principles.
In his criticism on Sunday, Mr. Moussavi avoided any direct assault against the supreme leader, instead saying the government cheated on the results of the June 12 presidential election.
“Every Muslim understands that anyone who would lie in this way is not just,” said Mr. Kadivar, the Duke professor, who was a senior adviser to the previous reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. “The basic requirement for being the supreme leader is to be just. Justice is a key point in Islamic values.”
The argument by Ayatollah Khamenei, laid out in his Friday sermon, is that he is the spiritual guide and therefore challenging him is challenging Islam. In the short term he probably has the more potent argument, analysts said, but sustained violence to subdue demonstrations will work against him.
“Both sides want to paint the other as responsible for the violence,” said Mr. Arjomand, adding that the opposition could not label Ayatollah Khamenei a dictator. “They don’t want to push it too far; they know they will lose because ultimately Khamenei has the better claim to being Khomeini’s heir.”
On the other hand, every time anyone inside Iran opens a Web site and sees the images of a teenage girl shot dead in a protest, it chips away at the government’s claim to being moral.
“If the movement is successful, they could spread the idea that the regime is evil,” said Fatimah Haghighatjoo, a former reformist member of the Iranian Parliament who is now a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
In student uprisings against the government in 1999 and 2003, demonstrators challenged the idea of having a supreme leader. It proved relatively easy to crush them, not just because of their small numbers, but because they were challenging the very foundation of the system.
“The people inside Iran are not saying they want regime change. They are saying, ‘Where is my vote?’ ” Ms. Haghighatjoo said. “It is just people coming down into the streets to defend their vote; they can’t accuse them of being anti-regime. I don’t think the lowest-level Basijis would accept shooting people because they are protesting cheating on the elections.”
The Basij — paramilitary, plainclothes vigilantes — is the main force the government uses to try to dispel antigovernment protesters. Thus far, that has been done mostly through beatings, arrests and other intimidation tactics. But the death toll is reportedly 10 to 19 people nationwide.
“In general, the Basij is an ideologically or culturally driven force, but the majority are very committed fundamentalists,” said Afshon P. Ostovar, who is writing his doctoral thesis at the University of Michigan about the Iranian security forces.
That ideology may not hold out if the crackdowns start to divide society, however. “You may see the middle ground in the Basij and even the Revolutionary Guards start to question their commitment,” Mr. Ostovar said.
This is one reason the suppression has not been as violent as it could be, he added.
Analysts also believe that the government has been holding back because the most senior ayatollahs, who so far have been largely silent about the election, could no longer sit on the sidelines. A few prominent liberal ayatollahs have criticized the election outcome.
But wider bloodshed would likely prompt the most senior conservative clerics in the holy city of Qum, as well as Najaf in Iraq, to weigh in against the government. That would have a significant impact on turning popular opinion toward the opposition.
The strength of the protests is that they have remained within religion, said Roxanne Varzi, an anthropologist at the University of California, Irvine, who has studied the way the government spreads its ideology.
“It was easier to play on the discourse of the infidel versus the righteous citizen,” said Ms. Varzi, but the opposition movement adopted the whole Islamic discourse. “It is not meant to be something anti-Islamic, even for those who are secular in their practices. Because they have kept inside that structure, it is hard for the government to justify clamping down on them.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world ... nted=print
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Iran Protest Ends In Deathskmaherali wrote:June 22, 2009
News Analysis
In Iran, Both Sides Seek to Carry Islam’s Banner
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, ended his prayer sermon in tears on Friday, invoking the name of a disappeared Shiite prophet to suggest that his government was besieged by forces of evil out to destroy a legitimate Islamic government.
The opposition leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi, in criticizing the government, demanded the kind of justice promised by the Koran and exhorted his followers to take to their rooftops at night to cry out, “Allahu akbar,” or “God is great.”
In the battle to control Iran’s streets, both the government and the opposition are deploying religious symbols and parables to portray themselves as pursing the ideal of a just Islamic state.
That struggle could prove the main fulcrum in the battle for the hearts and minds of most ordinary Iranians, because the Islamic Revolution, since its inception, has painted itself as battling evil. If the government fails the test of being just, not least by using excessive violence against its citizens, it risks letting the opposition wrap itself in the mantle of Islamic virtue.
“If either the reformists or the conservatives can make reference to Islamic values in a way that the majority of citizens understand, they will win,” said Mohsen Kadivar, a senior Iranian religious scholar teaching Islamic studies at Duke University.
Perhaps most important, the outcome may determine the support the government enjoys among the ideological zealots who form the backbone of the security forces. Some Iran experts see the level of violence in the week ahead as crucial in the tug of war over Islam.
“What is really smart about Moussavi and his group is that they say they are part of the Islamic Revolution and they want to say ‘God is great’ and overthrow tyranny,” said Said A. Arjomand, a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. “It is a struggle over the appropriation of the old symbols. If the public says we want Hussein and ‘God is great’ and then the militias are told to go kill them, that will be a little hard.”
The dawn of the Shiite faith can be traced back to the death of Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson; his killing at the hands of a far larger force in 680 has long infused the faith with a sense of being the underdog. Hence, both sides in Iran portray themselves as ready to be martyrs to their cause — Ayatollah Khamenei suggested it in his sermon, and Mr. Moussavi was quoted as saying that he was also ready to give his life.
The argument on both sides has stayed narrowly within the bounds of Islam, with the opposition even deftly using green, the color of Islam and the family of the prophet, as a subtle symbol that its protests are rooted in the faith. Both sides say they are the true heirs of the revered revolutionary patriarch, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in trying to carry out Islamic principles.
In his criticism on Sunday, Mr. Moussavi avoided any direct assault against the supreme leader, instead saying the government cheated on the results of the June 12 presidential election.
“Every Muslim understands that anyone who would lie in this way is not just,” said Mr. Kadivar, the Duke professor, who was a senior adviser to the previous reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. “The basic requirement for being the supreme leader is to be just. Justice is a key point in Islamic values.”
The argument by Ayatollah Khamenei, laid out in his Friday sermon, is that he is the spiritual guide and therefore challenging him is challenging Islam. In the short term he probably has the more potent argument, analysts said, but sustained violence to subdue demonstrations will work against him.
“Both sides want to paint the other as responsible for the violence,” said Mr. Arjomand, adding that the opposition could not label Ayatollah Khamenei a dictator. “They don’t want to push it too far; they know they will lose because ultimately Khamenei has the better claim to being Khomeini’s heir.”
On the other hand, every time anyone inside Iran opens a Web site and sees the images of a teenage girl shot dead in a protest, it chips away at the government’s claim to being moral.
“If the movement is successful, they could spread the idea that the regime is evil,” said Fatimah Haghighatjoo, a former reformist member of the Iranian Parliament who is now a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
In student uprisings against the government in 1999 and 2003, demonstrators challenged the idea of having a supreme leader. It proved relatively easy to crush them, not just because of their small numbers, but because they were challenging the very foundation of the system.
“The people inside Iran are not saying they want regime change. They are saying, ‘Where is my vote?’ ” Ms. Haghighatjoo said. “It is just people coming down into the streets to defend their vote; they can’t accuse them of being anti-regime. I don’t think the lowest-level Basijis would accept shooting people because they are protesting cheating on the elections.”
The Basij — paramilitary, plainclothes vigilantes — is the main force the government uses to try to dispel antigovernment protesters. Thus far, that has been done mostly through beatings, arrests and other intimidation tactics. But the death toll is reportedly 10 to 19 people nationwide.
“In general, the Basij is an ideologically or culturally driven force, but the majority are very committed fundamentalists,” said Afshon P. Ostovar, who is writing his doctoral thesis at the University of Michigan about the Iranian security forces.
That ideology may not hold out if the crackdowns start to divide society, however. “You may see the middle ground in the Basij and even the Revolutionary Guards start to question their commitment,” Mr. Ostovar said.
This is one reason the suppression has not been as violent as it could be, he added.
Analysts also believe that the government has been holding back because the most senior ayatollahs, who so far have been largely silent about the election, could no longer sit on the sidelines. A few prominent liberal ayatollahs have criticized the election outcome.
But wider bloodshed would likely prompt the most senior conservative clerics in the holy city of Qum, as well as Najaf in Iraq, to weigh in against the government. That would have a significant impact on turning popular opinion toward the opposition.
The strength of the protests is that they have remained within religion, said Roxanne Varzi, an anthropologist at the University of California, Irvine, who has studied the way the government spreads its ideology.
“It was easier to play on the discourse of the infidel versus the righteous citizen,” said Ms. Varzi, but the opposition movement adopted the whole Islamic discourse. “It is not meant to be something anti-Islamic, even for those who are secular in their practices. Because they have kept inside that structure, it is hard for the government to justify clamping down on them.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world ... nted=print
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3SRuzL77BDI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiFtoEmCHDs&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWozRk-kDxE&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_q ... an+protest
November 22, 2009
In Turkey, Trial Casts Wide Net of Mistrust
By DAN BILEFSKY
ISTANBUL — Few here doubt that the case began with something threatening: in June 2007, 27 hand grenades and fuses were found in the attic of a house in an Istanbul slum. Investigators claimed they were stashed there by an ultranationalist retired officer and they were later linked to an elaborate coup plot.
But the question many are asking, inside and outside Turkey, is whether the Islamic-inspired government is exaggerating the threat in order to wage a much larger battle against this moderate Muslim nation’s secular establishment.
Since 2007, 300 people have been detained during the investigation of an underground group known as Ergenekon, including a writer of erotic novels, four-star generals and other military officers, professors, editors and underworld figures — some of whom appear to have committed no offense greater than speaking in favor of Turkey as a secular state.
“Ergenekon has become a larger project in which the investigation is being used as a tool to sweep across civic society and cleanse Turkey of all secular opponents,” said Aysel Celikel, a former justice minister and president of a charity that finances the secular education of underprivileged rural girls. “As such, the country’s democracy, its rule of law and its freedom of expression are at stake.”
In all, 194 people have been charged, accused of trying to overthrow the government as part of Ergenekon (pronounced ahr-GEN-eh-kahn), named after a mythic Turkish valley. Prosecutors contend that they planned to engage in civil unrest, assassinations and terrorism to create chaos and undermine the stability of Turkey as groundwork for a coup.
Their trial, widely referred to by the group’s name, has become one of the most explosive in the nation’s modern history and has captivated Turks unused to seeing political secrets aired in public.
The case has brought into relief the larger strains in Turkey between a secular elite seeking to hold on to its waning influence and a growing, increasingly assertive population of observant Muslims. The case is being watched closely in Brussels, headquarters of the European Union, as a barometer of Turkey’s adherence to Western standards of justice. It comes as the country’s prospects for joining the bloc seem to be diminishing.
Proponents of the investigation argue that the trial is a long-overdue historical reckoning aimed at bringing to account what Turks call “the deep state”: a murky group of operatives, linked to the military, thought to have battled perceived enemies of the state since the cold war. The military, which sees itself as the guardian of Turkey’s secular state, has overthrown four elected governments in the past 50 years.
“No one has the right to establish a militia to overthrow a democratically elected government,” Egemen Bagis, the minister for European Union affairs, said in an interview.
Violence for which the authorities blame Ergenekon includes an armed attack on a senior state court in 2006 and the 2007 bombing of a leftist newspaper in Istanbul, Cumhuriyet.
But critics accuse investigators of overreaching in their pursuit of the perpetrators. Legal experts say zealous prosecutors have detained dozens of suspects without charges, and incriminating conversations intercepted from cellphones, as well as private documents, including love letters, seized during raids, have surfaced in pro-government newspapers and on Web sites.
In an extensive study of the case for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, a Washington research institute affiliated with Johns Hopkins University, Gareth Jenkins, a Turkey specialist, noted the pervasive fear among Western analysts of Turkey that Ergenekon “represents a major step, not, as its proponents maintain, towards the consolidation of pluralistic democracy in Turkey, but towards an authoritarian one-party state.”
In Ms. Celikel’s view, the fate of her predecessor at the charity, Turkan Saylan, an outspoken 73-year-old, is evidence of a political pogrom.
In April, as Ms. Saylan was recovering from chemotherapy for breast cancer, police officers raided her home, carting away dozens of files. Colleagues say she was put on a watch list by prosecutors because of her secular political views. She died of cancer the next month. No charges were ever brought.
Further, Ms. Celikel said, at the same time, investigators raided 95 of the charity’s offices across Turkey, taking the files of more than 15,000 students, confiscating computers and interrogating 14 board members, some of whom were remanded to prison without charges. Ms. Celikel said prosecutors had even sought to link some of the charity’s students to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, know as the P.K.K. and considered a terrorist organization by Turkey and the United States.
The Ergenekon case certainly seems intertwined with other major battles over Turkey’s way forward — as more Islamic, or more secular.
Last year, a top prosecutor sued in the Constitutional Court seeking to ban the governing party on the grounds that it was undermining Turkey’s secular state by, among other things, seeking to relax a prohibition on the wearing of Islamic head scarves by women in universities. The court kept the party, Justice and Development, alive by just one vote.
Government critics say the Ergenekon case is a concerted effort by Justice and Development to restore its dented credibility by demonizing its opponents.
Mr. Jenkins, who has analyzed the first two of three vast mass Ergenekon indictments — 2,455 and 1,909 pages — argued that some allegations were absurd.
He said the first indictment said the group’s members had met with Dick Cheney when he was vice president to discuss toppling and replacing the government. He said it also maintained that investigators had evidence that the group planned to “manufacture chemical and biological weapons and then, with the high revenue it earned from selling them, to finance and control every terrorist organization not just in Turkey but in the entire world.”
Suheyl Batum, who teaches constitutional law at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul, is advising a team of lawyers for several defendants, including Ergun Poyraz, who has written more than five books critical of the government, and Tuncay Ozkan, a secular journalist and critic of the governing party who helped organize antigovernment rallies two years ago.
Professor Batum said Mr. Poyraz had been detained for 29 months and Mr. Ozkan for 13 months without any evidence that either had committed a crime. He argued that snippets from their recorded cellphone conversations — like “What should we do about antisecular policies?” — were construed as evidence that they were plotting to overthrow the government.
After dozens of such cellphone wiretap transcripts were published in pro-government newspapers, intellectuals and journalists said it was now common for dinner parties to begin with everyone switching off cellphones.
“I believe that people who hope that Turkey’s dark past will be enlightened by the Ergenekon case will be disappointed,” said Nedim Sener, a journalist who has investigated Ergenekon for Milliyet, a leading newspaper, and who now fears that he could also be a target in the investigation. “As a result of Ergenekon, the Turkish justice system has been broken in pieces.”
Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world ... nted=print
******
November 22, 2009
Cleric Wields Religion to Challenge Iran’s Theocracy
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — For years, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri criticized Iran’s supreme leader and argued that the country was not the Islamic democracy it claimed to be, but his words seemed to fall on deaf ears. Now many Iranians, including some former government leaders, are listening.
Ayatollah Montazeri has emerged as the spiritual leader of the opposition, an adversary the state has been unable to silence or jail because of his religious credentials and seminal role in the founding of the republic.
He is widely regarded as the most knowledgeable religious scholar in Iran and once expected to become the country’s supreme leader until a falling-out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution and Iran’s supreme leader until his death in 1989.
Now, as the Iranian government has cracked down to suppress the protests that erupted after the presidential election in June and devastated the reform movement, Ayatollah Montazeri uses religion to attack the government’s legitimacy.
“We have many intellectuals who criticize this regime from the democratic point of view,” said Mehdi Khalaji, a former seminary student in Qum and now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “He criticizes this regime purely from a religious point of view, and this is very hurtful. The regime wants to say, ‘If I am not democratic enough that doesn’t matter, I am Islamic.’
“He says it is not an Islamic government.”
Now in his mid-80s, frail and ill, Ayatollah Montazeri has remained in his home in Qum, the center of religious learning in Iran, issuing one politically charged religious edict after another, helping keep alive a faltering opposition movement. The man whom Ayatollah Khomeini once called “the fruit of my life” has condemned the state he helped to create.
“A political system based on force, oppression, changing people’s votes, killing, closure, arresting and using Stalinist and medieval torture, creating repression, censorship of newspapers, interruption of the means of mass communications, jailing the enlightened and the elite of society for false reasons, and forcing them to make false confessions in jail, is condemned and illegitimate,” he said in one of a flurry of written comments posted on Web sites since the election.
Iran’s current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has limited religious credentials. But Ayatollah Montazeri, a marja or source of emulation, has achieved the highest standing a cleric can hold in Shiite Islam. He is also the architect of Velayat-e Faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, the foundation of Iran’s theocracy and the source of the supreme leader’s legitimacy. Indeed, when Ayatollah Khamenei was a student, Ayatollah Montazeri was one of his teachers.
“He is able to delegitimize Khamenei more than anybody else on the Earth,” Mr. Khalaji said.
Some Iran experts argue that Ayatollah Montazeri’s involvement in politics has undermined his religious credibility, and that he does not have as large a following as other grand ayatollahs. But there is evidence, others say, that the recent conflict has increased his popularity among younger Iranians who knew little of him, and that his edicts resonate with the pious masses.
Despite the arrests of thousands of protesters and reformists, with many complaining of torture and even rape, the government has failed to silence the opposition, led mostly by the clerics who built the Islamic Republic from the earliest days: a former prime minister and presidential candidate, Mir Hussein Moussavi; a former speaker of Parliament and presidential candidate, Mehdi Karroubi; and a former president, Mohammad Khatami.
These men have now adopted positions that Ayatollah Montazeri has argued for years, that even in a religious state legitimacy comes from the people. “The government will not achieve legitimacy without the support of the people, and as the necessary and obligatory condition for the legitimacy of the ruler is his popularity and the people’s satisfaction with him,” Ayatollah Montazeri said last month in response to questions the BBC sent to him.
In the early years of the revolution, he did not attract a broad following, in part because he was so plain-spoken. He was mocked by the elite and the middle class.
Despite his religious learning he came off as a sort of country bumpkin. In one joke that circulated after the revolution, he visited a medical school where students were studying to be pediatricians. Ayatollah Montazeri, the joke went, told them that if they studied harder they could become doctors for adults.
He was embraced by Ayatollah Khomeini because he promoted the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, which called for a religious leader to reign supreme over the government. The concept was ultimately embedded in the bedrock of the Islamic Republic. But Ayatollah Montazeri has also repeatedly said that he meant the faqih, or leader, should serve as an adviser, not as the final arbiter of all matters of state and religion.
Ayatollah Montazeri’s disillusionment, and his alienation from the state, came within a decade of the revolution. He mocked Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision to issue a fatwa calling for the murder of Salman Rushdie, author of “The Satanic Verses,” saying, “People in the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.”
The breach with Ayatollah Khomeini became irreparable in January 1988, when Ayatollah Montazeri objected to a wave of executions of political prisoners and challenged the leadership to export the revolution by example, not by violence.
“He was not willing to sell his soul to stay in power,” said Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California. The next month, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized Ayatollah Montazeri in a letter and then forced him to resign as his deputy and heir apparent.
He returned home to Qum where he remained relatively quiet until the rise of the reform movement, which he embraced. In 1997, Ayatollah Khamenei placed him under house arrest, which was lifted in 2003 under growing political pressure.
“There is no one else in the current leadership of the Green Movement who risked as much, as publicly, as early, as consistently as he has, and has lost as much,” said Abbas Milani, a professor of Iranian studies at Stanford University who as a young man shared a jail cell with Ayatollah Montazeri during the time of the shah.
In recent times, Ayatollah Montazeri has kept up the pressure, taking the unprecedented step of apologizing for his support for the 1979 takeover of the United States Embassy. He also has said that the Islamic Republic is neither Islamic, nor a republic, and that the supreme leader has lost his legitimacy.
“Independence,” he said in a recent speech on ethics, “is being free of foreign intervention, and freedom is giving people the freedom to express their opinions. Not being put in prison for every protest one utters.”
An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It is Mehdi Khalaji, not Mehdi Khaliji.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world ... nted=print
In Turkey, Trial Casts Wide Net of Mistrust
By DAN BILEFSKY
ISTANBUL — Few here doubt that the case began with something threatening: in June 2007, 27 hand grenades and fuses were found in the attic of a house in an Istanbul slum. Investigators claimed they were stashed there by an ultranationalist retired officer and they were later linked to an elaborate coup plot.
But the question many are asking, inside and outside Turkey, is whether the Islamic-inspired government is exaggerating the threat in order to wage a much larger battle against this moderate Muslim nation’s secular establishment.
Since 2007, 300 people have been detained during the investigation of an underground group known as Ergenekon, including a writer of erotic novels, four-star generals and other military officers, professors, editors and underworld figures — some of whom appear to have committed no offense greater than speaking in favor of Turkey as a secular state.
“Ergenekon has become a larger project in which the investigation is being used as a tool to sweep across civic society and cleanse Turkey of all secular opponents,” said Aysel Celikel, a former justice minister and president of a charity that finances the secular education of underprivileged rural girls. “As such, the country’s democracy, its rule of law and its freedom of expression are at stake.”
In all, 194 people have been charged, accused of trying to overthrow the government as part of Ergenekon (pronounced ahr-GEN-eh-kahn), named after a mythic Turkish valley. Prosecutors contend that they planned to engage in civil unrest, assassinations and terrorism to create chaos and undermine the stability of Turkey as groundwork for a coup.
Their trial, widely referred to by the group’s name, has become one of the most explosive in the nation’s modern history and has captivated Turks unused to seeing political secrets aired in public.
The case has brought into relief the larger strains in Turkey between a secular elite seeking to hold on to its waning influence and a growing, increasingly assertive population of observant Muslims. The case is being watched closely in Brussels, headquarters of the European Union, as a barometer of Turkey’s adherence to Western standards of justice. It comes as the country’s prospects for joining the bloc seem to be diminishing.
Proponents of the investigation argue that the trial is a long-overdue historical reckoning aimed at bringing to account what Turks call “the deep state”: a murky group of operatives, linked to the military, thought to have battled perceived enemies of the state since the cold war. The military, which sees itself as the guardian of Turkey’s secular state, has overthrown four elected governments in the past 50 years.
“No one has the right to establish a militia to overthrow a democratically elected government,” Egemen Bagis, the minister for European Union affairs, said in an interview.
Violence for which the authorities blame Ergenekon includes an armed attack on a senior state court in 2006 and the 2007 bombing of a leftist newspaper in Istanbul, Cumhuriyet.
But critics accuse investigators of overreaching in their pursuit of the perpetrators. Legal experts say zealous prosecutors have detained dozens of suspects without charges, and incriminating conversations intercepted from cellphones, as well as private documents, including love letters, seized during raids, have surfaced in pro-government newspapers and on Web sites.
In an extensive study of the case for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, a Washington research institute affiliated with Johns Hopkins University, Gareth Jenkins, a Turkey specialist, noted the pervasive fear among Western analysts of Turkey that Ergenekon “represents a major step, not, as its proponents maintain, towards the consolidation of pluralistic democracy in Turkey, but towards an authoritarian one-party state.”
In Ms. Celikel’s view, the fate of her predecessor at the charity, Turkan Saylan, an outspoken 73-year-old, is evidence of a political pogrom.
In April, as Ms. Saylan was recovering from chemotherapy for breast cancer, police officers raided her home, carting away dozens of files. Colleagues say she was put on a watch list by prosecutors because of her secular political views. She died of cancer the next month. No charges were ever brought.
Further, Ms. Celikel said, at the same time, investigators raided 95 of the charity’s offices across Turkey, taking the files of more than 15,000 students, confiscating computers and interrogating 14 board members, some of whom were remanded to prison without charges. Ms. Celikel said prosecutors had even sought to link some of the charity’s students to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, know as the P.K.K. and considered a terrorist organization by Turkey and the United States.
The Ergenekon case certainly seems intertwined with other major battles over Turkey’s way forward — as more Islamic, or more secular.
Last year, a top prosecutor sued in the Constitutional Court seeking to ban the governing party on the grounds that it was undermining Turkey’s secular state by, among other things, seeking to relax a prohibition on the wearing of Islamic head scarves by women in universities. The court kept the party, Justice and Development, alive by just one vote.
Government critics say the Ergenekon case is a concerted effort by Justice and Development to restore its dented credibility by demonizing its opponents.
Mr. Jenkins, who has analyzed the first two of three vast mass Ergenekon indictments — 2,455 and 1,909 pages — argued that some allegations were absurd.
He said the first indictment said the group’s members had met with Dick Cheney when he was vice president to discuss toppling and replacing the government. He said it also maintained that investigators had evidence that the group planned to “manufacture chemical and biological weapons and then, with the high revenue it earned from selling them, to finance and control every terrorist organization not just in Turkey but in the entire world.”
Suheyl Batum, who teaches constitutional law at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul, is advising a team of lawyers for several defendants, including Ergun Poyraz, who has written more than five books critical of the government, and Tuncay Ozkan, a secular journalist and critic of the governing party who helped organize antigovernment rallies two years ago.
Professor Batum said Mr. Poyraz had been detained for 29 months and Mr. Ozkan for 13 months without any evidence that either had committed a crime. He argued that snippets from their recorded cellphone conversations — like “What should we do about antisecular policies?” — were construed as evidence that they were plotting to overthrow the government.
After dozens of such cellphone wiretap transcripts were published in pro-government newspapers, intellectuals and journalists said it was now common for dinner parties to begin with everyone switching off cellphones.
“I believe that people who hope that Turkey’s dark past will be enlightened by the Ergenekon case will be disappointed,” said Nedim Sener, a journalist who has investigated Ergenekon for Milliyet, a leading newspaper, and who now fears that he could also be a target in the investigation. “As a result of Ergenekon, the Turkish justice system has been broken in pieces.”
Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world ... nted=print
******
November 22, 2009
Cleric Wields Religion to Challenge Iran’s Theocracy
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
CAIRO — For years, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri criticized Iran’s supreme leader and argued that the country was not the Islamic democracy it claimed to be, but his words seemed to fall on deaf ears. Now many Iranians, including some former government leaders, are listening.
Ayatollah Montazeri has emerged as the spiritual leader of the opposition, an adversary the state has been unable to silence or jail because of his religious credentials and seminal role in the founding of the republic.
He is widely regarded as the most knowledgeable religious scholar in Iran and once expected to become the country’s supreme leader until a falling-out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution and Iran’s supreme leader until his death in 1989.
Now, as the Iranian government has cracked down to suppress the protests that erupted after the presidential election in June and devastated the reform movement, Ayatollah Montazeri uses religion to attack the government’s legitimacy.
“We have many intellectuals who criticize this regime from the democratic point of view,” said Mehdi Khalaji, a former seminary student in Qum and now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “He criticizes this regime purely from a religious point of view, and this is very hurtful. The regime wants to say, ‘If I am not democratic enough that doesn’t matter, I am Islamic.’
“He says it is not an Islamic government.”
Now in his mid-80s, frail and ill, Ayatollah Montazeri has remained in his home in Qum, the center of religious learning in Iran, issuing one politically charged religious edict after another, helping keep alive a faltering opposition movement. The man whom Ayatollah Khomeini once called “the fruit of my life” has condemned the state he helped to create.
“A political system based on force, oppression, changing people’s votes, killing, closure, arresting and using Stalinist and medieval torture, creating repression, censorship of newspapers, interruption of the means of mass communications, jailing the enlightened and the elite of society for false reasons, and forcing them to make false confessions in jail, is condemned and illegitimate,” he said in one of a flurry of written comments posted on Web sites since the election.
Iran’s current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has limited religious credentials. But Ayatollah Montazeri, a marja or source of emulation, has achieved the highest standing a cleric can hold in Shiite Islam. He is also the architect of Velayat-e Faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, the foundation of Iran’s theocracy and the source of the supreme leader’s legitimacy. Indeed, when Ayatollah Khamenei was a student, Ayatollah Montazeri was one of his teachers.
“He is able to delegitimize Khamenei more than anybody else on the Earth,” Mr. Khalaji said.
Some Iran experts argue that Ayatollah Montazeri’s involvement in politics has undermined his religious credibility, and that he does not have as large a following as other grand ayatollahs. But there is evidence, others say, that the recent conflict has increased his popularity among younger Iranians who knew little of him, and that his edicts resonate with the pious masses.
Despite the arrests of thousands of protesters and reformists, with many complaining of torture and even rape, the government has failed to silence the opposition, led mostly by the clerics who built the Islamic Republic from the earliest days: a former prime minister and presidential candidate, Mir Hussein Moussavi; a former speaker of Parliament and presidential candidate, Mehdi Karroubi; and a former president, Mohammad Khatami.
These men have now adopted positions that Ayatollah Montazeri has argued for years, that even in a religious state legitimacy comes from the people. “The government will not achieve legitimacy without the support of the people, and as the necessary and obligatory condition for the legitimacy of the ruler is his popularity and the people’s satisfaction with him,” Ayatollah Montazeri said last month in response to questions the BBC sent to him.
In the early years of the revolution, he did not attract a broad following, in part because he was so plain-spoken. He was mocked by the elite and the middle class.
Despite his religious learning he came off as a sort of country bumpkin. In one joke that circulated after the revolution, he visited a medical school where students were studying to be pediatricians. Ayatollah Montazeri, the joke went, told them that if they studied harder they could become doctors for adults.
He was embraced by Ayatollah Khomeini because he promoted the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, which called for a religious leader to reign supreme over the government. The concept was ultimately embedded in the bedrock of the Islamic Republic. But Ayatollah Montazeri has also repeatedly said that he meant the faqih, or leader, should serve as an adviser, not as the final arbiter of all matters of state and religion.
Ayatollah Montazeri’s disillusionment, and his alienation from the state, came within a decade of the revolution. He mocked Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision to issue a fatwa calling for the murder of Salman Rushdie, author of “The Satanic Verses,” saying, “People in the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.”
The breach with Ayatollah Khomeini became irreparable in January 1988, when Ayatollah Montazeri objected to a wave of executions of political prisoners and challenged the leadership to export the revolution by example, not by violence.
“He was not willing to sell his soul to stay in power,” said Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California. The next month, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized Ayatollah Montazeri in a letter and then forced him to resign as his deputy and heir apparent.
He returned home to Qum where he remained relatively quiet until the rise of the reform movement, which he embraced. In 1997, Ayatollah Khamenei placed him under house arrest, which was lifted in 2003 under growing political pressure.
“There is no one else in the current leadership of the Green Movement who risked as much, as publicly, as early, as consistently as he has, and has lost as much,” said Abbas Milani, a professor of Iranian studies at Stanford University who as a young man shared a jail cell with Ayatollah Montazeri during the time of the shah.
In recent times, Ayatollah Montazeri has kept up the pressure, taking the unprecedented step of apologizing for his support for the 1979 takeover of the United States Embassy. He also has said that the Islamic Republic is neither Islamic, nor a republic, and that the supreme leader has lost his legitimacy.
“Independence,” he said in a recent speech on ethics, “is being free of foreign intervention, and freedom is giving people the freedom to express their opinions. Not being put in prison for every protest one utters.”
An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It is Mehdi Khalaji, not Mehdi Khaliji.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world ... nted=print
June 18, 2010
Letter From Istanbul, Part 2
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Istanbul
Highlight:
There is an inner struggle over that identity, between those who would like to see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and values and those who want it to remain more secular, Western and pluralistic. Who defines Turkey will determine a lot about whether we end up in a war of civilizations. We need to be involved but proceed delicately.
I leave Istanbul with four questions that Turks asked me echoing in my head. Forget the answers, just these questions will tell you all you need to understand the situation here. The four questions, which were asked of me by different Turkish journalists, academics or businessmen, can be summarized as follows:
One: Do you think we are seeing the death of the West and the rise of new world powers in the East? Two: Tom, it was great talking to you this morning, but would you mind not quoting me by name? I’m afraid the government will retaliate against me, my newspaper or my business if you do. Three: Is it true, as Prime Minister Erdogan believes, that Israel is behind the attacks by the Kurdish terrorist group P.K.K. on Turkey? Four: Do you really think Obama can punish Turkey for voting against the U.S. at the U.N. on Iran sanctions? After all, America needs Turkey more than Turkey needs America.
The question about the death of the West is really about the rise of Turkey, which is actually a wonderful story. The Turks wanted to get into the European Union and were rebuffed, but I’m not sure Turkish businessmen even care today. The E.U. feels dead next to Turkey, which last year was right behind India and China among the fastest-growing economies in the world — just under 7 percent — and was the fastest-growing economy in Europe.
Americans have tended to look at Turkey as a bridge or a base — either a cultural bridge that connects the West and the Muslim world, or as our base (Incirlik Air Base) that serves as the main U.S. supply hub for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Turks see themselves differently.
“Turkey is not a bridge. It’s a center,” explained Muzaffer Senel, an international relations researcher at Istanbul Sehir University.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has become the center of its own economic space, stretching from southern Russia, all through the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and down through Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Middle East. All you have to do is stand in the Istanbul airport and look at the departures board for Turkish Airlines, which flies to cities half of which I cannot even pronounce, to appreciate what a pulsating economic center this has become for Central Asia. I met Turkish businessmen who were running hotel chains in Moscow, banks in Bosnia and Greece, road-building projects in Iraq and huge trading operations with Iran and Syria. In 1980, Turkey’s total exports were worth $3 billion. In 2008, they were $132 billion. There are now 250 industrial zones throughout Anatolia. Turkey’s cellphone users have gone from virtually none in the 1990s to 64 million in 2008.
So Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees himself as the leader of a rising economic powerhouse of 70 million people who is entitled to play an independent geopolitical role — hence his U.N. vote against sanctioning Iran. But how Turkey rises really matters — and Erdogan definitely has some troubling Hugo Chávez-Vladimir Putin tendencies. I’ve never visited a democracy where more people whom I interviewed asked me not to quote them by name for fear of retribution by Erdogan’s circle — in the form of lawsuits, tax investigations or being shut out of government contracts. The media here is rampantly self-censored.
Moreover, Erdogan has evolved from just railing against Israel’s attacks on Hamas in Gaza to spouting conspiracy theories — like the insane notion that Israel is backing the P.K.K. terrorists — as a way of consolidating his political base among conservative Muslims in Turkey and abroad.
Is there anything the U.S. can do? My advice: Avoid a public confrontation that Erdogan can exploit to build more support, draw U.S. redlines in private and let Turkish democrats take the lead. Turkey is full of energy and hormones, and is trying to figure out its new identity. There is an inner struggle over that identity, between those who would like to see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and values and those who want it to remain more secular, Western and pluralistic. Who defines Turkey will determine a lot about whether we end up in a war of civilizations. We need to be involved but proceed delicately.
This struggle is for Turks, and they are on it. Only two weeks before the Gaza flotilla incident, a leading poll showed Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known as the A.K.P., trailing his main opposition — the secularist Republican People’s Party — for the first time since the A.K.P. came to office in 2002.
That is surely one reason Erdogan openly took sides with one of the most radical forces in the region, Hamas — to re-energize his political base. But did he overplay his hand? Up to now, Erdogan has been very cunning, treating his opponents like frogs in a pail, always just gradually turning up the heat so they never quite knew they were boiling. But now they know. The secular and moderate Muslim forces in Turkey are alarmed; the moderate Arab regimes are alarmed; the Americans are alarmed. The fight for Turkey’s soul is about to be joined in a much more vigorous way.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/opini ... ?th&emc=th
Letter From Istanbul, Part 2
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Istanbul
Highlight:
There is an inner struggle over that identity, between those who would like to see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and values and those who want it to remain more secular, Western and pluralistic. Who defines Turkey will determine a lot about whether we end up in a war of civilizations. We need to be involved but proceed delicately.
I leave Istanbul with four questions that Turks asked me echoing in my head. Forget the answers, just these questions will tell you all you need to understand the situation here. The four questions, which were asked of me by different Turkish journalists, academics or businessmen, can be summarized as follows:
One: Do you think we are seeing the death of the West and the rise of new world powers in the East? Two: Tom, it was great talking to you this morning, but would you mind not quoting me by name? I’m afraid the government will retaliate against me, my newspaper or my business if you do. Three: Is it true, as Prime Minister Erdogan believes, that Israel is behind the attacks by the Kurdish terrorist group P.K.K. on Turkey? Four: Do you really think Obama can punish Turkey for voting against the U.S. at the U.N. on Iran sanctions? After all, America needs Turkey more than Turkey needs America.
The question about the death of the West is really about the rise of Turkey, which is actually a wonderful story. The Turks wanted to get into the European Union and were rebuffed, but I’m not sure Turkish businessmen even care today. The E.U. feels dead next to Turkey, which last year was right behind India and China among the fastest-growing economies in the world — just under 7 percent — and was the fastest-growing economy in Europe.
Americans have tended to look at Turkey as a bridge or a base — either a cultural bridge that connects the West and the Muslim world, or as our base (Incirlik Air Base) that serves as the main U.S. supply hub for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Turks see themselves differently.
“Turkey is not a bridge. It’s a center,” explained Muzaffer Senel, an international relations researcher at Istanbul Sehir University.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has become the center of its own economic space, stretching from southern Russia, all through the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and down through Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Middle East. All you have to do is stand in the Istanbul airport and look at the departures board for Turkish Airlines, which flies to cities half of which I cannot even pronounce, to appreciate what a pulsating economic center this has become for Central Asia. I met Turkish businessmen who were running hotel chains in Moscow, banks in Bosnia and Greece, road-building projects in Iraq and huge trading operations with Iran and Syria. In 1980, Turkey’s total exports were worth $3 billion. In 2008, they were $132 billion. There are now 250 industrial zones throughout Anatolia. Turkey’s cellphone users have gone from virtually none in the 1990s to 64 million in 2008.
So Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees himself as the leader of a rising economic powerhouse of 70 million people who is entitled to play an independent geopolitical role — hence his U.N. vote against sanctioning Iran. But how Turkey rises really matters — and Erdogan definitely has some troubling Hugo Chávez-Vladimir Putin tendencies. I’ve never visited a democracy where more people whom I interviewed asked me not to quote them by name for fear of retribution by Erdogan’s circle — in the form of lawsuits, tax investigations or being shut out of government contracts. The media here is rampantly self-censored.
Moreover, Erdogan has evolved from just railing against Israel’s attacks on Hamas in Gaza to spouting conspiracy theories — like the insane notion that Israel is backing the P.K.K. terrorists — as a way of consolidating his political base among conservative Muslims in Turkey and abroad.
Is there anything the U.S. can do? My advice: Avoid a public confrontation that Erdogan can exploit to build more support, draw U.S. redlines in private and let Turkish democrats take the lead. Turkey is full of energy and hormones, and is trying to figure out its new identity. There is an inner struggle over that identity, between those who would like to see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and values and those who want it to remain more secular, Western and pluralistic. Who defines Turkey will determine a lot about whether we end up in a war of civilizations. We need to be involved but proceed delicately.
This struggle is for Turks, and they are on it. Only two weeks before the Gaza flotilla incident, a leading poll showed Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known as the A.K.P., trailing his main opposition — the secularist Republican People’s Party — for the first time since the A.K.P. came to office in 2002.
That is surely one reason Erdogan openly took sides with one of the most radical forces in the region, Hamas — to re-energize his political base. But did he overplay his hand? Up to now, Erdogan has been very cunning, treating his opponents like frogs in a pail, always just gradually turning up the heat so they never quite knew they were boiling. But now they know. The secular and moderate Muslim forces in Turkey are alarmed; the moderate Arab regimes are alarmed; the Americans are alarmed. The fight for Turkey’s soul is about to be joined in a much more vigorous way.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/opini ... ?th&emc=th
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world ... &th&emc=th
September 3, 2010
Syria’s Solidarity With Islamists Ends at Home
By KAREEM FAHIM
DAMASCUS, Syria — This country, which had sought to show solidarity with Islamist groups and allow religious figures a greater role in public life, has recently reversed course, moving forcefully to curb the influence of Muslim conservatives in its mosques, public universities and charities.
The government has asked imams for recordings of their Friday sermons and started to strictly monitor religious schools. Members of an influential Muslim women’s group have now been told to scale back activities like preaching or teaching Islamic law. And this summer, more than 1,000 teachers who wear the niqab, or the face veil, were transferred to administrative duties.
The crackdown, which began in 2008 but has gathered steam this summer, is an effort by President Bashar al-Assad to reassert Syria’s traditional secularism in the face of rising threats from radical groups in the region, Syrian officials say.
The policy amounts to a sharp reversal for Syria, which for years tolerated the rise of the conservatives. And it sets the government on the seemingly contradictory path of moving against political Islamists at home, while supporting movements like Hamas and Hezbollah abroad.
Syrian officials are adamant that the shifts stem from alarming domestic trends, and do not affect support for those groups, allies in their struggle against Israel. At the same time, they have spoken proudly about their secularizing campaign, though they have been reluctant to reveal its details. Some Syrian analysts view that as an overture to the United States and European nations, which have been courting Syria as part of a strategy to isolate Iran and curb the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Human rights advocates say the policy exacerbates pressing concerns: the arbitrary imprisonment of Islamists, as well as the continued failure to allow them any political space.
Pressure on Islamic conservatives in Syria began in earnest after a powerful car bomb exploded in the Syrian capital in September 2008, killing 17 people. The government blamed the radical group Fatah al-Islam.
“The bombing was the trigger, but the pressure had been building,” said Peter Harling, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. “After a period of accommodation with the Islamic groups, the regime entered this far more proactive and repressive mode. It realizes the challenge that the Islamization of Syrian society poses.”
The government’s campaign drew wider notice this summer, when a decision to bar students wearing the niqab from registering for university classes was compared to a similar ban in France. That move seemed to underscore a reduced tolerance for strict observance by Muslims in public life. Syrian officials have put it differently, saying the niqab is “alien” to Syrian society.
The campaign carries risks for a secular government that has fought repeated, violent battles with Islamists in the past, most notably in 1982, when Mr. Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, razed the city of Hama while confronting the Muslim Brotherhood, killing tens of thousands of people. For the moment there has been no visible domestic backlash, but one cleric, who said he was dismissed without being given a reason two years ago, suggested that could change.
“The Islamists now have a strong argument that the regime is antagonizing the Muslims,” he said.
The government courted religious conservatives as Western powers moved to isolate Syria amid accusations that it was behind the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005. The government appointed a sheik instead of a member of the ruling Baathist party to head the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and allowed, for the first time, religious activities in the stadium at Damascus University.
As the country emerged from that isolation, it focused on domestic challenges, including the fear that sectarian tensions in the region could spread — a recurring fear in Syria, a country with a Sunni majority ruled by Alawites, a religious minority.
The government also focused on conservatives. “What they had nourished and empowered, they felt the need to break,” said Hassan Abbas, a Syrian researcher.
The details of the campaign have remained murky, though Syrian officials have not been afraid to publicize its aims, including in foreign media outlets. In an interview with the American talk show host Charlie Rose in May, Mr. Assad was asked to name his biggest challenge.
“How we can keep our society as secular as it is today,” he said. “The challenge is the extremism in this region.”
Mr. Assad has in the past singled out northern Lebanon as a source of that extremism.
“We didn’t forget Nahr al-Bared,” said Mohammed al-Habash, a Syrian lawmaker, referring to battles in that region three years ago between Lebanese forces and Fatah al-Islam. “We have to take this seriously.”
Beginning in 2008, the government embarked on its new course when it fired administrators at several Islamic charities, according to the former cleric, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisal by the government.
The clampdown has intensified in recent months. Last spring, the Qubaisiate, an underground women’s prayer group that was growing in prominence, was barred from meeting at mosques, according to members. Earlier this summer, top officials in Damascus Governorate were fired for their religious leanings, according to Syrian analysts.
Other moves underscore the delicacy of Mr. Assad’s campaign — or perhaps send mixed signals. A planned conference on secularism earlier this year, initially approved by the government, was abruptly canceled for no reason, according to Mr. Abbas.
“Secularism is their version of being secular,” Mr. Abbas said.
Another episode can be seen as a concession to Islamists, or a sign of just how comfortable the conservatives have become. A proposed rewrite of Syria’s personal status law, which governs civil matters, leaked last year, retained provisions that made it legal for men to marry girls as young as 13 years old. Under pressure, including from women’s groups, lawmakers abandoned the draft law.
“There are limits to what they can do,” Mr. Harling, the analyst, said of the Syrian government. “They will try things out and pedal back if things go too far. It says a lot about how difficult it is — even for a regime that is deeply secular itself and whose survival is tied to the secular nature of Syrian society.”
Nawara Mahfoud contributed reporting.
September 3, 2010
Syria’s Solidarity With Islamists Ends at Home
By KAREEM FAHIM
DAMASCUS, Syria — This country, which had sought to show solidarity with Islamist groups and allow religious figures a greater role in public life, has recently reversed course, moving forcefully to curb the influence of Muslim conservatives in its mosques, public universities and charities.
The government has asked imams for recordings of their Friday sermons and started to strictly monitor religious schools. Members of an influential Muslim women’s group have now been told to scale back activities like preaching or teaching Islamic law. And this summer, more than 1,000 teachers who wear the niqab, or the face veil, were transferred to administrative duties.
The crackdown, which began in 2008 but has gathered steam this summer, is an effort by President Bashar al-Assad to reassert Syria’s traditional secularism in the face of rising threats from radical groups in the region, Syrian officials say.
The policy amounts to a sharp reversal for Syria, which for years tolerated the rise of the conservatives. And it sets the government on the seemingly contradictory path of moving against political Islamists at home, while supporting movements like Hamas and Hezbollah abroad.
Syrian officials are adamant that the shifts stem from alarming domestic trends, and do not affect support for those groups, allies in their struggle against Israel. At the same time, they have spoken proudly about their secularizing campaign, though they have been reluctant to reveal its details. Some Syrian analysts view that as an overture to the United States and European nations, which have been courting Syria as part of a strategy to isolate Iran and curb the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Human rights advocates say the policy exacerbates pressing concerns: the arbitrary imprisonment of Islamists, as well as the continued failure to allow them any political space.
Pressure on Islamic conservatives in Syria began in earnest after a powerful car bomb exploded in the Syrian capital in September 2008, killing 17 people. The government blamed the radical group Fatah al-Islam.
“The bombing was the trigger, but the pressure had been building,” said Peter Harling, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. “After a period of accommodation with the Islamic groups, the regime entered this far more proactive and repressive mode. It realizes the challenge that the Islamization of Syrian society poses.”
The government’s campaign drew wider notice this summer, when a decision to bar students wearing the niqab from registering for university classes was compared to a similar ban in France. That move seemed to underscore a reduced tolerance for strict observance by Muslims in public life. Syrian officials have put it differently, saying the niqab is “alien” to Syrian society.
The campaign carries risks for a secular government that has fought repeated, violent battles with Islamists in the past, most notably in 1982, when Mr. Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, razed the city of Hama while confronting the Muslim Brotherhood, killing tens of thousands of people. For the moment there has been no visible domestic backlash, but one cleric, who said he was dismissed without being given a reason two years ago, suggested that could change.
“The Islamists now have a strong argument that the regime is antagonizing the Muslims,” he said.
The government courted religious conservatives as Western powers moved to isolate Syria amid accusations that it was behind the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005. The government appointed a sheik instead of a member of the ruling Baathist party to head the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and allowed, for the first time, religious activities in the stadium at Damascus University.
As the country emerged from that isolation, it focused on domestic challenges, including the fear that sectarian tensions in the region could spread — a recurring fear in Syria, a country with a Sunni majority ruled by Alawites, a religious minority.
The government also focused on conservatives. “What they had nourished and empowered, they felt the need to break,” said Hassan Abbas, a Syrian researcher.
The details of the campaign have remained murky, though Syrian officials have not been afraid to publicize its aims, including in foreign media outlets. In an interview with the American talk show host Charlie Rose in May, Mr. Assad was asked to name his biggest challenge.
“How we can keep our society as secular as it is today,” he said. “The challenge is the extremism in this region.”
Mr. Assad has in the past singled out northern Lebanon as a source of that extremism.
“We didn’t forget Nahr al-Bared,” said Mohammed al-Habash, a Syrian lawmaker, referring to battles in that region three years ago between Lebanese forces and Fatah al-Islam. “We have to take this seriously.”
Beginning in 2008, the government embarked on its new course when it fired administrators at several Islamic charities, according to the former cleric, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisal by the government.
The clampdown has intensified in recent months. Last spring, the Qubaisiate, an underground women’s prayer group that was growing in prominence, was barred from meeting at mosques, according to members. Earlier this summer, top officials in Damascus Governorate were fired for their religious leanings, according to Syrian analysts.
Other moves underscore the delicacy of Mr. Assad’s campaign — or perhaps send mixed signals. A planned conference on secularism earlier this year, initially approved by the government, was abruptly canceled for no reason, according to Mr. Abbas.
“Secularism is their version of being secular,” Mr. Abbas said.
Another episode can be seen as a concession to Islamists, or a sign of just how comfortable the conservatives have become. A proposed rewrite of Syria’s personal status law, which governs civil matters, leaked last year, retained provisions that made it legal for men to marry girls as young as 13 years old. Under pressure, including from women’s groups, lawmakers abandoned the draft law.
“There are limits to what they can do,” Mr. Harling, the analyst, said of the Syrian government. “They will try things out and pedal back if things go too far. It says a lot about how difficult it is — even for a regime that is deeply secular itself and whose survival is tied to the secular nature of Syrian society.”
Nawara Mahfoud contributed reporting.
Martyrs of Karbala [Paperback]
Aghaie (Author)
Product Description
From Publishers Weekly
In 680 CE, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hoseyn and 70 associates were slaughtered by troops of the rival Umayyad caliphate. This massacre, known as the Battle of Karbala, was a decisive event in the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, and as such is remembered by Shi'ites in story, song, drama and ritual procession. In this book, Islamic historian Aghaie traces the political uses of Karbala symbolism in 19th- and 20th-century Iran, arguing that it has been a "very flexible" narrative for Iranian rulers. Some, like the Qajar regime (1796–1925), enthusiastically sponsored the story in drama and song, and found that their use of Karbala symbolism helped legitimate their rule. Others, like the more secular and Westernized Pahlavi regime (1925–1979), ignored or suppressed the story's retelling—at their peril. Although the prose is dry and formal, Aghaie is sensitive to the way that Karbala symbolism serves as a valuable lens for examining change in modern Iranian society.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
Review
"Aghaie brings to the fore the complex interplay and interaction between ritualistic religious observations and pressing political action, and demonstrates how religion and politics have been mixed in Iran at least since the early 1500s." - Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, University of Washington "This is an erudite, highly textured, multi-voiced study of perhaps the most essential aspect of Shi'ism." - Yasser Tabbaa, Oberlin College"
See all Product Description
http://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/0295984554/ref=snp_dp
Aghaie (Author)
Product Description
From Publishers Weekly
In 680 CE, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hoseyn and 70 associates were slaughtered by troops of the rival Umayyad caliphate. This massacre, known as the Battle of Karbala, was a decisive event in the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, and as such is remembered by Shi'ites in story, song, drama and ritual procession. In this book, Islamic historian Aghaie traces the political uses of Karbala symbolism in 19th- and 20th-century Iran, arguing that it has been a "very flexible" narrative for Iranian rulers. Some, like the Qajar regime (1796–1925), enthusiastically sponsored the story in drama and song, and found that their use of Karbala symbolism helped legitimate their rule. Others, like the more secular and Westernized Pahlavi regime (1925–1979), ignored or suppressed the story's retelling—at their peril. Although the prose is dry and formal, Aghaie is sensitive to the way that Karbala symbolism serves as a valuable lens for examining change in modern Iranian society.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
Review
"Aghaie brings to the fore the complex interplay and interaction between ritualistic religious observations and pressing political action, and demonstrates how religion and politics have been mixed in Iran at least since the early 1500s." - Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, University of Washington "This is an erudite, highly textured, multi-voiced study of perhaps the most essential aspect of Shi'ism." - Yasser Tabbaa, Oberlin College"
See all Product Description
http://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/0295984554/ref=snp_dp
Events in Pakistan as highlighted in the article below are an example of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam forcing their views on the politics of the country.
December 31, 2010
Pakistanis Rally in Support of Blasphemy Law
By SALMAN MASOOD
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — A crippling strike by Islamist parties brought Pakistan to a standstill on Friday as thousands of people took to the streets, and forced businesses to close, to head off any change in the country’s blasphemy law, which rights groups say has been used to persecute minorities, especially Christians.
The law was introduced in the 1980s under the military dictatorship of Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as part of a policy of promoting Islam to unite this deeply fractious society. Many attempts to revise the law have since been thwarted by the strong opposition of religious forces, which continue to gather strength.
In fiery speeches across all major cities and towns, religious leaders warned the government on Friday against altering the law, which carries a mandatory death sentence for anyone convicted of insulting Islam.
“The president and prime minister should take the nation into confidence and assure in unequivocal terms that there will be no change in the blasphemy law under any international pressure,” Sahibzada Fazal Kareem, a religious leader and member of Parliament, said at a rally in the southern port city of Karachi, where the police fired tear gas to stop protesters from marching toward Bilawal House, one of the residences of President Asif Ali Zardari.
The governing Pakistan Peoples Party, which is struggling to keep its government coalition intact, has been conciliatory on the issue.
Syed Sumsam Ali Bokhari, the minister for information, tried to placate religious forces by assuring them that the government did not intend to amend or repeal the law. “Neither the Pakistan Peoples Party nor the government has discussed the issue to bring any amendment in the blasphemy law,” Mr. Bokhari said Thursday at a news briefing.
But such assurances failed to calm the religious parties, who issued their call on Dec. 15 for a countrywide strike.
“I call it a natural result of religious extremism that is on the rise in Pakistani society,” said Mehdi Hasan, the chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent rights group, while commenting on the strike.
“The liberal and democratic forces in the country have retreated so much that it has created an ideological vacuum that is now being filled by the religious extremists,” Dr. Hasan said.
The human rights commission has documented scores of cases in which men have been harassed for being Christian or for being members of the Ahmadi sect, a minority group within Islam, and then accused of blasphemy. The mere fact of being a Christian or an Ahmadi in Pakistan makes a person vulnerable to prosecution, the commission says. Often the mere accusation of blasphemy has led to murders, lynchings and false arrests.
The latest push to revise the law came after the case of Asia Bibi, a 45-year-old mother of five who was sentenced to death by a municipal court, gained prominence in November. Ms. Bibi, a Christian, was accused of blasphemy after her fellow agricultural workers grew angry when she touched their water bowl, her supporters say.
After indicating that a pardon was forthcoming, government spokespeople have recently taken a more ambiguous position and now say that Mr. Zardari can extend a pardon to someone only if the prime minister recommends it. Pope Benedict XVI has appealed for Ms. Bibi to be freed unconditionally.
Rights activists, critics and several government officials, including Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab Province, and Sherry Rehman, a lawmaker and former information minister, have urged the government to repeal or revise the laws.
“These laws institutionalize injustice,” Ms. Rehman said. “People have to feel secure as first-class citizens of this country.”
Ms. Rehman expressed disappointment that the government had distanced itself from her proposed amendments to the law.
The general strike and protests on Friday show the power Islamists hold on the streets of Pakistan. They also contrast sharply with the campaigns by rights activists and opponents of the blasphemy laws who have vented their opposition and discontent mostly on the Internet and social networks like Facebook and Twitter. Protest rallies by rights activists have been ineffective and relatively small.
Since the 1980s, conservatism and religious extremism have been on the rise in the country, analysts say. The religious right has become extremely powerful by establishing its networks across major urban centers and small towns.
“Their agitation potential is immense,” said Rasul Baksh Rais, a political analyst who teaches at Lahore University of Management Sciences in Lahore. “Their numerical strength is not enough for electoral wins but is enough to create trouble for any government in Pakistan.”
“The government is not in a position to take any drastic step against the sensitivities of the religious right, which does not want to concede any inch, even if that is meant to save innocent lives,” Mr. Rais said.
Ms. Rehman, the former information minister, said the secular, democratic forces need not be deterred by the show of force by Islamists. “Eventually, I think we have to keep at it with the help of the civil society and media; their street power is disproportional,” she said, referring to religious parties. “The mainstream political parties need to push back and resist the religious extremists who hijack issues through street power.”
However, analysts said the huge show of force by religious parties, and even the attention local news media outlets gave them on Friday, would only embolden the religious elements in the country. The dynamic is such that “the government may not be able to make any changes in the blasphemy laws in the coming years,” Mr. Rais predicted.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/01/world ... &emc=tha22
December 31, 2010
Pakistanis Rally in Support of Blasphemy Law
By SALMAN MASOOD
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — A crippling strike by Islamist parties brought Pakistan to a standstill on Friday as thousands of people took to the streets, and forced businesses to close, to head off any change in the country’s blasphemy law, which rights groups say has been used to persecute minorities, especially Christians.
The law was introduced in the 1980s under the military dictatorship of Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as part of a policy of promoting Islam to unite this deeply fractious society. Many attempts to revise the law have since been thwarted by the strong opposition of religious forces, which continue to gather strength.
In fiery speeches across all major cities and towns, religious leaders warned the government on Friday against altering the law, which carries a mandatory death sentence for anyone convicted of insulting Islam.
“The president and prime minister should take the nation into confidence and assure in unequivocal terms that there will be no change in the blasphemy law under any international pressure,” Sahibzada Fazal Kareem, a religious leader and member of Parliament, said at a rally in the southern port city of Karachi, where the police fired tear gas to stop protesters from marching toward Bilawal House, one of the residences of President Asif Ali Zardari.
The governing Pakistan Peoples Party, which is struggling to keep its government coalition intact, has been conciliatory on the issue.
Syed Sumsam Ali Bokhari, the minister for information, tried to placate religious forces by assuring them that the government did not intend to amend or repeal the law. “Neither the Pakistan Peoples Party nor the government has discussed the issue to bring any amendment in the blasphemy law,” Mr. Bokhari said Thursday at a news briefing.
But such assurances failed to calm the religious parties, who issued their call on Dec. 15 for a countrywide strike.
“I call it a natural result of religious extremism that is on the rise in Pakistani society,” said Mehdi Hasan, the chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent rights group, while commenting on the strike.
“The liberal and democratic forces in the country have retreated so much that it has created an ideological vacuum that is now being filled by the religious extremists,” Dr. Hasan said.
The human rights commission has documented scores of cases in which men have been harassed for being Christian or for being members of the Ahmadi sect, a minority group within Islam, and then accused of blasphemy. The mere fact of being a Christian or an Ahmadi in Pakistan makes a person vulnerable to prosecution, the commission says. Often the mere accusation of blasphemy has led to murders, lynchings and false arrests.
The latest push to revise the law came after the case of Asia Bibi, a 45-year-old mother of five who was sentenced to death by a municipal court, gained prominence in November. Ms. Bibi, a Christian, was accused of blasphemy after her fellow agricultural workers grew angry when she touched their water bowl, her supporters say.
After indicating that a pardon was forthcoming, government spokespeople have recently taken a more ambiguous position and now say that Mr. Zardari can extend a pardon to someone only if the prime minister recommends it. Pope Benedict XVI has appealed for Ms. Bibi to be freed unconditionally.
Rights activists, critics and several government officials, including Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab Province, and Sherry Rehman, a lawmaker and former information minister, have urged the government to repeal or revise the laws.
“These laws institutionalize injustice,” Ms. Rehman said. “People have to feel secure as first-class citizens of this country.”
Ms. Rehman expressed disappointment that the government had distanced itself from her proposed amendments to the law.
The general strike and protests on Friday show the power Islamists hold on the streets of Pakistan. They also contrast sharply with the campaigns by rights activists and opponents of the blasphemy laws who have vented their opposition and discontent mostly on the Internet and social networks like Facebook and Twitter. Protest rallies by rights activists have been ineffective and relatively small.
Since the 1980s, conservatism and religious extremism have been on the rise in the country, analysts say. The religious right has become extremely powerful by establishing its networks across major urban centers and small towns.
“Their agitation potential is immense,” said Rasul Baksh Rais, a political analyst who teaches at Lahore University of Management Sciences in Lahore. “Their numerical strength is not enough for electoral wins but is enough to create trouble for any government in Pakistan.”
“The government is not in a position to take any drastic step against the sensitivities of the religious right, which does not want to concede any inch, even if that is meant to save innocent lives,” Mr. Rais said.
Ms. Rehman, the former information minister, said the secular, democratic forces need not be deterred by the show of force by Islamists. “Eventually, I think we have to keep at it with the help of the civil society and media; their street power is disproportional,” she said, referring to religious parties. “The mainstream political parties need to push back and resist the religious extremists who hijack issues through street power.”
However, analysts said the huge show of force by religious parties, and even the attention local news media outlets gave them on Friday, would only embolden the religious elements in the country. The dynamic is such that “the government may not be able to make any changes in the blasphemy laws in the coming years,” Mr. Rais predicted.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/01/world ... &emc=tha22
This article is about the vision of the future of Egypt and the role of religion in public life...
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/opini ... emc=tha212
February 9, 2011
What the Muslim Brothers Want
By ESSAM EL-ERRIAN
Cairo
THE Egyptian people have spoken, and we have spoken emphatically. In two weeks of peaceful demonstrations we have persistently demanded liberation and democracy. It was groups of brave, sincere Egyptians who initiated this moment of historical opportunity on Jan. 25, and the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to joining the national effort toward reform and progress.
In more than eight decades of activism, the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently promoted an agenda of gradual reform. Our principles, clearly stated since the inception of the movement in 1928, affirm an unequivocal position against violence. For the past 30 years we have posed, peacefully, the greatest challenge to the ruling National Democratic Party of Hosni Mubarak, while advocating for the disenfranchised classes in resistance to an oppressive regime.
We have repeatedly tried to engage with the political system, yet these efforts have been largely rejected based on the assertion that the Muslim Brotherhood is a banned organization, and has been since 1954. It is seldom mentioned, however, that the Egyptian Administrative Court in June 1992 stated that there was no legal basis for the group’s dissolution.
In the wake of the people’s revolt, we have accepted invitations to participate in talks on a peaceful transition. Along with other representatives of the opposition, we recently took part in exploratory meetings with Vice President Omar Suleiman. In these talks, we made clear that we will not compromise or co-opt the public’s agenda. We come with no special agenda of our own — our agenda is that of the Egyptian people, which has been asserted since the beginning of this uprising.
We aim to achieve reform and rights for all: not just for the Muslim Brotherhood, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians. We do not intend to take a dominant role in the forthcoming political transition. We are not putting forward a candidate for the presidential elections scheduled for September.
While we express our openness to dialogue, we also re-assert the public’s demands, which must be met before any serious negotiations leading to a new government. The Mubarak regime has yet to show serious commitment to meeting these demands or to moving toward substantive, guaranteed change.
As our nation heads toward liberty, however, we disagree with the claims that the only options in Egypt are a purely secular, liberal democracy or an authoritarian theocracy. Secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy.
In Egypt, religion continues to be an important part of our culture and heritage. Moving forward, we envision the establishment of a democratic, civil state that draws on universal measures of freedom and justice, which are central Islamic values. We embrace democracy not as a foreign concept that must be reconciled with tradition, but as a set of principles and objectives that are inherently compatible with and reinforce Islamic tenets.
The tyranny of autocratic rule must give way to immediate reform: the demonstration of a serious commitment to change, the granting of freedoms to all and the transition toward democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood stands firmly behind the demands of the Egyptian people as a whole.
Steady, gradual reform must begin now, and it must begin on the terms that have been called for by millions of Egyptians over the past weeks. Change does not happen overnight, but the call for change did — and it will lead us to a new beginning rooted in justice and progress.
Essam El-Errian is a member of the guidance council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/opini ... emc=tha212
February 9, 2011
What the Muslim Brothers Want
By ESSAM EL-ERRIAN
Cairo
THE Egyptian people have spoken, and we have spoken emphatically. In two weeks of peaceful demonstrations we have persistently demanded liberation and democracy. It was groups of brave, sincere Egyptians who initiated this moment of historical opportunity on Jan. 25, and the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to joining the national effort toward reform and progress.
In more than eight decades of activism, the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently promoted an agenda of gradual reform. Our principles, clearly stated since the inception of the movement in 1928, affirm an unequivocal position against violence. For the past 30 years we have posed, peacefully, the greatest challenge to the ruling National Democratic Party of Hosni Mubarak, while advocating for the disenfranchised classes in resistance to an oppressive regime.
We have repeatedly tried to engage with the political system, yet these efforts have been largely rejected based on the assertion that the Muslim Brotherhood is a banned organization, and has been since 1954. It is seldom mentioned, however, that the Egyptian Administrative Court in June 1992 stated that there was no legal basis for the group’s dissolution.
In the wake of the people’s revolt, we have accepted invitations to participate in talks on a peaceful transition. Along with other representatives of the opposition, we recently took part in exploratory meetings with Vice President Omar Suleiman. In these talks, we made clear that we will not compromise or co-opt the public’s agenda. We come with no special agenda of our own — our agenda is that of the Egyptian people, which has been asserted since the beginning of this uprising.
We aim to achieve reform and rights for all: not just for the Muslim Brotherhood, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians. We do not intend to take a dominant role in the forthcoming political transition. We are not putting forward a candidate for the presidential elections scheduled for September.
While we express our openness to dialogue, we also re-assert the public’s demands, which must be met before any serious negotiations leading to a new government. The Mubarak regime has yet to show serious commitment to meeting these demands or to moving toward substantive, guaranteed change.
As our nation heads toward liberty, however, we disagree with the claims that the only options in Egypt are a purely secular, liberal democracy or an authoritarian theocracy. Secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy.
In Egypt, religion continues to be an important part of our culture and heritage. Moving forward, we envision the establishment of a democratic, civil state that draws on universal measures of freedom and justice, which are central Islamic values. We embrace democracy not as a foreign concept that must be reconciled with tradition, but as a set of principles and objectives that are inherently compatible with and reinforce Islamic tenets.
The tyranny of autocratic rule must give way to immediate reform: the demonstration of a serious commitment to change, the granting of freedoms to all and the transition toward democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood stands firmly behind the demands of the Egyptian people as a whole.
Steady, gradual reform must begin now, and it must begin on the terms that have been called for by millions of Egyptians over the past weeks. Change does not happen overnight, but the call for change did — and it will lead us to a new beginning rooted in justice and progress.
Essam El-Errian is a member of the guidance council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
February 20, 2011
Next Question for Tunisia: The Role of Islam in Politics
By THOMAS FULLER
TUNIS — The Tunisian revolution that overthrew decades of authoritarian rule has entered a delicate new phase in recent days over the role of Islam in politics. Tensions mounted here last week when military helicopters and security forces were called in to carry out an unusual mission: protecting the city’s brothels from a mob of zealots.
Police officers dispersed a group of rock-throwing protesters who streamed into a warren of alleyways lined with legally sanctioned bordellos shouting, “God is great!” and “No to brothels in a Muslim country!”
Five weeks after protesters forced out the country’s dictator, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians are locked in a fierce and noisy debate about how far, or even whether, Islamism should be infused into the new government.
About 98 percent of the population of 10 million is Muslim, but Tunisia’s liberal social policies and Western lifestyle shatter stereotypes of the Arab world. Abortion is legal, polygamy is banned and women commonly wear bikinis on the country’s Mediterranean beaches. Wine is openly sold in supermarkets and imbibed at bars across the country.
Women’s groups say they are concerned that in the cacophonous aftermath of the revolution, conservative forces could tug the country away from its strict tradition of secularism.
“Nothing is irreversible,” said Khadija Cherif, a former head of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, a feminist organization. “We don’t want to let down our guard.”
Ms. Cherif was one of thousands of Tunisians who marched through Tunis, the capital, on Saturday demanding the separation of mosque and state in one of the largest demonstrations since the overthrow of Mr. Ben Ali.
Protesters held up signs saying, “Politics ruins religion and religion ruins politics.”
They were also mourning the killing on Friday of a Polish priest by unknown attackers. That assault was also condemned by the country’s main Muslim political movement, Ennahdha, or Renaissance, which was banned under Mr. Ben Ali’s dictatorship but is now regrouping.
In interviews in the Tunisian news media, Ennahdha’s leaders have taken pains to praise tolerance and moderation, comparing themselves to the Islamic parties that govern Turkey and Malaysia.
“We know we have an essentially fragile economy that is very open toward the outside world, to the point of being totally dependent on it,” Hamadi Jebali, the party’s secretary general, said in an interview with the Tunisian magazine Réalités. “We have no interest whatsoever in throwing everything away today or tomorrow.”
The party, which is allied with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, says it opposes the imposition of Islamic law in Tunisia.
But some Tunisians say they remain unconvinced.
Raja Mansour, a bank employee in Tunis, said it was too early to tell how the Islamist movement would evolve.
“We don’t know if they are a real threat or not,” she said. “But the best defense is to attack.” By this she meant that secularists should assert themselves, she said.
Ennahdha is one of the few organized movements in a highly fractured political landscape. The caretaker government that has managed the country since Mr. Ben Ali was ousted is fragile and weak, with no clear leadership emerging from the revolution.
The unanimity of the protest movement against Mr. Ben Ali in January, the uprising that set off demonstrations across the Arab world, has since evolved into numerous daily protests by competing groups, a development that many Tunisians find unsettling.
“Freedom is a great, great adventure, but it’s not without risks,” said Fathi Ben Haj Yathia, an author and former political prisoner. “There are many unknowns.”
One of the largest demonstrations since Mr. Ben Ali fled took place on Sunday in Tunis, where several thousand protesters marched to the prime minister’s office to demand the caretaker government’s resignation. They accused it of having links to Mr. Ben Ali’s government.
Tunisians are debating the future of their country on the streets. Avenue Habib Bourguiba, the broad thoroughfare in central Tunis named after the country’s first president, resembles a Roman forum on weekends, packed with people of all ages excitedly discussing politics.
The freewheeling and somewhat chaotic atmosphere across the country has been accompanied by a breakdown in security that has been particularly unsettling for women. With the extensive security apparatus of the old government decimated, leaving the police force in disarray, many women now say they are afraid to walk outside alone at night.
Achouri Thouraya, a 29-year-old graphic artist, says she has mixed feelings toward the revolution.
She shared in the joy of the overthrow of what she described as Mr. Ben Ali’s kleptocratic government. But she also says she believes that the government’s crackdown on any Muslim groups it considered extremist, a draconian police program that included monitoring those who prayed regularly, helped protect the rights of women.
“We had the freedom to live our lives like women in Europe,” she said.
But now Ms. Thouraya said she was a “little scared.”
She added, “We don’t know who will be president and what attitudes he will have toward women.”
Mounir Troudi, a jazz musician, disagrees. He has no love for the former Ben Ali government, but said he believed that Tunisia would remain a land of beer and bikinis.
“This is a maritime country,” Mr. Troudi said. “We are sailors, and we’ve always been open to the outside world. I have confidence in the Tunisian people. It’s not a country of fanatics.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/world ... &emc=tha22
Next Question for Tunisia: The Role of Islam in Politics
By THOMAS FULLER
TUNIS — The Tunisian revolution that overthrew decades of authoritarian rule has entered a delicate new phase in recent days over the role of Islam in politics. Tensions mounted here last week when military helicopters and security forces were called in to carry out an unusual mission: protecting the city’s brothels from a mob of zealots.
Police officers dispersed a group of rock-throwing protesters who streamed into a warren of alleyways lined with legally sanctioned bordellos shouting, “God is great!” and “No to brothels in a Muslim country!”
Five weeks after protesters forced out the country’s dictator, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians are locked in a fierce and noisy debate about how far, or even whether, Islamism should be infused into the new government.
About 98 percent of the population of 10 million is Muslim, but Tunisia’s liberal social policies and Western lifestyle shatter stereotypes of the Arab world. Abortion is legal, polygamy is banned and women commonly wear bikinis on the country’s Mediterranean beaches. Wine is openly sold in supermarkets and imbibed at bars across the country.
Women’s groups say they are concerned that in the cacophonous aftermath of the revolution, conservative forces could tug the country away from its strict tradition of secularism.
“Nothing is irreversible,” said Khadija Cherif, a former head of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, a feminist organization. “We don’t want to let down our guard.”
Ms. Cherif was one of thousands of Tunisians who marched through Tunis, the capital, on Saturday demanding the separation of mosque and state in one of the largest demonstrations since the overthrow of Mr. Ben Ali.
Protesters held up signs saying, “Politics ruins religion and religion ruins politics.”
They were also mourning the killing on Friday of a Polish priest by unknown attackers. That assault was also condemned by the country’s main Muslim political movement, Ennahdha, or Renaissance, which was banned under Mr. Ben Ali’s dictatorship but is now regrouping.
In interviews in the Tunisian news media, Ennahdha’s leaders have taken pains to praise tolerance and moderation, comparing themselves to the Islamic parties that govern Turkey and Malaysia.
“We know we have an essentially fragile economy that is very open toward the outside world, to the point of being totally dependent on it,” Hamadi Jebali, the party’s secretary general, said in an interview with the Tunisian magazine Réalités. “We have no interest whatsoever in throwing everything away today or tomorrow.”
The party, which is allied with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, says it opposes the imposition of Islamic law in Tunisia.
But some Tunisians say they remain unconvinced.
Raja Mansour, a bank employee in Tunis, said it was too early to tell how the Islamist movement would evolve.
“We don’t know if they are a real threat or not,” she said. “But the best defense is to attack.” By this she meant that secularists should assert themselves, she said.
Ennahdha is one of the few organized movements in a highly fractured political landscape. The caretaker government that has managed the country since Mr. Ben Ali was ousted is fragile and weak, with no clear leadership emerging from the revolution.
The unanimity of the protest movement against Mr. Ben Ali in January, the uprising that set off demonstrations across the Arab world, has since evolved into numerous daily protests by competing groups, a development that many Tunisians find unsettling.
“Freedom is a great, great adventure, but it’s not without risks,” said Fathi Ben Haj Yathia, an author and former political prisoner. “There are many unknowns.”
One of the largest demonstrations since Mr. Ben Ali fled took place on Sunday in Tunis, where several thousand protesters marched to the prime minister’s office to demand the caretaker government’s resignation. They accused it of having links to Mr. Ben Ali’s government.
Tunisians are debating the future of their country on the streets. Avenue Habib Bourguiba, the broad thoroughfare in central Tunis named after the country’s first president, resembles a Roman forum on weekends, packed with people of all ages excitedly discussing politics.
The freewheeling and somewhat chaotic atmosphere across the country has been accompanied by a breakdown in security that has been particularly unsettling for women. With the extensive security apparatus of the old government decimated, leaving the police force in disarray, many women now say they are afraid to walk outside alone at night.
Achouri Thouraya, a 29-year-old graphic artist, says she has mixed feelings toward the revolution.
She shared in the joy of the overthrow of what she described as Mr. Ben Ali’s kleptocratic government. But she also says she believes that the government’s crackdown on any Muslim groups it considered extremist, a draconian police program that included monitoring those who prayed regularly, helped protect the rights of women.
“We had the freedom to live our lives like women in Europe,” she said.
But now Ms. Thouraya said she was a “little scared.”
She added, “We don’t know who will be president and what attitudes he will have toward women.”
Mounir Troudi, a jazz musician, disagrees. He has no love for the former Ben Ali government, but said he believed that Tunisia would remain a land of beer and bikinis.
“This is a maritime country,” Mr. Troudi said. “We are sailors, and we’ve always been open to the outside world. I have confidence in the Tunisian people. It’s not a country of fanatics.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/world ... &emc=tha22
April 1, 2011
In Egypt’s Democracy, Room for Islam
By ALI GOMAA
Cairo
LAST month, Egyptians approved a referendum on constitutional amendments that will pave the way for free elections. The vote was a milestone in Egypt’s emerging democracy after a revolution that swept away decades of authoritarian rule. But it also highlighted an issue that Egyptians will grapple with as they consolidate their democracy: the role of religion in political life.
The vote was preceded by the widespread use of religious slogans by supporters and opponents of the amendments, a debate over the place of religion in Egypt’s future Constitution and a resurgence in political activity by Islamist groups. Egypt is a deeply religious society, and it is inevitable that Islam will have a place in our democratic political order. This, however, should not be a cause for alarm for Egyptians, or for the West.
Egypt’s religious tradition is anchored in a moderate, tolerant view of Islam. We believe that Islamic law guarantees freedom of conscience and expression (within the bounds of common decency) and equal rights for women. And as head of Egypt’s agency of Islamic jurisprudence, I can assure you that the religious establishment is committed to the belief that government must be based on popular sovereignty.
While religion cannot be completely separated from politics, we can ensure that it is not abused for political gain.
Much of the debate around the referendum focused on Article 2 of the Constitution — which, in 1971, established Islam as the religion of the state and, a few years later, the principles of Islamic law as the basis of legislation — even though the article was not up for a vote. But many religious groups feared that if the referendum failed, Egypt would eventually end up with an entirely new Constitution with no such article.
On the other side, secularists feared that Article 2, if left unchanged, could become the foundation for an Islamist state that discriminates against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities.
But acknowledgment of a nation’s religious heritage is an issue of national identity, and need not interfere with the civil nature of its political processes. There is no contradiction between Article 2 and Article 7 of Egypt’s interim Constitution, which guarantees equal citizenship before the law regardless of religion, race or creed. After all, Denmark, England and Norway have state churches, and Islam is the national religion of politically secular countries like Tunisia and Jordan. The rights of Egypt’s Christians to absolute equality, including their right to seek election to the presidency, is sacrosanct.
Similarly, long-suppressed Islamist groups can no longer be excluded from political life. All Egyptians have the right to participate in the creation of a new Egypt, provided that they respect the basic tenets of religious freedom and the equality of all citizens. To protect our democracy, we must be vigilant against any party whose platform or political rhetoric threatens to incite sectarianism, a prohibition that is enshrined in law and in the Constitution.
Islamists must understand that, in a country with such diverse movements as the Muslim Brotherhood; the Wasat party, which offers a progressive interpretation of Islam; and the conservative Salafi movements, no one group speaks for Islam.
At the same time, we should not be afraid that such groups in politics will do away with our newfound freedoms. Indeed, democracy will put Islamist movements to the test; they must now put forward programs and a political message that appeal to the Egyptian mainstream. Any drift toward radicalism will not only run contrary to the law, but will also guarantee their political marginalization.
Having overthrown the heavy hand of authoritarianism, Egyptians will not accept its return under the guise of religion. Islam will have a place in Egypt’s democracy. But it will be as a pillar of freedom and tolerance, never as a means of oppression.
Ali Gomaa is the grand mufti of Egypt.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/opini ... emc=tha212
In Egypt’s Democracy, Room for Islam
By ALI GOMAA
Cairo
LAST month, Egyptians approved a referendum on constitutional amendments that will pave the way for free elections. The vote was a milestone in Egypt’s emerging democracy after a revolution that swept away decades of authoritarian rule. But it also highlighted an issue that Egyptians will grapple with as they consolidate their democracy: the role of religion in political life.
The vote was preceded by the widespread use of religious slogans by supporters and opponents of the amendments, a debate over the place of religion in Egypt’s future Constitution and a resurgence in political activity by Islamist groups. Egypt is a deeply religious society, and it is inevitable that Islam will have a place in our democratic political order. This, however, should not be a cause for alarm for Egyptians, or for the West.
Egypt’s religious tradition is anchored in a moderate, tolerant view of Islam. We believe that Islamic law guarantees freedom of conscience and expression (within the bounds of common decency) and equal rights for women. And as head of Egypt’s agency of Islamic jurisprudence, I can assure you that the religious establishment is committed to the belief that government must be based on popular sovereignty.
While religion cannot be completely separated from politics, we can ensure that it is not abused for political gain.
Much of the debate around the referendum focused on Article 2 of the Constitution — which, in 1971, established Islam as the religion of the state and, a few years later, the principles of Islamic law as the basis of legislation — even though the article was not up for a vote. But many religious groups feared that if the referendum failed, Egypt would eventually end up with an entirely new Constitution with no such article.
On the other side, secularists feared that Article 2, if left unchanged, could become the foundation for an Islamist state that discriminates against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities.
But acknowledgment of a nation’s religious heritage is an issue of national identity, and need not interfere with the civil nature of its political processes. There is no contradiction between Article 2 and Article 7 of Egypt’s interim Constitution, which guarantees equal citizenship before the law regardless of religion, race or creed. After all, Denmark, England and Norway have state churches, and Islam is the national religion of politically secular countries like Tunisia and Jordan. The rights of Egypt’s Christians to absolute equality, including their right to seek election to the presidency, is sacrosanct.
Similarly, long-suppressed Islamist groups can no longer be excluded from political life. All Egyptians have the right to participate in the creation of a new Egypt, provided that they respect the basic tenets of religious freedom and the equality of all citizens. To protect our democracy, we must be vigilant against any party whose platform or political rhetoric threatens to incite sectarianism, a prohibition that is enshrined in law and in the Constitution.
Islamists must understand that, in a country with such diverse movements as the Muslim Brotherhood; the Wasat party, which offers a progressive interpretation of Islam; and the conservative Salafi movements, no one group speaks for Islam.
At the same time, we should not be afraid that such groups in politics will do away with our newfound freedoms. Indeed, democracy will put Islamist movements to the test; they must now put forward programs and a political message that appeal to the Egyptian mainstream. Any drift toward radicalism will not only run contrary to the law, but will also guarantee their political marginalization.
Having overthrown the heavy hand of authoritarianism, Egyptians will not accept its return under the guise of religion. Islam will have a place in Egypt’s democracy. But it will be as a pillar of freedom and tolerance, never as a means of oppression.
Ali Gomaa is the grand mufti of Egypt.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/opini ... emc=tha212
Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution (Princeton Series on the Middle East) [Paperback]
Editorial Reviews
From Library Journal
Halm (history, Univ. of Tubingen) attempts here to lessen the reader's confusion about the bewildering events in the Middle East. His work has three parts: the first, "The House of Sorrow?The Twelve Imams," recounts the history and doctrine of Shi'a, the "party" of Ali ibn Ali Tahib and his 11 heirs, regarded as the true imams and only legitimate successors to the prophet Muhammed. Part 2, "The Deluge of Weeping?Flagellant Procession and Passion Play," describes distinctive Shi'ite rituals that display grief and penitence over the martyrdoms of the successive imams. Most valuable in terms of modern history is the third part, "The Government of the Expert?Islam of the Mullahs," which discusses the forming of the Shi'ite hierarchy of mullahs and ayatollahs and how they came to religious and political power. Two minor criticisms of an otherwise excellent source: the hardcover is rather pricey, and the brief bibliography will not satisfy serious scholars. Recommended for academic libraries.?James F. DeRoche, Alexandria, Va.
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.
http://www.amazon.com/Shia-Islam-Religi ... 847&sr=8-1
Editorial Reviews
From Library Journal
Halm (history, Univ. of Tubingen) attempts here to lessen the reader's confusion about the bewildering events in the Middle East. His work has three parts: the first, "The House of Sorrow?The Twelve Imams," recounts the history and doctrine of Shi'a, the "party" of Ali ibn Ali Tahib and his 11 heirs, regarded as the true imams and only legitimate successors to the prophet Muhammed. Part 2, "The Deluge of Weeping?Flagellant Procession and Passion Play," describes distinctive Shi'ite rituals that display grief and penitence over the martyrdoms of the successive imams. Most valuable in terms of modern history is the third part, "The Government of the Expert?Islam of the Mullahs," which discusses the forming of the Shi'ite hierarchy of mullahs and ayatollahs and how they came to religious and political power. Two minor criticisms of an otherwise excellent source: the hardcover is rather pricey, and the brief bibliography will not satisfy serious scholars. Recommended for academic libraries.?James F. DeRoche, Alexandria, Va.
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.
http://www.amazon.com/Shia-Islam-Religi ... 847&sr=8-1
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JFK Demanded UFO Files Prior to Assassination
http://www.nowpublic.com/strange/jfk-de ... 78888.html
http://www.nowpublic.com/strange/jfk-de ... 78888.html
June 23, 2011 10:56 pm
Top Sunni body calls for democratic Egypt
By Heba Saleh in Cairo
Al-Azhar, the Cairo-based religious institution regarded as the highest authority in Sunni Islam, has issued an unprecedented document spelling out a bold vision for the future of Egypt as a “democratic, constitutional and modern state”.
Drafted by Ahmed al Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, along with a group of Egyptian intellectuals who include Christians – also a first – the document says Egypt should hold elections, respect basic rights, adhere to its international covenants and guarantee “full protection and total respect” to places of worship belonging to other religions.
The institution, whose views resonate across the Sunni Islamic world, has thrown its weight and prestige behind a modern vision of the state “ruled by law and law alone”.
Al-Azhar’s intervention comes as Egyptians find themselves mired in an intense debate about the country’s future following the revolution which ousted the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the former president.
Islamists and liberals have been pulling in different directions with each group seeking to expand its political influence and to fashion the future state in its image. Although intended as a statement on “the future of Egypt”, its propositions are likely to have an impact on other Muslim countries where the relationship between state and religion is in question.
“This is the first comprehensive declaration about specific matters that are the subject of dispute,” said Gamal al-Ghitani, a novelist who took part in forging the document. “Al-Azhar is siding with modernity and rejecting the concept of the theocratic state. This is something like a bill of basic rights which speaks to Muslims everywhere.”
To “regain its original intellectual role, and global influence”, al-Azhar also makes a bid for independence from the Egyptian state in the same document. Fettered by government control for more than half a century, the institution is seeking a return to an old system under which the Grand Imam was elected by senior religious scholars, and not appointed by the president.
Significantly the Azhar document does not call for the application of sharia law, but says that laws would be based on “the principles of Islamic law” – widely interpreted as the universal values of freedom, justice and equality.
It also insists that legislation is the job of elected representatives, an apparent response to more extreme voices who claim that democracy is incompatible with Islam, and say that legislating through an elected assembly is sinful because it replaces God’s law with people’s law.
Alongside, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood – expected to do well in the next election – a vocal Salafi current has emerged in the turmoil of Egypt’s transition. It espouses an ultraconservative interpretation of religion similar to that of Saudi Arabia.
A heated and highly polarised debate has raged in recent weeks raising fears of a deepening fracture in society between those who would like to see the country go in a more Islamist direction, and others who fear a slide towards the imposition of a strict form of Islamic rule.
Mahmoud Azab, the spokesman of al-Azhar, said his institution aimed at reassuring the Egyptian public using language it understood.
“Egyptians are afraid they would come under the rule of an autocratic theocracy,” he said. “Domestic and international fears are justified because of some of the calls we are now hearing. But we are telling people our religion does not include rule by a theocratic state.”
The document also addresses the fears of the Coptic Christian minority – an estimated 10 per cent of the population – that in the future they could become second class citizens.
It says: “The exploitation of religion and its use to create division, conflict and enmity between citizens should be criminalised. Inciting religious discrimination or sectarian and chauvinistic tendencies should be considered a crime against the nation.”
Rashad Bayoumi, the deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood told the Financial Times the document was “exemplary”.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/56ac8782 ... z1QCt4WNRp
Top Sunni body calls for democratic Egypt
By Heba Saleh in Cairo
Al-Azhar, the Cairo-based religious institution regarded as the highest authority in Sunni Islam, has issued an unprecedented document spelling out a bold vision for the future of Egypt as a “democratic, constitutional and modern state”.
Drafted by Ahmed al Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, along with a group of Egyptian intellectuals who include Christians – also a first – the document says Egypt should hold elections, respect basic rights, adhere to its international covenants and guarantee “full protection and total respect” to places of worship belonging to other religions.
The institution, whose views resonate across the Sunni Islamic world, has thrown its weight and prestige behind a modern vision of the state “ruled by law and law alone”.
Al-Azhar’s intervention comes as Egyptians find themselves mired in an intense debate about the country’s future following the revolution which ousted the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the former president.
Islamists and liberals have been pulling in different directions with each group seeking to expand its political influence and to fashion the future state in its image. Although intended as a statement on “the future of Egypt”, its propositions are likely to have an impact on other Muslim countries where the relationship between state and religion is in question.
“This is the first comprehensive declaration about specific matters that are the subject of dispute,” said Gamal al-Ghitani, a novelist who took part in forging the document. “Al-Azhar is siding with modernity and rejecting the concept of the theocratic state. This is something like a bill of basic rights which speaks to Muslims everywhere.”
To “regain its original intellectual role, and global influence”, al-Azhar also makes a bid for independence from the Egyptian state in the same document. Fettered by government control for more than half a century, the institution is seeking a return to an old system under which the Grand Imam was elected by senior religious scholars, and not appointed by the president.
Significantly the Azhar document does not call for the application of sharia law, but says that laws would be based on “the principles of Islamic law” – widely interpreted as the universal values of freedom, justice and equality.
It also insists that legislation is the job of elected representatives, an apparent response to more extreme voices who claim that democracy is incompatible with Islam, and say that legislating through an elected assembly is sinful because it replaces God’s law with people’s law.
Alongside, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood – expected to do well in the next election – a vocal Salafi current has emerged in the turmoil of Egypt’s transition. It espouses an ultraconservative interpretation of religion similar to that of Saudi Arabia.
A heated and highly polarised debate has raged in recent weeks raising fears of a deepening fracture in society between those who would like to see the country go in a more Islamist direction, and others who fear a slide towards the imposition of a strict form of Islamic rule.
Mahmoud Azab, the spokesman of al-Azhar, said his institution aimed at reassuring the Egyptian public using language it understood.
“Egyptians are afraid they would come under the rule of an autocratic theocracy,” he said. “Domestic and international fears are justified because of some of the calls we are now hearing. But we are telling people our religion does not include rule by a theocratic state.”
The document also addresses the fears of the Coptic Christian minority – an estimated 10 per cent of the population – that in the future they could become second class citizens.
It says: “The exploitation of religion and its use to create division, conflict and enmity between citizens should be criminalised. Inciting religious discrimination or sectarian and chauvinistic tendencies should be considered a crime against the nation.”
Rashad Bayoumi, the deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood told the Financial Times the document was “exemplary”.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/56ac8782 ... z1QCt4WNRp
There is a related video summarizing the article linked at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world ... s&emc=tha2
September 29, 2011
Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State
By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
CAIRO — By force of this year’s Arab revolts and revolutions, activists marching under the banner of Islam are on the verge of a reckoning decades in the making: the prospect of achieving decisive power across the region has unleashed an unprecedented debate over the character of the emerging political orders they are helping to build.
Few question the coming electoral success of religious activists, but as they emerge from the shadows of a long, sometimes bloody struggle with authoritarian and ostensibly secular governments, they are confronting newly urgent questions about how to apply Islamic precepts to more open societies with very concrete needs.
In Turkey and Tunisia, culturally conservative parties founded on Islamic principles are rejecting the name “Islamist” to stake out what they see as a more democratic and tolerant vision.
In Egypt, a similar impulse has begun to fracture the Muslim Brotherhood as a growing number of politicians and parties argue for a model inspired by Turkey, where a party with roots in political Islam has thrived in a once-adamantly secular system. Some contend that the absolute monarchy of puritanical Saudi Arabia in fact violates Islamic law.
A backlash has ensued, as well, as traditionalists have flirted with timeworn Islamist ideas like imposing interest-free banking and obligatory religious taxes and censoring irreligious discourse.
The debates are deep enough that many in the region believe that the most important struggles may no longer occur between Islamists and secularists, but rather among the Islamists themselves, pitting the more puritanical against the more liberal.
“That’s the struggle of the future,” said Azzam Tamimi, a scholar and the author of a biography of a Tunisian Islamist, Rachid Ghannouchi, whose party, Ennahda, is expected to dominate elections next month to choose an assembly to draft a constitution. “The real struggle of the future will be about who is capable of fulfilling the desires of a devout public. It’s going to be about who is Islamist and who is more Islamist, rather than about the secularists and the Islamists.”
The moment is as dramatic as any in recent decades in the Arab world, as autocracies crumble and suddenly vibrant parties begin building a new order, starting with elections in Tunisia in October, then Egypt in November. Though the region has witnessed examples of ventures by Islamists into politics, elections in Egypt and Tunisia, attempts in Libya to build a state almost from scratch and the shaping of an alternative to Syria’s dictatorship are their most forceful entry yet into the region’s still embryonic body politic.
“It is a turning point,” said Emad Shahin, a scholar on Islamic law and politics at the University of Notre Dame who was in Cairo.
At the center of the debates is a new breed of politician who has risen from an Islamist milieu but accepts an essentially secular state, a current that some scholars have already taken to identifying as “post Islamist.” Its foremost exemplars are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey, whose intellectuals speak of a shared experience and a common heritage with some of the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. Like Turkey, Tunisia faced decades of a state-enforced secularism that never completely reconciled itself with a conservative population.
“They feel at home with each other,” said Cengiz Candar, an Arabic-speaking Turkish columnist. “It’s similar terms of reference, and they can easily communicate with them.”
Mr. Ghannouchi, the Tunisian Islamist, has suggested a common ambition, proposing what some say Mr. Erdogan’s party has managed to achieve: a prosperous, democratic Muslim state, led by a party that is deeply religious but operates within a system that is supposed to protect liberties. (That is the notion, at least — Mr. Erdogan’s critics accuse him of a pronounced streak of authoritarianism.)
“If the Islamic spectrum goes from Bin Laden to Erdogan, which of them is Islam?” Mr. Ghannouchi asked in a recent debate with a secular critic. “Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models, models that combine Islam and modernity?”
The notion of an Arab post-Islamism is not confined to Tunisia. In Libya, Ali Sallabi, the most important Islamist political leader, cites Mr. Ghannouchi as a major influence. Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who is running for president in Egypt, has joined several new breakaway political parties in arguing that the state should avoid interpreting or enforcing Islamic law, regulating religious taxes or barring a person from running for president based on gender or religion.
A party formed by three leaders of the Brotherhood’s youth wing says that while Egypt shares a common Arab and Islamic culture with the region, its emerging political system should ensure protections of individual freedoms as robust as the West’s. In an interview, one of them, Islam Lotfy, argued that the strictly religious kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the Koran is ostensibly the constitution, was less Islamist than Turkey. “It is not Islamist; it is dictatorship,” said Mr. Lotfy, who was recently expelled from the Brotherhood for starting the new party.
Egypt’s Center Party, a group that struggled for 16 years to win a license from the ousted government, may go furthest here in elaborating the notion of post-Islamism. Its founder, Abul-Ela Madi, has long sought to mediate between religious and liberal forces, even coming up with a set of shared principles last month. Like the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, he disavows the term “Islamist,” and like other progressive Islamic activists, he describes his group as Egypt’s closest equivalent of Mr. Erdogan’s party.
“We’re neither secular nor Islamist,” he said. “We’re in between.”
It is often heard in Turkey that the country’s political system, until recently dominated by the military, moderated Islamic currents there. Mr. Lotfy said he hoped that Egyptian Islamists would undergo a similar, election-driven evolution, though activists themselves cautioned against drawing too close a comparison. “They went to the streets and they learned that the public was not just worried about the hijab” — the veil — “but about corruption,” he said. “If every woman in Turkey wore the hijab, it would not be a great country. It takes economic development.”
Compared with the situation in Turkey, the stakes of the debates may be even higher in the Arab world, where divided and weak liberal currents pale before the organization and popularity of Islamic activists.
In Syria, debates still rage among activists over whether a civil or Islamic state should follow the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, if he falls. The emergence in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria of Salafists, the most inflexible currents in political Islam, is one of the most striking political developments in those societies. (“The Koran is our constitution,” goes one of their sayings.)
And the most powerful current in Egypt, still represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, has stubbornly resisted some of the changes in discourse.
When Mr. Erdogan expressed hope for “a secular state in Egypt,” meaning, he explained, a state equidistant from all faiths, Brotherhood leaders immediately lashed out, saying that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey offered no model for either Egypt or its Islamists.
A Brotherhood spokesman, Mahmoud Ghozlan, accused Turkey of violating Islamic law by failing to criminalize adultery. “In the secularist system, this is accepted, and the laws protect the adulterer,” he said, “But in the Shariah law this is a crime.”
As recently as 2007, a prototype Brotherhood platform sought to bar women or Christians from serving as Egypt’s president and called for a panel of religious scholars to advise on the compliance of any legislation with Islamic law. The group has never disavowed the document. Its rhetoric of Islam’s long tolerance of minorities often sounds condescending to Egypt’s Christian minority, which wants to be afforded equal citizenship, not special protections. The Brotherhood’s new party has called for a special surtax on Muslims to enforce charitable giving.
Indeed, Mr. Tamimi, the scholar, argued that some mainstream groups like the Brotherhood, were feeling the tug of their increasingly assertive conservative constituencies, which still relentlessly call for censorship and interest-free banking.
“Is democracy the voice of the majority?” asked Mohammed Nadi, a 26-year-old student at a recent Salafist protest in Cairo. “We as Islamists are the majority. Why do they want to impose on us the views of the minorities — the liberals and the secularists? That’s all I want to know.”
Anthony Shadid reported from Cairo, and Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli, Libya. Heba Afify contributed reporting from Cairo.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world ... s&emc=tha2
September 29, 2011
Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State
By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
CAIRO — By force of this year’s Arab revolts and revolutions, activists marching under the banner of Islam are on the verge of a reckoning decades in the making: the prospect of achieving decisive power across the region has unleashed an unprecedented debate over the character of the emerging political orders they are helping to build.
Few question the coming electoral success of religious activists, but as they emerge from the shadows of a long, sometimes bloody struggle with authoritarian and ostensibly secular governments, they are confronting newly urgent questions about how to apply Islamic precepts to more open societies with very concrete needs.
In Turkey and Tunisia, culturally conservative parties founded on Islamic principles are rejecting the name “Islamist” to stake out what they see as a more democratic and tolerant vision.
In Egypt, a similar impulse has begun to fracture the Muslim Brotherhood as a growing number of politicians and parties argue for a model inspired by Turkey, where a party with roots in political Islam has thrived in a once-adamantly secular system. Some contend that the absolute monarchy of puritanical Saudi Arabia in fact violates Islamic law.
A backlash has ensued, as well, as traditionalists have flirted with timeworn Islamist ideas like imposing interest-free banking and obligatory religious taxes and censoring irreligious discourse.
The debates are deep enough that many in the region believe that the most important struggles may no longer occur between Islamists and secularists, but rather among the Islamists themselves, pitting the more puritanical against the more liberal.
“That’s the struggle of the future,” said Azzam Tamimi, a scholar and the author of a biography of a Tunisian Islamist, Rachid Ghannouchi, whose party, Ennahda, is expected to dominate elections next month to choose an assembly to draft a constitution. “The real struggle of the future will be about who is capable of fulfilling the desires of a devout public. It’s going to be about who is Islamist and who is more Islamist, rather than about the secularists and the Islamists.”
The moment is as dramatic as any in recent decades in the Arab world, as autocracies crumble and suddenly vibrant parties begin building a new order, starting with elections in Tunisia in October, then Egypt in November. Though the region has witnessed examples of ventures by Islamists into politics, elections in Egypt and Tunisia, attempts in Libya to build a state almost from scratch and the shaping of an alternative to Syria’s dictatorship are their most forceful entry yet into the region’s still embryonic body politic.
“It is a turning point,” said Emad Shahin, a scholar on Islamic law and politics at the University of Notre Dame who was in Cairo.
At the center of the debates is a new breed of politician who has risen from an Islamist milieu but accepts an essentially secular state, a current that some scholars have already taken to identifying as “post Islamist.” Its foremost exemplars are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey, whose intellectuals speak of a shared experience and a common heritage with some of the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. Like Turkey, Tunisia faced decades of a state-enforced secularism that never completely reconciled itself with a conservative population.
“They feel at home with each other,” said Cengiz Candar, an Arabic-speaking Turkish columnist. “It’s similar terms of reference, and they can easily communicate with them.”
Mr. Ghannouchi, the Tunisian Islamist, has suggested a common ambition, proposing what some say Mr. Erdogan’s party has managed to achieve: a prosperous, democratic Muslim state, led by a party that is deeply religious but operates within a system that is supposed to protect liberties. (That is the notion, at least — Mr. Erdogan’s critics accuse him of a pronounced streak of authoritarianism.)
“If the Islamic spectrum goes from Bin Laden to Erdogan, which of them is Islam?” Mr. Ghannouchi asked in a recent debate with a secular critic. “Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models, models that combine Islam and modernity?”
The notion of an Arab post-Islamism is not confined to Tunisia. In Libya, Ali Sallabi, the most important Islamist political leader, cites Mr. Ghannouchi as a major influence. Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who is running for president in Egypt, has joined several new breakaway political parties in arguing that the state should avoid interpreting or enforcing Islamic law, regulating religious taxes or barring a person from running for president based on gender or religion.
A party formed by three leaders of the Brotherhood’s youth wing says that while Egypt shares a common Arab and Islamic culture with the region, its emerging political system should ensure protections of individual freedoms as robust as the West’s. In an interview, one of them, Islam Lotfy, argued that the strictly religious kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the Koran is ostensibly the constitution, was less Islamist than Turkey. “It is not Islamist; it is dictatorship,” said Mr. Lotfy, who was recently expelled from the Brotherhood for starting the new party.
Egypt’s Center Party, a group that struggled for 16 years to win a license from the ousted government, may go furthest here in elaborating the notion of post-Islamism. Its founder, Abul-Ela Madi, has long sought to mediate between religious and liberal forces, even coming up with a set of shared principles last month. Like the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, he disavows the term “Islamist,” and like other progressive Islamic activists, he describes his group as Egypt’s closest equivalent of Mr. Erdogan’s party.
“We’re neither secular nor Islamist,” he said. “We’re in between.”
It is often heard in Turkey that the country’s political system, until recently dominated by the military, moderated Islamic currents there. Mr. Lotfy said he hoped that Egyptian Islamists would undergo a similar, election-driven evolution, though activists themselves cautioned against drawing too close a comparison. “They went to the streets and they learned that the public was not just worried about the hijab” — the veil — “but about corruption,” he said. “If every woman in Turkey wore the hijab, it would not be a great country. It takes economic development.”
Compared with the situation in Turkey, the stakes of the debates may be even higher in the Arab world, where divided and weak liberal currents pale before the organization and popularity of Islamic activists.
In Syria, debates still rage among activists over whether a civil or Islamic state should follow the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, if he falls. The emergence in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria of Salafists, the most inflexible currents in political Islam, is one of the most striking political developments in those societies. (“The Koran is our constitution,” goes one of their sayings.)
And the most powerful current in Egypt, still represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, has stubbornly resisted some of the changes in discourse.
When Mr. Erdogan expressed hope for “a secular state in Egypt,” meaning, he explained, a state equidistant from all faiths, Brotherhood leaders immediately lashed out, saying that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey offered no model for either Egypt or its Islamists.
A Brotherhood spokesman, Mahmoud Ghozlan, accused Turkey of violating Islamic law by failing to criminalize adultery. “In the secularist system, this is accepted, and the laws protect the adulterer,” he said, “But in the Shariah law this is a crime.”
As recently as 2007, a prototype Brotherhood platform sought to bar women or Christians from serving as Egypt’s president and called for a panel of religious scholars to advise on the compliance of any legislation with Islamic law. The group has never disavowed the document. Its rhetoric of Islam’s long tolerance of minorities often sounds condescending to Egypt’s Christian minority, which wants to be afforded equal citizenship, not special protections. The Brotherhood’s new party has called for a special surtax on Muslims to enforce charitable giving.
Indeed, Mr. Tamimi, the scholar, argued that some mainstream groups like the Brotherhood, were feeling the tug of their increasingly assertive conservative constituencies, which still relentlessly call for censorship and interest-free banking.
“Is democracy the voice of the majority?” asked Mohammed Nadi, a 26-year-old student at a recent Salafist protest in Cairo. “We as Islamists are the majority. Why do they want to impose on us the views of the minorities — the liberals and the secularists? That’s all I want to know.”
Anthony Shadid reported from Cairo, and Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli, Libya. Heba Afify contributed reporting from Cairo.
November 2, 2011
The Overblown Islamist Threat
By MARWAN MUASHER
Washington
Tunisia’s election last month, in which the Islamist party Ennahda claimed more than 40 percent of the seats in the national assembly, reinforced the conventional wisdom that Islamists will be the biggest beneficiaries of the Arab Spring.
Held down for years by autocratic regimes, so the argument goes, Islamists will be able to exploit their popularity in new elections and ultimately gain control. This raises fears among secular leaders in the region and in Western capitals.
The West wants to pretend that Islamist parties don’t really exist. This won’t work. Political Islam will not go away because the West ignores it; Islamist parties will, however, become more moderate if they are included in government.
Islamists are unlikely to take over new governments in the Arab world, and seeking to prevent Islamist parties from participating in governance would actually be counterproductive for several reasons.
First, Islamists are not stupid. Arab countries face daunting challenges and whoever governs them will need to tackle tremendous political and economic problems. Islamists don’t want to be blamed for the mess. In Tunisia, Ennahda has made it clear that it’s uninterested in ruling the country alone.
Second, Islamists are not as popular as Western pundits and policy makers think. Political Islam benefited from closed authoritarian systems throughout the Arab world because there was no alternative; they were the only viable political opposition. Although Islamists in Egypt and Jordan enjoy no more than 15 to 20 percent of the popular vote, they are seen to have much wider influence on the street.
Regimes couldn’t totally crack down on Islamists given the power of the mosques, so people unhappy with the status quo tended to cast protest votes in favor of Islamist parties. Now there are other options and new political parties will take some of the opposition votes away from Islamists.
Third, the vast majority of protesters are not seeking to replace autocratic regimes with religious theocracies. Arabs — especially the young people and secular liberals who poured into the streets earlier this year — are not going to be satisfied with hard-line ideological regimes. Islam as a solution is not enough for them; people want jobs and better lives and will demand results.
Moderate Arab countries like Jordan have included Islamists in governments in the past. When Islamists were brought into the Jordanian government in 1990, they tried to introduce segregation between fathers and their daughters at school events. This backfired and citizens simply refused to go along with it. Jordan’s Islamists quickly backed down and dropped the demand. Political inclusion, it turned out, had a moderating effect on Islamists.
Islamists have proved to be no better or worse than any other party in government. The best way to deal with Islamist parties, therefore, is to include them in government and hold them accountable.
In Tunisia, Ennahda has already said that it will respect personal rights and that the veil is a woman’s choice. Ennahda understands that it can’t ignore the secular part of the electorate. If the party wants to be as successful in Tunisia’s next election after a new constitution has been written, it knows it needs to present moderate views.
Over the next few years, other parties will have a chance to develop in Tunisia and Islamists are likely to get a lower percentage of the vote next time around. They will start winning votes in relation to their actual strength on the ground. While they may be part of leading coalitions in various countries, they are unlikely to gain power outright in any country.
In order to ensure peaceful political competition between Islamists and other political parties, the new Arab democracies need to enshrine two principles in their new constitutions: pluralism and a peaceful political landscape that is free of armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Pluralism would ensure that neither Islamists nor anyone else could come to power and then deny the right of political organization to others. And peaceful transfers of power are essential for any stable democracy.
Countries in transition have no choice but to open up the political system. Excluding and marginalizing Islamists out of fear will only strengthen their appeal.
Marwan Muasher, the former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan, is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: November 3, 2011
An earlier version of this op-ed misidentified the author’s former position in Jordan. He was a deputy prime minister, not a deputy president.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/opini ... n&emc=tya3
The Overblown Islamist Threat
By MARWAN MUASHER
Washington
Tunisia’s election last month, in which the Islamist party Ennahda claimed more than 40 percent of the seats in the national assembly, reinforced the conventional wisdom that Islamists will be the biggest beneficiaries of the Arab Spring.
Held down for years by autocratic regimes, so the argument goes, Islamists will be able to exploit their popularity in new elections and ultimately gain control. This raises fears among secular leaders in the region and in Western capitals.
The West wants to pretend that Islamist parties don’t really exist. This won’t work. Political Islam will not go away because the West ignores it; Islamist parties will, however, become more moderate if they are included in government.
Islamists are unlikely to take over new governments in the Arab world, and seeking to prevent Islamist parties from participating in governance would actually be counterproductive for several reasons.
First, Islamists are not stupid. Arab countries face daunting challenges and whoever governs them will need to tackle tremendous political and economic problems. Islamists don’t want to be blamed for the mess. In Tunisia, Ennahda has made it clear that it’s uninterested in ruling the country alone.
Second, Islamists are not as popular as Western pundits and policy makers think. Political Islam benefited from closed authoritarian systems throughout the Arab world because there was no alternative; they were the only viable political opposition. Although Islamists in Egypt and Jordan enjoy no more than 15 to 20 percent of the popular vote, they are seen to have much wider influence on the street.
Regimes couldn’t totally crack down on Islamists given the power of the mosques, so people unhappy with the status quo tended to cast protest votes in favor of Islamist parties. Now there are other options and new political parties will take some of the opposition votes away from Islamists.
Third, the vast majority of protesters are not seeking to replace autocratic regimes with religious theocracies. Arabs — especially the young people and secular liberals who poured into the streets earlier this year — are not going to be satisfied with hard-line ideological regimes. Islam as a solution is not enough for them; people want jobs and better lives and will demand results.
Moderate Arab countries like Jordan have included Islamists in governments in the past. When Islamists were brought into the Jordanian government in 1990, they tried to introduce segregation between fathers and their daughters at school events. This backfired and citizens simply refused to go along with it. Jordan’s Islamists quickly backed down and dropped the demand. Political inclusion, it turned out, had a moderating effect on Islamists.
Islamists have proved to be no better or worse than any other party in government. The best way to deal with Islamist parties, therefore, is to include them in government and hold them accountable.
In Tunisia, Ennahda has already said that it will respect personal rights and that the veil is a woman’s choice. Ennahda understands that it can’t ignore the secular part of the electorate. If the party wants to be as successful in Tunisia’s next election after a new constitution has been written, it knows it needs to present moderate views.
Over the next few years, other parties will have a chance to develop in Tunisia and Islamists are likely to get a lower percentage of the vote next time around. They will start winning votes in relation to their actual strength on the ground. While they may be part of leading coalitions in various countries, they are unlikely to gain power outright in any country.
In order to ensure peaceful political competition between Islamists and other political parties, the new Arab democracies need to enshrine two principles in their new constitutions: pluralism and a peaceful political landscape that is free of armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Pluralism would ensure that neither Islamists nor anyone else could come to power and then deny the right of political organization to others. And peaceful transfers of power are essential for any stable democracy.
Countries in transition have no choice but to open up the political system. Excluding and marginalizing Islamists out of fear will only strengthen their appeal.
Marwan Muasher, the former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan, is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: November 3, 2011
An earlier version of this op-ed misidentified the author’s former position in Jordan. He was a deputy prime minister, not a deputy president.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/opini ... n&emc=tya3
May 13, 2012
Can Islamists Be Liberals?
By MUSTAFA AKYOL
Istanbul
FOR years, foreign policy discussions have focused on the question of whether Islam is compatible with democracy. But this is becoming passé. In Tunisia and Egypt, Islamists, who were long perceived as opponents of the democratic system, are now promoting and joyfully participating in it. Even the ultra-Orthodox Salafis now have deputies sitting in the Egyptian Parliament, thanks to the ballots that they, until very recently, denounced as heresy.
For those concerned about extremism in the Middle East, this is good news. It was the exclusion and suppression of Islamists by secular tyrants that originally bred extremism. (Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda’s leading ideologue, was a veteran of Hosni Mubarak’s torture chambers.) Islamists will become only more moderate when they are not oppressed, and only more pragmatic as they face the responsibility of governing.
But there is another reason for concern: What if elected Islamist parties impose laws that curb individual freedoms — like banning alcohol or executing converts — all with popular support? What if democracy does not serve liberty?
This question is seldom asked in the West, where democracy is often seen as synonymous with liberalism. However, as Fareed Zakaria warned in his 2003 book “The Future of Freedom,” there are illiberal democracies, too, where the majority’s power isn’t checked by constitutional liberalism, and the rights and freedoms of all citizens are not secured. This is a risk for the post-Arab Spring countries, and even for post-Kemalist Turkey. The real debate, therefore, is whether Islam is compatible with liberalism.
The main bone of contention is whether Islamic injunctions are legal or moral categories. When Muslims say Islam commands daily prayers or bans alcohol, are they talking about public obligations that will be enforced by the state or personal ones that will be judged by God?
For those who believe the former, Saudi Arabia might look like the ideal state. Its religious police ensure that every Saudi observes every rule that is deemed Islamic: women are forced to cover themselves, men are forced to frequent the mosque, and everyone is barred from anything considered sinful. Yet members of the Saudi elite are also famous for trips abroad, where they hit wild nightclubs to commit the sins they can’t at home. And while this is their civil right, it raises the question of whether Saudi Arabia’s intense piety is hypocritical.
By contrast, rather than imposing Islamic practices, the ultra-secular Turkish Republic has for decades aggressively discouraged them, going so far as to ban head scarves. Yet Turkish society has remained resolutely religious, thanks to family, tradition, community and religious leaders. Hence in today’s Turkey, where one has the freedom to choose between the bar and the mosque, many choose the latter — based on their own consciences, not the dictates of the state.
Yet even in Turkey, where democracy is rapidly being consolidated under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known as A.K.P., there are reasons to worry that illiberal democracy could emerge. For Turkey still suffers from a paranoid nationalism that abhors minority rights, a heavy-handed judiciary designed to protect the state rather than its citizens, and an intolerant political culture that regards any criticism as an attack and sees provocative ideas as criminal.
These obstacles to liberal democracy are unrelated to religion though; they are the legacy of years of secular but authoritarian politics. But the A.K.P., which has been in power for almost a decade and has introduced important liberal reforms, has lately let its progressivism wane. The party has absorbed some of the traditional illiberalism of the establishment in Ankara, the capital, that it now fully dominates. It has not been too Islamic; it is just proving to be too Turkish.
As the A.K.P.’s rule empowers Turkey’s religiously conservative majority, it is imperative that the new elite liberalize the political system, rather than simply co-opt it for their own advantage. And as new questions about religion and public life emerge — Should schools promote Islam? Should alcohol sales be restricted? Should the state instruct private TV channels to uphold “moral values”? — the government must protect civil liberties, including the “freedom to sin,” and constrain those who seek to use state power to impose their values on others.
If Turkey succeeds in that liberal experiment, and drafts its new constitution-in-the-making accordingly, it can set a promising example for Islamist-led governments in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere. All of these countries desperately need not only procedural democracy, but also liberalism. And there is an Islamic rationale for it as well: Imposed religiosity leads to hypocrisy. Those who hope to nurture genuine religiosity should first establish liberty.
Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish journalist, is the author of “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opini ... y_20120514
Can Islamists Be Liberals?
By MUSTAFA AKYOL
Istanbul
FOR years, foreign policy discussions have focused on the question of whether Islam is compatible with democracy. But this is becoming passé. In Tunisia and Egypt, Islamists, who were long perceived as opponents of the democratic system, are now promoting and joyfully participating in it. Even the ultra-Orthodox Salafis now have deputies sitting in the Egyptian Parliament, thanks to the ballots that they, until very recently, denounced as heresy.
For those concerned about extremism in the Middle East, this is good news. It was the exclusion and suppression of Islamists by secular tyrants that originally bred extremism. (Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda’s leading ideologue, was a veteran of Hosni Mubarak’s torture chambers.) Islamists will become only more moderate when they are not oppressed, and only more pragmatic as they face the responsibility of governing.
But there is another reason for concern: What if elected Islamist parties impose laws that curb individual freedoms — like banning alcohol or executing converts — all with popular support? What if democracy does not serve liberty?
This question is seldom asked in the West, where democracy is often seen as synonymous with liberalism. However, as Fareed Zakaria warned in his 2003 book “The Future of Freedom,” there are illiberal democracies, too, where the majority’s power isn’t checked by constitutional liberalism, and the rights and freedoms of all citizens are not secured. This is a risk for the post-Arab Spring countries, and even for post-Kemalist Turkey. The real debate, therefore, is whether Islam is compatible with liberalism.
The main bone of contention is whether Islamic injunctions are legal or moral categories. When Muslims say Islam commands daily prayers or bans alcohol, are they talking about public obligations that will be enforced by the state or personal ones that will be judged by God?
For those who believe the former, Saudi Arabia might look like the ideal state. Its religious police ensure that every Saudi observes every rule that is deemed Islamic: women are forced to cover themselves, men are forced to frequent the mosque, and everyone is barred from anything considered sinful. Yet members of the Saudi elite are also famous for trips abroad, where they hit wild nightclubs to commit the sins they can’t at home. And while this is their civil right, it raises the question of whether Saudi Arabia’s intense piety is hypocritical.
By contrast, rather than imposing Islamic practices, the ultra-secular Turkish Republic has for decades aggressively discouraged them, going so far as to ban head scarves. Yet Turkish society has remained resolutely religious, thanks to family, tradition, community and religious leaders. Hence in today’s Turkey, where one has the freedom to choose between the bar and the mosque, many choose the latter — based on their own consciences, not the dictates of the state.
Yet even in Turkey, where democracy is rapidly being consolidated under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known as A.K.P., there are reasons to worry that illiberal democracy could emerge. For Turkey still suffers from a paranoid nationalism that abhors minority rights, a heavy-handed judiciary designed to protect the state rather than its citizens, and an intolerant political culture that regards any criticism as an attack and sees provocative ideas as criminal.
These obstacles to liberal democracy are unrelated to religion though; they are the legacy of years of secular but authoritarian politics. But the A.K.P., which has been in power for almost a decade and has introduced important liberal reforms, has lately let its progressivism wane. The party has absorbed some of the traditional illiberalism of the establishment in Ankara, the capital, that it now fully dominates. It has not been too Islamic; it is just proving to be too Turkish.
As the A.K.P.’s rule empowers Turkey’s religiously conservative majority, it is imperative that the new elite liberalize the political system, rather than simply co-opt it for their own advantage. And as new questions about religion and public life emerge — Should schools promote Islam? Should alcohol sales be restricted? Should the state instruct private TV channels to uphold “moral values”? — the government must protect civil liberties, including the “freedom to sin,” and constrain those who seek to use state power to impose their values on others.
If Turkey succeeds in that liberal experiment, and drafts its new constitution-in-the-making accordingly, it can set a promising example for Islamist-led governments in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere. All of these countries desperately need not only procedural democracy, but also liberalism. And there is an Islamic rationale for it as well: Imposed religiosity leads to hypocrisy. Those who hope to nurture genuine religiosity should first establish liberty.
Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish journalist, is the author of “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opini ... y_20120514
Turkey Promotes Religious Schools, Often Defying Parents
"Education has become the latest front in Turkey’s cultural wars, pitting the country’s tradition of secularism against the religious mores of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist allies. The tensions underscore the way Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has gradually injected religion into public life over the past 12 years in an effort to reshape Turkish society."
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world ... d=45305309
"Education has become the latest front in Turkey’s cultural wars, pitting the country’s tradition of secularism against the religious mores of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist allies. The tensions underscore the way Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has gradually injected religion into public life over the past 12 years in an effort to reshape Turkish society."
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world ... d=45305309
Egypt’s President Turns to Religion to Bolster His Authority
CAIRO — When President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi opened a much-heralded extension to the Suez Canal in August, the official Friday Prayer sermon that week hailed it as a “gift from God.”
When Egyptian voters elected a new Parliament in December, a preacher on state TV urged its members to “obey those in authority, specifically the highest authority,” and referred indirectly to Mr. Sisi as “God’s shadow on earth.”
And when a Russian airplane leaving the Sharm el Sheik resort crashed in the Sinai Desert in October, killing 224 people and crippling Egyptian tourism, the Ministry of Religious Endowments encouraged clerics to vacation at the deserted resort — notable because many observant Muslims here view it as a sinful fleshpot.
Fears of Islamist rule helped propel Mr. Sisi, then a military general, to power in 2013 following giant protests that led to the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government. But as Mr. Sisi wrestles with militant attacks and a struggling economy, he has increasingly turned to religion to bolster his authority and justify a crackdown on his rivals.
In the latest decree, the Ministry of Religious Endowments on Monday instructed preachers that any call to protest on Jan. 25, the fifth anniversary of the revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak, would lead to “sabotage, murder and destruction,” and constituted a “full crime.”
Such tactics are not novel: Arab leaders have tried for decades to use Islam to boost their legitimacy. Mr. Sisi, the former head of the armed forces, has also presented himself as a reformer, calling publicly for a “religious revolution” to help combat extremism. But rather than spurring discussion about Islam, his approach — shutting unregistered mosques and banning unauthorized preachers while drawing the religious establishment into an uneasy embrace — has had the effect of constricting the debate here.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world ... d=71987722
CAIRO — When President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi opened a much-heralded extension to the Suez Canal in August, the official Friday Prayer sermon that week hailed it as a “gift from God.”
When Egyptian voters elected a new Parliament in December, a preacher on state TV urged its members to “obey those in authority, specifically the highest authority,” and referred indirectly to Mr. Sisi as “God’s shadow on earth.”
And when a Russian airplane leaving the Sharm el Sheik resort crashed in the Sinai Desert in October, killing 224 people and crippling Egyptian tourism, the Ministry of Religious Endowments encouraged clerics to vacation at the deserted resort — notable because many observant Muslims here view it as a sinful fleshpot.
Fears of Islamist rule helped propel Mr. Sisi, then a military general, to power in 2013 following giant protests that led to the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government. But as Mr. Sisi wrestles with militant attacks and a struggling economy, he has increasingly turned to religion to bolster his authority and justify a crackdown on his rivals.
In the latest decree, the Ministry of Religious Endowments on Monday instructed preachers that any call to protest on Jan. 25, the fifth anniversary of the revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak, would lead to “sabotage, murder and destruction,” and constituted a “full crime.”
Such tactics are not novel: Arab leaders have tried for decades to use Islam to boost their legitimacy. Mr. Sisi, the former head of the armed forces, has also presented himself as a reformer, calling publicly for a “religious revolution” to help combat extremism. But rather than spurring discussion about Islam, his approach — shutting unregistered mosques and banning unauthorized preachers while drawing the religious establishment into an uneasy embrace — has had the effect of constricting the debate here.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world ... d=71987722
Prince Alykhan in his address to the United Nations http://ismaili.net/timeline/1958/19580527ic.html explained the fundamental principles upon which Pakistan was founded.
"Pakistan, with a personality of its own in the Moslem world, calls itself an Islamic Republic, in the sense that the overwhelming majority of its people, are of the Moslem faith and aspire to a social and political order based on justice and equality, in accordance with the spirit of the injunctions of Islam that I have quoted. The appellation "Islamic" however, does not imply that Pakistan is a theocratic State, run by religious fanatics who seek to reduce the non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan to the status of inferior citizens. The relevant provision of our Constitution, under which Pakistan became a democratic Republic on the 23rd of March 1956, lays down: "Section 5 (1): All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law."
.....
The leaders of the Government of Pakistan are liberal and enlightened men, responsible to a freely elected Parliament in accordance with the popular will. They function entirely within the framework of the Constitution and laws of Pakistan. I am well aware that the people of the United States are deeply committed to the doctrine of separation of church and state. We, in Pakistan do not have an established church as such. Basically, the fundamental values and virtues which you cherish and try to practice in the United States, are virtually identical with those we believe in and try to practice in Pakistan."
The article below seems to violate the fundamental basis of Pakistan.
Bill banning child marriage fails in Pakistan after it’s deemed ‘un-Islamic’
Pakistani lawmakers had to withdraw a bill aimed at curbing the practice of child marriage after a prominent religious body declared the legislation un-Islamic.
The bill, which proposed raising the marriage age for females from 16 to 18, also called for harsher penalties for those who would arrange marriages involving children. Despite the laws in place, child marriages, particularly involving young female brides, are common in parts of the country. It's estimated that some 20 percent of girls in the country are married before they turn 18.
But the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutional body which gives advice to parliament on the compatibility of laws with Sharia, appeared to slap down the legislation after deeming it "un-Islamic" and "blasphemous," according to Agence France Presse. It had already handed down a similar ruling in 2014.
More....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wor ... ?tid=sm_fb
"Pakistan, with a personality of its own in the Moslem world, calls itself an Islamic Republic, in the sense that the overwhelming majority of its people, are of the Moslem faith and aspire to a social and political order based on justice and equality, in accordance with the spirit of the injunctions of Islam that I have quoted. The appellation "Islamic" however, does not imply that Pakistan is a theocratic State, run by religious fanatics who seek to reduce the non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan to the status of inferior citizens. The relevant provision of our Constitution, under which Pakistan became a democratic Republic on the 23rd of March 1956, lays down: "Section 5 (1): All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law."
.....
The leaders of the Government of Pakistan are liberal and enlightened men, responsible to a freely elected Parliament in accordance with the popular will. They function entirely within the framework of the Constitution and laws of Pakistan. I am well aware that the people of the United States are deeply committed to the doctrine of separation of church and state. We, in Pakistan do not have an established church as such. Basically, the fundamental values and virtues which you cherish and try to practice in the United States, are virtually identical with those we believe in and try to practice in Pakistan."
The article below seems to violate the fundamental basis of Pakistan.
Bill banning child marriage fails in Pakistan after it’s deemed ‘un-Islamic’
Pakistani lawmakers had to withdraw a bill aimed at curbing the practice of child marriage after a prominent religious body declared the legislation un-Islamic.
The bill, which proposed raising the marriage age for females from 16 to 18, also called for harsher penalties for those who would arrange marriages involving children. Despite the laws in place, child marriages, particularly involving young female brides, are common in parts of the country. It's estimated that some 20 percent of girls in the country are married before they turn 18.
But the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutional body which gives advice to parliament on the compatibility of laws with Sharia, appeared to slap down the legislation after deeming it "un-Islamic" and "blasphemous," according to Agence France Presse. It had already handed down a similar ruling in 2014.
More....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wor ... ?tid=sm_fb